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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the problem of incorporating consumer 
search into equilibrium-in particular with the relationship between oligopoly 
models where consumers search and those which assume perfect information. 
Two chapters consider duality in search. The conventional way of 
expressing a consumer's search strategy is to describe his decision variable 
as a function of the search cost. The dual approach is to find the search cost 
that leaves the consumer just indifferent between two decisions. Since cost is 
continuous this search-cost function is differentiable in more parameters than 
its inverse and so more readily yields comparative static results. Using this 
function it is possible to express the demand facing firms as explicit 
functions of the distribution of consumers search costs. 
The belief is commonly expressed in the literature that adaptive search 
models add little insight compared to the analytically simpler "rational 
expectations" models. It is shown that this is not valid when considering 
equilibrium, as the linkage between prices and consumers' search strategies 
implied by rational expectations affects the reaction functions of 
oligopolistic firms. This point is illustrated in a separate chapter which 
presents a Bayesian search model. 
An equilibrium model allows the number of firms to be determined 
endogenously, and then considers the effect that entry has on efficiency and 
welfare. It is shown that since the monopoly power of firms arises from the 
incomplete information of consumers, and since the amount of search for 
information is endogenous-determined in part by the number of firms-entry 
can reduce efficiency and increase prices. It is also shown that the entry of . 
a specialist dealer (an arbitrager) will generally reduce efficiency, and can 
lead to a wider dispersion of prices as the arbitrager profits from 
arbitraging away the inefficiency that its own presence in the market creates. 
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2 Equilibrium Search a Survey 
PART A: INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER 1: THESIS OVERVIEW 
The now huge literature arising from the seminal article of Stigler 
(1961) has two main branches. The first-what may be termed "pure search 
models"-investigates the information-acquiring behaviour of agents faced with 
uncertainty over the possibilities available in a market. The second branch 
considers market outcomes when the behaviour of firms confronted with 
searching consumers is also modeled. 
Pure search models include the formal model of Stigler's paper, in which 
consumers are assumed to choose the expected-price minimizing number of firms 
sampled from a known distribution of prices. This literature has developed by 
exploring the variations in sampling technique used, the objectives sought, 
and initial information available to the consumer. 
Although these models can explain why consumers do not necessarily buy at 
the lowest available price, they leave open the question of why firms choose 
to charge different prices. In the earliest models incorporating search into a 
partial equilibrium-notably Diamond (1971) - the equilibrium degenerated to a 
single price. Rothschild (1973) challenged economists to develop models which 
produce price dispersion endogenously. Much subsequent literature is a 
response to that challenge, and there are now many ingenious models of 
equilibrium price dispersion. 
As well as explaining price dispersion, models of search in equilibrium 
can be useful for addressing questions about the characteristics of oligo-
polistic markets when there is imperfect information. Here, the existing 
literature is less satisfactory. A major motivation of equilibrium price-
dispersion models has been to find the minimum amount of of heterogeneity that 
can be imposed on the parameters describing agents in a model and still allow 
heterogeneity in prices to be obtained endogenously. As a result, these models 
are really elaborate examples resting on ad-hoc assumptions; it is difficult 
to infer from them general properties of imperfect information. It would be 
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interesting to know, for instance, if the equilibrium properties of search 
vary greatly as different assumptions are made about the search process, or if 
they depend mainly on the universal feature of search models-that consumers 
allocate scarce resources to the purchase of price information in such a way 
that the net benefit is maximized? To address this question, it is necessary 
to consider the demand functions facing firms that arise from search. Pure 
search models have generally been developed independently of the equilibrium 
literature and are rarely of a form that allows tractable demand functions to 
be derived, that not being their objective. 
Generality is an objective of this thesis. The problems involved in 
deriving equilibria from search models are presented more fully in the 
following literature survey. Part B of this thesis (Chapters 3-6) develops 
pure search models where the emphasis is on deriving results relevant to 
equilibrium. Chapter 7, which makes up Part C, is an equilibrium model. It is 
used to make a comparison with perfect-information oligopoly models. In 
particular, the role of a specialist dealer (arbitrager) is considered. As a 
summary of the results, some further directions of research are suggested in 
Part D (Chapter 8). 
Throughout the thesis, the convention is used that propositions describe 
the mathematical properties of models and theorems present economic results. 
Some of the longer mathematical derivations and proofs from Chapters 3, 4, 5, 
and 7, which have no independent economic interest, are placed in the four 
appendices. 
CHAPTER 2: EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH - A SURVEY 
2.1 Introduction. 
This survey is not exhaustive. Four excellent surveys of search models 
already exist: Rothschild (1973), Lippman and McCall (1976), McKenna (1987a), 
and McKenna (1987b). The aim here is to provide a context for the material in 
this thesis. In particular, two branches of search theory, job search and 
general equilibrium search, which are not directly relevant to this objective 
are ignored. Of course, many search models can be interpreted as either 
consumer or job search; the branches become distinct in equilibrium modeling 
where the job search literature has been concerned with macroeconomic issues 
such as the search-theoretic foundations of the natural rate of unemployment. 
Lippman and McCall's is a survey of job search. 
"Equilibrium search" refers here to a class of partial equilibrium models 
concerning the market for a consumer good. This class has the following 
structure: A market for a homogeneous good is characterized by a number of 
firms who each post a price for that good, and by a group of consumers who 
initially do not know the prices posted by any particular firm. Before 
deciding from which firm to buy, consumers can search; that is they can sample 
some firms at a cost to learn the prices posted by those firms. These models 
are concerned with establishing what prices can be posted by firms in an 
equilibrium, and how these are affected by search. 
The demand for each firm depends on its own price through the effect 
price has on individual consumers' demand, and on all firm's prices through 
their effect on consumers' search. The profit function for each firm j is 
given by 
(2-1-1) 
where p . is the vector of all firms' prices except firm j's, ¢.(q.) is the 
-J J J 
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cost function for firm j, and q.(p.,p .) is the expected demand for firm j.l 
J J -J 
The index j can take integer values only (if there are a finite number of 
firms), or it can be a member of a real interval (if there is a continuum of 
firms) . 
The equilibrium definition used is Nash/Bertrand: Each firm chooses its 
price to maximize the profit from expected demand, taking the prices of the 
other firms as given. An equilibrium is then a vector of prices p* such that 
* * IT.(p.,p .) ~ 
J J -J 
II.(p.,p* .) 
J J -J 
v p., V j. 
J 
(2-1-2) 
The model structure given in (2-1-1) and (2-1-2) is equivalent to that of 
product-differentiation models. In those models, price-setting firms can face 
downward-sloping demand functions, as each firm's product is differentiated 
from its competitors. In equilibrium-search models, the good is homogeneous, 
so differences in the prices revealed by search are the only thing disting-
uishing one firm from another for any particular consumer. The information 
that consumers have, however, will vary across consumers following a random 
search process, leading to downward-sloping demand. These models can therefore 
be interpreted as a variant of product differentiation. 
In most product differentiation models, the demand functions are imposed 
rather than derived from consumer behaviour. 2 As a result, assumptions can be 
made about demand directly. This is not possible with equilibrium search: The 
1 
2 
Since search is a random process, each firm's demand is generally a random 
variable. In all the equilibrium models surveyed here, the expected value of 
demand is used to give a deterministic demand function. This is simpler than 
assuming that firms maximize expected profit, which would generally require 
that the full density function of demand be derived. The expected profit 
from demand and the profit from expected demand will only be the same when 
the total-cost function is linear, or when the law of large numbers implies 
that demand has no variance. 
An exception is Rotelling-type models where the differentiation is derived 
from the spatial dispersion of consumers. 
Chapter 2 
particular assumptions made about search place restrictions on the demand 
functions. 
7 
One effect of having to derive demand from consumer behaviour is that it 
is difficult to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium when a standard 
search model is used. This is one reason why the equilibrium-search models 
tend to be special cases: So many assumptions are required to ensure existence 
that few free parameters remain to be used to address general questions. If, 
as has been the case in most equilibrium-search models, the objective of a 
model is to generate price dispersion in equilibrium and so explain search, 
further restrictions are imposed on the model. 
The emphasis in this thesis is on investigating the relationship between 
search and the demand functions facing firms, and on the similarities between 
search models and other forms of product differentiation. The remainder of 
this chapter considers further the problem of generating existence and price 
dispersion, and summarizes the various solutions that have been found. The 
choice of search strategy by consumers is important to these solutions. The 
next section describes the variations that exist in the pure search literature 
that are relevant to equilibrium. Section 2.3 then considers existence, and 
Section 2.4, price dispersion. Finally, Section 2.5 outlines how the remaining 
chapters of the thesis fit into this literature and relate to the points made 
here. 
2.2 Pure Search Models. 
This section describes the original Stigler (1961) search model, and then 
presents other models as variations on it. 
A. Stigler's Model. 
A consumer wishes to buy one unit of a homogeneous good. He faces a 
continuum of prices described by the density function f, defined over some 
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range of prices. The consumer knows f but not the prices charged by particular 
firms. He views any price as a random variable with f(p) as its density. 
Search is the process of realizing a value for this random variable. Stigler 
allowed only fixed-sample-size (FSS) search; that is, the consumer decides in 
advance how many firms to search, and then purchases at the lowest price 
sampled. 
The consumer has a unit search cost for each firm sampled of c. Let g be 
n 
the probability density of the sample-minimum price resulting from a sample 
size of n. The expected total cost to the consumer is then 
(2-2-1) 
where J P'gn(p) dp is the expected minimum cost of the purchase, and nc is the 
cost of acquiring quotations. The consumer is assumed to minimize this value. 
Stigler showed that J P'gn(p) dp is a concave function in n. The solution to 
the consumer's problem is then to choose the largest sample size such that the 
unit search cost does not exceed the marginal benefit, J p' (gn(P)-gn+1 (P)) dp. 
Alternatives to all the major assumptions in this model now exist in the 
search literature. The remainder of this section will present a taxonomy of 
these alternatives rather than of specific models. 
B. Assumptions about Sampling Technique. 
An early reaction to Stigler's model (for example, in McCall (1970) and 
Nelson (1970)) was that, by assuming FSS search, only sub-optimal behaviour by 
consumers was considered. The optimal strategy, it was claimed, is sequential 
search, a strategy in which consumers reconsider whether to continue search 
after every price quotation taken. 3 This allows consumers who receive a low 
3 
The analysis of sequential sampling has a long history in statistical 
decision theory (see De Groot, Chapter 12.1, for a survey of some of this 
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quotation early to avoid wasteful additional search. 
With sequential search, the consumer's problem is to calculate an optimal 
stopping rule. This is a function of the sequence of prices sampled that 
determines whether search should stop or continue after each quotation taken. 
The marginal benefit of taking another quotation is the expected reduction in 
the minimum price sampled. When the distribution of prices is known and only 
one purchase is to be made, the marginal benefit depends only on the minimum 
price already sampled. Let Pi be that sample minimum. The expected reduction 
in the minimum price if a single additional quotation is taken is then 
(2-2-2) 
The simple model has the property of stationarity (the problem looks the 
same after each quotation). As a result of stationarity, it is also myopic 
(the decision to take one more quotation is independent of the possibility of 
future sampling). This provides the reservation price rule: Stop search if and 
only if the lowest price quotation is at or below the reservation price r, 
where r equates the marginal benefit with the marginal cost of a quotation. 
That is, 
M(r) - c. (2-2-3) 
The alleged superiority of sequential over FSS search rests on the 
implicit assumption that there can be no savings from taking several price 
quotations at once. It is easy to find examples where such economies of scale 
exist. If there is a delay between seeking a quotation and receiving it--as 
with putting a contract to tender--and there is discounting, then there are 
material). McCall (1970) was the first to apply it to search. 
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obvious gains to seeking several quotations simultaneously. The decision to 
drive to a many-shop mall within which marginal search is almost cost less can 
also be thought of as a form of FSS search. Morgan and Manning's (1985) model 
allows this generality. In it, consumers choose sample sizes sequentially; 
that is, at each period they must decide whether to continue search, and if so 
how many quotations to seek in the next period. This model allows both FSS and 
sequential search to emerge as special cases. 
A feature of the reservation-price rule and stationarity in the simple 
sequential model is that consumers will always purchase from the last firm 
sampled. In more complicated sequential models, this may not be the case, so 
assumptions are required on the longevity of price offers. With full recall, 
consumers can always purchase from a firm previously sampled; with zero 
recall, they must purchase from the last firm sampled; partial recall 
describes all the possibilities between these two extremes. Less than full 
recall may be realistic in models where the duration of search is important-
for instance with job search. In static consumer models, full recall is a 
natural assumption. 
The distribution of prices faci~g consumers is usually assumed to be 
continuous. Carlson and McAfee (1983) modify sequential search to accommodate 
a discrete distribution of prices. Their motivation is to model equilibrium 
with a finite number of firms. When the price distribution is discrete, there 
arises a distinction between with-replacement and without-replacement 
sampling. This concerns whether, having visited a firm, a consumer is as 
likely to visit that firm again on further search or it is "removed from the 
draw". Carlson and McAfee only consider with-replacement sampling. Character-
izations of both without-replacement sequential search and either case of 
discrete FSS search are missing from the literature. Chapters 3 and 4 fill 
this gap. 
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C. Assumptions about Consumers' Objectives. 
Stigler's assumption that consumers seek to minimize expected expenditure 
has often been changed. Manning and Morgan (1982), in an FSS search model, 
have consumers maximize the expected indirect utility from price. While still 
addressing Stigler's question of how consumers behave when faced with price 
dispersion, this approach allows search theory to be merged into neo-classical 
consumer theory. For instance, the effect of income on the demand for price 
information can be easily considered in this framework. Veendorp (1984), using 
the expected indirect utility approach with sequential search, shows that, if 
there is a monetary cost to search (rather than only a utility cost), then the 
loss of stationarity that arises from search reducing income can prevent the 
existence of a reservation-price rule. 
A particularly useful aspect of the indirect-utility-maximizing approach 
is that elastic consumer demand for the searched for good can be eas~ly accom-
modated. Stiglitz (1987), in an equilibrium model, allows elastic demand this 
way, rather than using the conventional equilibrium assumption of inelastic 
demand with a choke price: the price at which demand discretely fall to zero. 
Kohn and Shavell (1973) and Weitzman (1979) go further in widening 
consumers' objectives. In their very general models, consumers maximize 
expected utility when searching from a distribution of utilities. Search for 
the low prices is just one interpretation of this framework. For instance, 
Kohn and Shavell, by allowing the utility search cost to be negative, can 
model search for what Nelson (1970) terms experience goods: goods such as 
restaurants where sampling is through consumption rather than inspection, and 
where the utility of that consumption can more than compensate for the search 
cost. 
One variation in the consumer objectives assumed in search models has 
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received little attention. This is the relationship between search, purchase, 
and consumption in time. The experience-good interpretation of Kohn and 
Shavell is a rare exception to the implicit assumption that search precedes 
purchase which precedes consumption. Models recently addressing this aspect 
are Manning (1989a), where consumers consume while searching, and Manning 
(1989b), where, even if consumption is postponed, consumers are allowed to 
spread risk by purchasing some units of a good before terminating sequential 
search. Search models of this form will be required if the equilibrium-search 
literature is to consider issues such as reputation where time is implicit. 
D. Assumptions about the Information Known to Consumers. 
Perhaps the strangest assumption used in search models is that of 
rational expectations: the assumption that consumers know the distribution of 
prices of all firms without knowing the prices charged by specific firms. An 
alternative approach is adaptive search, in which sequentially searching 
consumers update their prior beliefs about the distribution of prices as 
search reveals information. Adaptive search is considered in McCall (1970) and 
Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979). Other adaptive models have been developed 
~ 
by Axell (1974), Rothschild (1974), Kohn and Shavell (1974), Rosenfield and 
Shapiro (1981), and Morgan (1985). 
There is a trade-off between the generality of adaptive search and the 
simplicity of rational expectations search. In the context of pure search 
models, the consensus has been that adaptive search models add too little 
insight to justify their complexity; rational expectations models are just 
Bayesean models with degenerate priors. In the context of equilibrium, 
however, the distinction has to be made between a model where consumers have 
rational expectations and one where there is no updating of priors. The former 
implies the latter but with the additional feature that consumers' priors are 
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correct. This implies that if a firm changes its price, knowledge of that can 
affect consumers' search strategies. The demand functions of firms then 
reflect that each can affect the behaviour of consumers yet to sample it. The 
importance of the rational-expectations assumption in equilibrium search 
models has not previously been considered. It is the subject of Chapter 6. 
2.3 Existence of Equilibrium. 
In product differentiation models which have the structure described by 
equations (2-1-1) and (2-1-2), a standard assumption is that the demand 
fUnctions are continuously differentiable. With some other restrictions, this 
assumption is used to guarantee continuous best-reply correspondences, and 
hence the existence of an equilibrium. When demand functions are derived from 
search, each firm's demand is, in many cases, discontinuous at the prices of 
other firms. This implies discontinuous best-reply correspondences and result-
ing problems for existence that are not easily assumed away. 
The demand discontinuity in equilibrium-search models is a result of the 
assumption that firms are price setters. In the simple Bertrand model, each 
firm's demand function is discontinuous at the prices charged by other firms; 
as long as price exceeds marginal cost, each firm has an incentive to undercut 
its rivals. This competition for customers forces price down to marginal cost, 
even with only two firms. 
An appeal of the differentiated product approach is that it combines the 
continuity of Cournot, quantity-setting behaviour with the realism of price 
setting. By its nature, search implies price setting, since it is for pre-
viously posted prices that consumers search. Information, however, only 
differentiates firms which have not been sampled (whose prices are therefore 
perceived as random variables) from those who have been sampled. Since the 
searched-for good is homogeneous, the products of two firms which have both 
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been sampled by some consumer appear identical to that consumer, who therefore 
buys at the firm with the lowest price. This means that the demand discontinu-
ities of the Bertrand model are likely to be present if there is a positive 
probability that two firms are both sampled by some mass of consumers. Unlike 
the Bertrand case, however, the competitive solution will not be an equi-
librium since incomplete search by consumers also gives firms some monopoly 
power. 
This feature, that the products of any two firms cease to be differ-
entiated to a consumer who samples both, is common to all equilibrium-search 
models. Models can, however, be set up so that it does not result in 
discontinuous demand functions, or, if it does, that existence can still be 
ensured for at least a range of parameters. Four approaches have been used in 
the literature to generate existence of equilibrium. 
First, even if some consumers are indifferent between two firms charging 
the same price, that price can still maximize profit if the demand function of 
each firm never lies above the average cost curve. If one of the two firms 
then lowered its price slightly, there would be a quantum increase in its 
demand but not in its profit. This is the case in the model of Salop and 
Stiglitz (1977),4 where free entry ensures price equals average cost for all 
firms. They derive a two-price equilibrium for some values of parameters. The 
lower of the two prices is at the minimum of the U-shaped average cost curve. 
A demand discontinuity at the higher price is avoided because of the form of 
search assumed. In this special case of FSS search, consumers can either 
sample all firms' prices (for example, by buying a newspaper) and then buy at 
the lowest price, or they buy from a randomly chosen firm. As a result, no 
consumer samples more than one of the higher priced stores without also 
4 This model has been generalized by Braverman (1980). 
Chapter 2 
sampling a lower price. 
Second, if there is an infinity of firms with prices dispersed along a 
continuum with no mass points, there is zero probability of two identical 
prices being sampled by any consumer. Demand functions can therefore be 
continuous. This is the approach used by Wilde and Schwartz (1979), Sadanand 
and Wilde (1982), and Burdett and Judd (1983). They are formally similar to 
Butters' (1977) model which is not principally about search, but is very 
similar to FSS search in the way price information is disseminated (firms 
randomly issue advertisements to consumers, who purchase at the lowest price 
of these). 
15 
Third, if sequentially searching-consumers never use recall, then they 
are never indifferent between two prices. But zero recall does not have to be 
imposed: As noted in the previous section, it is a property of the basic 
sequential-search model that consumers purchase from the first firm visited 
that has a price lower than their reservation price, and so they are never 
indifferent between two prices. This practical attribute of sequential search 
perhaps explains its prevalence in equilibrium models: Axell (1977), Reinganum 
(1979), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Rob (1985), and Stiglitz (1987), all employ 
sequential search. 
If there are no pure-strategy equilibria, then it is sensible to look for 
mixed-strategy equilibria. This is the final way that has been found to deal 
with the problem of demonstrating existence. Shilony (1977) derives mixed-
strategy results in a model that can be interpreted as a Hotelling-style 
locational oligopoly or as a search based model almost equivalent to Salop and 
Stiglitz (1977). Varian (1980) develops the Shilony model further, giving the 
economic interpretation of the mixed strategy as price dispersion over time 
due to sales. Salop and Stiglitz (1982) also model sales with a mixed-strategy 
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equilibrium. 5 
The use of mixed strategies in the Varian, and Salop and Stiglitz (1982) 
papers is a nice way of modeling price dispersion by firms across time. For 
static equilibria, the pure-strategy existence solutions are less satisfying 
as they lack robustness. For instance, the Salop and Stigliz (1977)/Braverman 
solution is very neat but it requires an ad hoc search model not drawn from 
the pure-search literature and not based on consumer behaviour. The models 
employing FSS search among an infinity of firms are preferable in this 
respect, and it does follow the tradition of pure-search models to assume a 
continuum of prices. Having an infinity of firms, however, is unfortunate for 
two reasons: First, continuous distributions are useful if they are the 
limiting cases of discrete distributions, but they have no interpretation on 
their own (there not being any market with an infinity of firms). Second, some 
of the interesting questions raised by price dispersion models, which are 
oligopolistic in structure, concern the effects on the market from changes in 
the number of firms. The requirement that there be an infinity of firms 
precludes these questions from being addressed. 
An appealing generalization, applicable to the other continua models, is 
offered by Butters. He shows that, with a finite number of firms, there always 
exists an e-equilibrium, where e, the minimum profit required to induce a firm 
to change price, can be regarded as a proxy for adjustment costs. As the 
number of firms tends to infinity, e tends to zero. This provides a limit 
interpretation of continuous models, but still precludes the use of firm 
numbers as a variable for comparative static analysis. 
5 Mixed strategies are not required for equilibrium in this Salop and Stigliz 
model. With an infinity of firms, pure strategy equilibria exist; the 
distribution of prices is the same as each firm's probability distribution 
in the mixed strategy. It is the mixed strategy, however, that has the 
interpretation of sales. 
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The third way of guaranteeing existence--using the no-recall property of 
sequential search--offers the most elegant solution to the problem. Again, 
however, existence is not robust: No-use-of-recall is a result of station-
arity; it does not necessarily survive the introduction of income effects or 
adaptive learning. Also, without-replacement sampling (despite retaining no 
recall) troubles existence for other reasons. This is shown in Chapter 4. 
2.4 Price Dispersion. 
As noted in the previous section, mixed strategy solutions are one way of 
modeling dispersed-price equilibria. Generating price dispersion from pure 
strategies requires more work. The early models placing search in an equi-
librium setting--for instance, Diamond (1971), Fisher (1970), (1972), (1973), 
and Hey (1974)--resulted in degeneration to a single-price equilibrium. 
The reason for degeneration is that search is too successful in achieving 
its aim of avoiding high-priced firms. To illustrate, consider a simple FSS 
search model where identical consumers search for one unit of a good from a 
density of prices f(p). If this density is sufficiently spread to induce 
consumers to sample more than one firm, then there results a distribution of 
sample minimum prices, g (p), which has the same support as f(p) but is 
n 
stochastically dominated by it. The expected demand for firms charging the 
highest price is zero, so charging that price cannot be equilibrium behaviour. 
If, however, the density of prices is so narrow that consumers sample only one 
firm--resulting in identical price-offer and sample-minimum distributions--
then each firm is a perfect monopolist. Now it is the lowest prices that 
cannot be explained. This is the logic behind the Diamond (1971), result where 
the only equilibrium entails every firm charging the monopoly price. 
To have price dispersion in equilibrium, the assumptions about consumers 
must produce elastic demand functions for firms, that have the property that 
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these yield profits at both high and low prices. This is necessary but not 
sufficient to explain heterogeneous price setting by firms; the assumptions 
made about firms are also important. This section considers both sides of the 
market, and finishes with a comment on the role that heterogeneity of 
consumers and firms plays in these models. 
A. Consumers. 
The simplest way of achieving elastic demand for firms is to allow each 
consumer to have elastic demand. This is the approach of Reinganum (1979). In 
her model, the equilibrium price distribution has all prices at or below the 
reservation price of sequentially searching consumers. As a result, all 
consumers buy at the first firm visited and so each firm is a perfect mono-
polist. It is the elastic consumer demand which provides an incentive for 
firms to charge below the reservation price. 
Despite the consistency of elastic demand with neo-classical theory, all 
but Reinganum and Stiglitz (1987) of the equilibrium models cited in the 
previous section have eschewed this approach and assumed inelastic consumer 
demand. In each of these models, some, .but not all consumers, sample only one 
firm. The consumers who sample only one firm ensure some demand for the 
highest priced firms; the other consumers provide the additional demand that 
justifies some firms' charging of lower prices. Heterogeneity in consumers' 
sampling behaviour has been achieved in three ways: assumed exogenously; 
derived endogenously as a result of ex-ante heterogeneity in other consumer 
parameters; and derived endogenously from ex-post heterogeneity that can 
result from the randomness of search. 
Exogenous sampling differences is assumed by Wilde and Schwartz (1979), 
and in a more general version of that model, by Sadanand and Wilde (1982). 
Their consumers employ FSS search, but the sample sizes are not derived from 
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beliefs about the price distribution. Rather, a certain proportion of 
consumers hate searching and so choose a sample size of one; the remainder 
love searching and choose some constant sample size exceeding one. 
Heterogeneity in consumer parameters is employed by Axell (1977), Salop 
and Stiglitz (1977), Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979), Braverman (1980), Von 
Zur Muehlen (1980), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Rob (1985), and Stiglitz 
(1987),6 In each case, the consumers differ only in their search costs but 
this can be interpreted several ways. For instance, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) 
motivate search cost differences as reflecting differences in consumers' 
"ra tionali ty"; Gabszewicz and Garella (1985) in a degenerate-price model 
assume search costs to be a linear function of consumers' location along the 
real line. 
In Burdett and Judd (1983), ex-post heterogeneity in consumer sampling 
can arise even with ex-ante homogeneity when, in the only dispersed price 
equilibrium, identical FSS searching consumers are indifferent between 
sampling one or two firms. This model, however, still imposes a form of 
heterogeneity in its assumption that consumers do choose differently when 
faced with equally appealing options. This difference can be reinterpreted as 
being based on a difference in search costs. This has the advantage of conver-
ting a knife-edge result into a robust equilibrium. Albrecht, Axell and Lang 
(1986) have a more appealing way of generating sampling differences ex-post. 
In their general-equilibrium model, consumers search simultaneously in a 
factor market and a goods market for wage/price offers. There is no recall, 
and search must stop in both markets simultaneously. Identical consumers will 
then react to differently to the same sampled price in the goods market 
6 Von Zur Muehlen also assumes elastic consumer demand, but it is the consumer 
heterogeneity that is important in generating a dispersed price equilibrium 
in hi s mode 1. 
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because their concurrent wage offers differ, and vice-versa. Anglin (1989) has 
a similar model, where consumers search concurrently for two goods. Consumers 
also differ in their search costs in that model, so there are two sources of 
heterogeneity. 
B. Firms. 
As with consumer heterogeneity, differences in firms' behaviour can be 
achieved through heterogeneity in parameters, or generated from within the 
model. The first approach is that used by Reinganum (1979), and Carlson and 
McAfee (1983) who both assume firms have differing cost functions. Other ways 
of imposing heterogeneity, such as allowing different probabilities between 
firms of being sampled, remain to be modeled. 
Price dispersion is possible with identical firms if each has aU-shaped 
average cost curve, and there is free entry, as in Salop and Stigliz (1977), 
Braverman (1980), Wilde and Schwartz (1979), Sadanand and Wilde (1982) and Von 
Zur Muehlen (1982). 
An alternative approach, used by Axell (1977), Burdett and Judd (1982), 
Rob (1985), and Stiglitz (1987), has all firms earning the same amount of 
monopoly profit. These four models all have an infinity of firms and the 
equilibrium is a price distribution which, when merged with consumers' search 
strategies, produces unitary elastic demand functions from which the resulting 
set of profit-maximizing prices is that price distribution. The infinite 
number of firms is important as it ensures that no deviating firm has the 
power to influence consumers' search behaviour and hence the profit function. 
For instance, Rogerson (1987) shows that Rob's model fails to produce price 
dispersion when there is a finite number of firms no matter how large. This is 
another example of why it is unsatisfactory to model equilibrium with an 
infinity of firms. 
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Of course, if there is a finite number of firms, there may be Nash 
equilibria where identical firms earn non-identical amounts of profit. 
Stiglitz (1987) gives a numerical example of a dispersed-price equilibrium in 
the case where there are three firms and consumers search sequentially without 
replacement. 
C. The Role of Heterogeneity. 
With the exception of the Albrecht, Axell and Lang paper, all these 
price-dispersion models have required heterogeneity among either consumers or 
firms. The Carlson and McAfee model, which is the most robust in the sense of 
allowing the most comparative static analysis, requires both consumers and 
firms to be non-identical. Imposing heterogeneity has been regarded by many 
authors as unsatisfactory, but the assumptions for both consumers and firms 
can be justified on grounds other than analytical convenience. 
First, allowing differences in consumers may be an "explanation by 
taste", but it is consistent with differentiated product models, which 
formally differ from Bertrand models only when consumers are not identical. 
For instance, Rotelling-type differentiation-by-Iocation models are only 
interesting if consumers are also distributed locationally. A lot of the 
insight about the role of information in oligopoly comes from comparing its 
results to the other types of product differentiation. Since it is consistent 
with those models, the assumption of consumer heterogeneity in equilibrium-
search models is desirable rather than a weakness. 
Allowing differences in firms' cost functions can also easily be 
justified. The conventional textbook justification for assuming identical 
costs is not that it is either an empirical observation or a useful abstrac-
tion from reality, but rather that is is a result of perfect competition that 
firms can only remain in the market if they have access to the most efficient 
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technology. When there is imperfect competition, it is an interesting question 
how much technological inefficiency the market can sustain. 
2.5 Relation of the Literature to the Remaining Chapters. 
In concluding his survey of search models, Rothschild commented: 
"By now it should be clear that it is possible to build 
logically consistent models of markets which depart in one 
way or another from the classical standards of perfection. 
In some ways it is almost too easy. The number and variety 
of different models make it hard to draw any firm 
conclusions about the consequences of different types of 
market failure, and it is, after all, conclusions of this 
sort which make the game worth the candle." 
Rothschild (1973, p 1303) 
The previous two sections demonstrate that a similar comment can be applied to 
the search-based equilibrium price dispersion models that were inspired by 
Rothschild's survey: The problems of generating existence and price dispersion 
can be overcome, but, again, the specific assumptions employed to do so 
produce very specific results. There is a need for equilibrium models that can 
.be applied to a variety of situations. 
This thesis works in that direction. The connecting theme of the remain-
ing chapters is the similarity, described in Section 2.1, between equilibrium-
search models and other types of product-differentiation models, and the fact 
that the properties specific to the former come from the restrictions search 
places on the demand functions facing firms. 
The pure-search models of Part B consider the relationship between the 
assumptions made about how consumers search and the resulting demand funct-
ions, and on the implications these functions have for equilibrium. In doing 
so, these chapters fill in some of the gaps in the pure-search literature. 
In Chapter 3, FSS search from discrete distributions of prices is 
analysed. The new feature here is that the sampling strategy of consumers is 
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expressed parametrically; with-replacement and without-replacement sampling 
emerge as special cases from particular values of the parameters. A method is 
presented for deriving the demand functions facing firms as functions of the 
sampling strategy and a distribution of consumer search costs. The parametric 
form provides a means of comparison of different types of sampling strategy if 
these demand functions are used to derive an equilibrium. Chapter 4 considers 
discrete, without-replacement, sequential search (Carlson and McAfee having 
analysed the case of with-replacement sampling). The major result of this 
chapter is that, unlike with-replacement sampling (which produces analytically 
convenient demand functions), without-replacement sampling results in non-
differentiable demand. The similarities between the results of Chapters 3 and 
4 provide some interesting insights. 
Chapter 5 describes an adaptive-search model where consumers have almost 
no information about prices before they search. Chapter 6 discusses why, 
contrary to the commonly stated view, the assumption that consumers have 
rational expectations about the price distribution is not just an innocuous 
special case of adaptive search when considering equilibrium. The model of 
Chapter 5 is used to illustrate this point. 
Part C considers equilibrium directly. The single equilibrium-search 
there, Chapter7, draws comparisons with non-search, product-differentiation 
models in considering how changing the number of firms and adding a 
specialist dealer (arbitrager) affects welfare and efficiency in an oligopo-
listic market. To produce robust manipulable equilibria, heterogeneity in both 
consumers and firms is allowed in this model. The material of Parts C and D 
are not directly related. The conclusion of Part D suggests some further 
directions of research that could tie this material together. 
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CHAPTER 3: SEARCH AND DUALITy-DERIVING DEMAND FUNCTIONS FROM FSS SEARCH 
3.1 Introduction. 
In the standard form of equilibrium search models, described in the 
previous chapter, search only affects the equilibrium through the demand 
functions facing firms. Although different assumptions made about consumers' 
search behaviour will produce different demand functions, and hence different 
equilibrium results, the procedure used to derive these functions will in many 
cases be the same. Much economy of effort can therefore be achieved by concen-
trating on the derivation of demand from search separately from specific 
equilibrium models. 
This chapter presents a method of deriving demand functions for a broad 
class of fixed-sample-size (FSS) search strategies. This class includes the 
standard Stigler (1961) model of sampling from a continuum of prices, and 
various ways of sampling from discrete distributions. As well as collecting in 
one place a number of results that can be used in equilibrium, FSS search 
models, this approach allows easy comparison between the equilibrium results 
of different assumptions about search. 
The main technique used is duality: describing consumer's search 
behaviour by the search cost that leaves him indifferent between two sample 
sizes, rather than by the optimal sample size given a particular search cost. 
The advantage of using duality is that it describes consumer behaviour with a 
continuous variable. Carlson and McAfee (1983) use the continuity of duality 
to derive demand functions when consumers sample sequentially from a discrete 
distribution of prices. By calculating the search cost required to make a 
particular price the reservation price, they are able to map a continuous 
distribution of search costs onto demand functions. A similar procedure is 
followed here. The continuity of the dual function is also an advantage when 
doing comparative static analysis of search, as it allows the variable 
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describing consumer behaviour to be a differentiable function of the 
parameters in the model. 
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In the next section, the basic model is outlined and then duality is 
introduced in Section 3.3. It is shown there that, to be able to use the. 
duality approach, it is necessary that there be diminishing returns to search. 
Conditions for diminishing returns are presented in Section 3.4. These are 
illustrated in Section 3.5 which presents examples of search behaviour that 
are among those described by the model. Demand functions are then derived in 
Section 3.6. As equilibrium models are frequently used to address the welfare 
implications of dispersed prices, measures of welfare appropriate to search 
are required. In Section 3.7, two measures of welfare, expressed in the same 
general notation as the rest of the chapter, are derived. In the final 
section, some further extensions are suggested. Proofs of two results from 
this chapter are found in Appendix A. 
3.2 Notation and Setup of the Model. 
The sampling environment facing consumers is characterized by a set of 
prices for a homogeneous good and a search strategy (to be defined). Prices 
are indexed by the subscript j. When the price distribution is discrete, j is 
an integer from the set {1, '" J}. When the distribution is continuous, j is 
a member of the interval [l,J]. In either case, prices are ordered from lowest 
to highest so that 
i < j V i, j. 
The price distribution is known to consumers, but, before sampling, the 
price charged by any firm is perceived as a random variable drawn from this 
distribution. The consumer will purchase some units of the good only at the 
minimum price sampled, and so is interested in the distribution of the sample 
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minima rather than in the distribution of prices directly. It is the informa-
tion about the sample minima distributions that we term a search strategy. 
Definition 3-1: 
A search strategy is a set {gl' g2' ... goo}' of probability distributions 
over {Pl' ... PJ}' where gn(Pj) is the probability that Pj will be the minimum 
price in a sample of size n. 
The definition of a search strategy as a set of probability distributions 
admits a wide variety of sampling behaviour. Examples of different search 
strategies and values of g (p.) for each of these are presented in Section 
n J 
3.5. These include sampling with and without replacement. The latter clearly 
dominates the former, but, with the search strategy being considered part of 
the environment facing consumers, we are not concerned here with the choice of 
an optimal search strategy. This approach does, however, allow easy compari-
sons between different strategies. 
G is the cumulative probability distribution, 
n 
j 
L g (p.). 
i=l n 1 
When the price distribution is continuous, g and G are density and distribu-
n n 
tion functions defined over the interval [Pl,PJ]' In general, the discrete 
notation is used, but, by interpreting summations as integrals, the results 
extend to the continuous case. 
Each consumer has a search cost per firm sampled. This cost is constant 
except that it is assumed that there is no cost to sampling the first firm. 
The total expenditure on search for a consumer with search cost c sampling n 
firms is therefore (n-l)c. This assumption ensures that at least one firm is 
always sampled (and so avoids making the decision to search endogenous), but 
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it has a useful interpretation: All purchase involves sampling the price of 
the firm from whom the good is bought. The cost of sampling that firm is a 
necessary transactions cost. By assuming the first sample to be free, only the 
additional costs that arise from introducing search into a model are being 
1 modeled as search costs. 
The consumer's problem given this environment is to choose the expected-
* utility maximizing sample size n E ~ \0 (the set of positive integers). Where + 
there is more than one utility maximizing n, the convention is followed that 
the consumer will choose n* to be the minimum of these. A special case that is 
used a lot in the search literature, and that we shall often consider 
separately, is where consumers' demand is inelastic and independent of income. 
In this case maximizing expected utility gives the same result as minimizing 
expected expenditure. 
The main concern of this chapter is with how the demand functions facing 
firms can be derived when all consumers in the market follow the search 
behaviour just described. Search mainly affects the demand functions of firms 
by affecting the expected number of consumers buying from particular firms. 
The probability that any consumer will buy from a particular firm depends on 
the number of firms sampled by that consumer. Let ben) be the proportion of 
consumers with sample size equal to n, and let B(n) be the proportion with 
sample size greater than n so that 
1 
ben) - B(n-l) - B(n). 
If consumers were identical, they would all choose the same sample size, 
This is also a common assumption in search models (e.g. see Salop (1977) and 
Stiglitz (1987)). An alternative way of ensuring that consumers enter the 
market is to assume that the marginal utility of the searched-for good tends 
to infinity as consumption of it tends to zero (e.g. see Manning and Morgan 
(1982)). 
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say n*, giving b(n*)=l, and b(n)=O V n*n*. As noted in Section 2.4, p 17, some 
kind of consumer heterogeneity is usually required to generate interesting 
demand functions. The standard approach of assuming that consumers differ only 
in their unit search costs is followed here. Let Hand h be the distribution 
and density functions of consumers' search costs. Each value B(n) then depends 
on this distribution, the prices charged by firms, and the search strategy. To 
derive the demand functions facing firms, we need to find the relationship 
between {H, Pl' .. ,PJ' gl, .. ,goo} and B(n). This relationship is derived in the 
next two sections using duality. 
Finally in this section, we state two notational conventions used 
throughout the chapter. First, where any variable is parameterized by n, the 
standard forward difference notation is used. That is, for any variable X, 
~X - X - X n n+l n 
and ~2X - ~X 1 - ~X . n n+ n 
Second, a circumflex II II A 
x - E[Xln]. n 
is used to denote expected value conditional on n, 
3.3 The Role of Duality. 
The role of duality is illustrated here by using the example of search 
from a continuum of prices. This standard model was introduced in Section 2.1, 
p 5, but is presented here in more detail. Duality is then applied to the 
general model in Section 3.4. 
A. Properties of the Standard Model. 
Let F and f be the distribution and density functions of a continuum of 
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prices for a good which can be sampled by a searching consumer seeking to buy 
one unit of the good. The distribution and density functions of sample minima 
are derived as follows: 
The probability that all n prices sampled exceed a particular value p is 
The probability that at least one price is lower than p is then 
G (p) - 1 - (1-F(p))n. 
n 
Differentiating gives 
g (p) 
n 
n-l - n(1-F(p)) 'f(p) (3-3-1) 
A consumer with unit search cost c chooses n* to minimize the total 
expected expenditure on purchase and search, 
J P'gn(p) dp + (n-1)c. 
The marginal benefit of search is 
MB = -~p n 
= J P'gn(p) dp - J P·gn+1 (p) dp 
= -J p·~gn(p) dp. 
It is readily seen by using (3-3-1) that the marginal benefit is positive 
but decreasing in n. The unique optimal sample size, n*(c), is then the small-
est positive integer n for which the marginal benefit does not exceed the 
marginal cost, c. 
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This is illustrated in Figure 3-1 for the case where f is a uniform density of 
prices over the interval [0, 6], and c = 0.25. 
Figure 3-1. 
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B. Duality. 
* n 5 n 
The consumer's problem described above is to select a sample of prices 
that would minimize total expected expenditure given the search cost c. The 
dual problem is to select the sample to maximize the search cost, C(n), that 
leaves the consumer indifferent between sampling nand n+1 firms. If C is a 
function and exists for all n E l \0 it is termed the dual function. 
+ 
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In the present example, the marginal benefit of search is positive but 
decreasing in n. The dual function therefore exists with 
C(n) 
The dual function provides a convenient way of relating the distribution 
of search costs to the distribution of sample sizes. The diminishing marginal 
benefit of search implies that C(n) is monotonic decreasing. Therefore, for 
any consumer 
c < C(n) n*(c) > n. V n (3-3-2) 
It follows that the proportion of consumers whose optimal sample size is in 
excess of n will be the proportion whose search cost does not exceed C(n). 
That is, 
B(n) = H(C(n)) (3-3-3) 
B(O), the proportion of consumers who sample at least one firm, exists 
and equals one. It will be convenient in the derivation of some equations 
later in the chapter to be able to use equation (3-3-3) when n=O. We therefore 
define C(O) to give H(C(O)) = 1, and, so that (3-3-2) holds, C(O) > C(l). 
Formally, 
C(O) - max{ min{cIH(c)=l}, C(l) } 
Note the importance of the dual function having a continuous range and a 
discrete domain. The relationship between Band H could not be stated so 
easily as in equation (3-3-3) using the primal-that is, a relationship 
between B(n*(c)) and H(c)-because H is defined over continuous support while 
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n*(c) takes only discrete values. 
The only property of the example of independent sampling from a continuum 
of prices that mattered in the above analysis was that the marginal benefit of 
search was positive and decreasing. As long as this property holds for a given 
search strategy, C will be a non-decreasing function defined for all positive 
n, and equation (3-3-2) will hold. This is why the level of generality used 
here can be maintained: The marginal benefit of search and sufficient condit-
ions guaranteeing diminishing returns to search are easily stated as functions 
of the set of gn; no specific search strategy needs to be appealed to. These 
conditions are derived in the following section under a number of assumptions 
about consumers' demand. 
3.4 Diminishing Returns. 
The characteristics of a search strategy that ensure a positive but 
decreasing marginal benefit of search can be described by a property of 
sampling distributions that is termed here distributional dominance. 
Definition 3-2: 
Let fa and fb be real-valued functions defined over {xl ,x2 ' ... xJ} with 
xl < x2 < '" < xJ and let Fa and Fb be the cumulative functions 
with 
j 
F (x.) = L f (x.), 
a J i=l a 1 
Then Fa distributionally dominates Fb if and only if 
F (x.) 
a J 
v j, 
with strict inequality holding for at least one j. 
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Distributional dominance is the same concept as stochastic dominance, 
except that the latter is defined only over distribution functions. Here it is 
not required that Fa and Fb be non-decreasing or that Fa(x j ) = Fb(x j ) = 1. The 
new term is introduced so that the concept can also be applied to the first 
differences of distribution functions. 
Assumption 3-1: 
a) G distributionally dominates G l' n n+ 
b) ~G 1 distributionally dominates ~G . n+ n 
The following property of distributional dominance is the basis of its 
role in search theory: 
Lemma 3-1: 
A necessary and sufficient condition for F to distributionally dominate 
a 
j 
L p(x.)· (f (x.) - fb(X.)) > «) 0 
j=1 J a J J 
for all monotonic increasing (decreasing) functions p. 
Proof: 
This is a well-known result for stochastic dominance. 2 To show that it 
also holds for distributional dominance, a proof is given in Appendix A. 
Assumption 3-1 is sufficient to guarantee a diminishing rate of decrease 
in the expected minimum sampled price. When demand is inelastic, the marginal 
o 
price reduction is proportional to the marginal benefit, and so Assumption 3-1 
2 For example see Lafont (1989), Chapter 2.5. 
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ensures the existence of the dual function C. With elastic demand, additional 
assumptions are required. To emphasize the role of Assumption 3-1, the case of 
inelastic demand is presented first. 
A. Inelastic Demand. 
Let the consumer have a demand, X, for the searched-for good that is 
independent of both price and income. The total expected cost that the 
consumer minimizes is 
J 
XLP.'g (p.) + (n-1)c. 
j=1 J n J 
Proposition 3-1: 
If Assumption 3-1 holds, and if consumers have inelastic demand, then the 
function C exists and is non-increasing with 
C(n) 
Proof: 
J 
= -X L P .L1g (p.) 
j=1 J n J 
Assumption 3-1 and Lemma 3-1 together imply that 
J 
L (P.,g +1(P.) - p.'g (P.)) 
j=1 J n J J n J 
J 
= L p,' L1g (p.) < 0 
j=1 J n J 
J 
and 2 L p.L1 g (p.) 
j=1 J n J 
> o 
so the expected purchase cost of X units of the good decreases at a decreasing 
rate in n. Therefore, 
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J 
C(n) = -Xflp n = -X E p. ·flg (p.) j=1 J n J 
J 
and flC(n) = -X Ep.·fl2g (p.) < O. 
j=1 J n J 
Also, 
B. Elastic Demand with Quasilinear Utility. 
Part B 
(3-4-1) 
(3-4-2) 
o 
The formulation with inelastic demand can be simply re-interpreted to 
allow for negatively sloped demand. Let consumers maximize expected utility 
with indirect utility functions of the form 
u = V(p) + I - c, (3-4-3) 
where V'(p) ~ 0, I is income, and c can either be interpreted as a financial 
cost or a direct utility cost representing the irritation of search. 
Proposition 3-2: 
If Assumption 3-1 holds, and if consumers have quasilinear utility, then 
the function C exists and is non-increasing with 
J 
C(n) = flV n = E V(p.)·flg (p.) j=1 J n J 
(3-4-4) 
Proof: 
The proof follows as for Proposition 3-1, substituting -V(p.) for p .. 
J J o 
With this formulation, the optimal sample size is given by 
(3-4-5) 
o 
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C. General Demand. 
Now let consumers' indirect utility take the general form 
Yep, p, I, n), I - w - (n-1)c 
where p is the random price of the searched for good, p is the vector of all 
other prices (known with certainty), w is the pre-search wealth and so I is 
income available for consumption, and n as the fourth argument represents the 
direct effect search has on utility.3 
We have already seen that Assumption 3-1 implies diminishing marginal 
price reductions. To ensure that this also implies diminishing marginal 
utility, the following assumptions are required: 
Assumption 3-2: 
(a) 
a 2y 
aI 2 
~ 0 
(b) 
a2 y 
apaI 
~ 0 
(c) 
a 2 y 
an
2
1I 
~ 0 
(d) a:(~~II) ~ 0 
(e) a~ (~~I I) ~ 0 
Proposition 3-3: 
If Assumptions 3-1 and 3-2 bold, then, in the problem with general 
utility functions, C exists, is non-increasing, and is the solution to 
3 
A natural assumption would be that search is an irritation with an oppor-
tunity cost in time. No restriction, however, needs to be placed on the sign 
of (aYlan) I I; "search for its own sake" is captured in this model. 
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J 
~V 
n 
= E V(p.,p,w-(n-l)C(n),n)·g (p.) 
j=1 J . n J 
= o (3-4-6) 
with n*= min{ nln E 2+\0, ~V (p.) ~ c } 
n J 
(3-4-7) 
Proof: 
Given in Appendix A. 
The role of Assumption 3-2 is straightforward. There are two costs to 
searching: the financial cost (- ~~) and the direct cost (~~II)' To demon-
strate diminishing returns to search, it is required that these costs be 
non-decreasing in n. As n increases, income is reduced due to the financial 
cost, and also the expected minimum price is reduced. The second partial 
derivatives therefore involve n, I, and p. 
This formulation of the consumer search problem in terms of the indirect 
o 
utility of price is due to Manning and Morgan (1982) who considered FSS search 
from a continuous distribution of prices. The contribution here is to extend 
that formulation to allow different search strategies and search from discrete 
price distributions. Two differences in approach between the Manning and 
Morgan paper and this chapter merit comment. First, in their model n is 
regarded as a continuous variable, and second, they assume search has a 
financial cost only. 
When n is continuous it can be shown that V is concave in n, implying 
n 
diminishing returns to search. For instance, Manning and Morgan's Appendix 
Theorems 1 and 2 are the continuous form of Lemma 3-1 in this chapter applied 
to the particular functional form of g appropriate for sampling from a 
n 
continuous distribution of prices. 
Treating n as continuous also allows a convenient way of deriving and 
presenting comparative static results since n* is then (generally) a 
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differentiable function of parameters such as income, the spread of prices 
etc. With the exception of two Slutsky equations (which have no interpretation 
when n is discrete), equivalent results to those presented by Manning and 
Morgan can be easily derived here by considering the effect on C(n). If C(n) 
increases for all n when some parameter changes, then ~n* ~ o. 
One such result is that the sample size will increase with income. 
Manning and Morgan comment that this result runs counter to the conventional 
wisdom about search. It is, however, a natural consequence of search having a 
financial cost only. When extending the model to allow direct effects on 
utility from search, Assumptions 3-2 (d) and (e) are required to ensure that C 
is decreasing, from which a~~n) > 0 follows. It is these assumptions that 
violate the intuition underlying the conventional wisdom, which is that a 
greater income will imply a greater willingness to pay to avoid the irritation 
of search. 
3.5 Examples of Different Search Strategies. 
The definition of a search strategy as a set of probability distributions 
over {Pl' .. , PJ} for all n encompasses a wide variety of consumer behaviour. 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate a number of these variations and 
to check whether Assumption 3-1 holds in each case. Section 3.3 gave the 
example of sampling from a continuum of prices; the three strategies given in 
this section all involve sampling from discrete distributions. 
Strategy 1: With-Replacement Sampling. 
Let F(p.) be the probability, independent of n, that a firm chosen at 
J 
random will charge a price not exceeding p .. Then 
J 
= 1 - (l-F(p.))n 
J 
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so ~G (p.) = (1 - F(p.))nF(p.) 
n J J J 
> 0 
so Assumption 3-1 holds. 
Also gn(PJ') = (l-F(p. ))n - (l-F(p.))n 
J-1 J 
(3-5-1) 
and ~g (p.) = (l-F(p.))nF (p.) 
n J J J 
(3-5-2) 
strategy 2: Without-Replacement Sampling. 
Let there be J firms, each charging a different price and each equally 
likely to be sampled, so 
Then 1-G (p.) is found using the hypergeometric distribution 
n J 
giving 
so 
1-G (p.) 
n J 
{(J-j)! (J-n)! 
~G (p.) = (J-j)! [(J-n)! _ (J-n-1)!] 
n J J! (J-j-n)! (J-j-n-1)! 
~G (p.) 
n J 
(
(J-j)!) ( (J-n-1)! ) (~ _ 1) 
J! (J-j-n-l)! J-j-n 
(
(J-j)!) ((J-n-1)!). 
J! (J- j-n)! J 
n :s J-j 
otherwise 
n :s J-j 
n :s J-j 
otherwise 
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2 (-(J-j)!) ((J-n-2)!) ('-1)' fl G (p.) = n J J! (J-j-n)! J J and 
so { < 0 2 fl G (p.) n J = 0 
so Assumption 3-1 holds. 
Also, 
and 
g (p.) = G (p.) - G (p. 1) 
n J n J n J-
flg (p.) 
n J 
{ 
(J-n)! (J- j)! n 
= J! (J-j-n+l)! 
o 
{ 
(J-n-l ~! (J- j)! ((J+1)- (n+1) .) 
J! (J-J-n+l)! J 
= 
o 
n !:: J-j 
n !:: J-j+l 
otherwise 
n !:: J-j+l 
otherwise 
n !:: J-j+l 
n !:: J-l 
otherwise 
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(3-5-3) 
(3-5-4) 
By adding consecutive terms of g (p.) together, the case of several firms 
n J 
charging the same price can be allowed for without affecting dominance. 
strategy 3: An Example of Firm-Specific Sampling. 
Let there be three firms, labelled A,B,C, posting prices Pi < P2 < P3' As 
usual the consumer does not know the matching between firms and prices, but 
has prior beliefs. These are summarized in Table 3-1 which gives the 
(independent) probabilities of each firm's charging each price. 
Table 3-1. 
Since firms do not appear ex-ante identical to consumers in this example, 
the sampling distribution will depend on which stores are sampled. If 
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consumers use without-replacement sampling in the order (ABC) that is, firm 
A is sampled when the sample size is one, and firms A and B when the sample 
size is two- then the sampling distribution is given by Table 3-2. In this 
case, the required properties of distributional dominance hold. 
Table 3-2. Sampling order: (ABC) 
If, however, the search strategy is to sample in the order (ACB), then the 
sampling distribution is as given in :~able 3-3, and Assumption 3-1 (b) is 
violated. Note that the strategy with order (ABC) is better for the consumer 
than that with order (ACB) in the sense that the former results in an expected 
minimum price that is no greater than the latter for each sample size and is 
less than for a sample of size 2. If the consumer were able to choose the 
order in which to visit firms- that is, if he were able to choose his search 
strategy- then (ABC) would be the opUmal order and Assumption 3-1 would hold. 
Table 3-3. Sampling order: (ACB) 
3.6 Demand Functions. 
The maln objective of this chapter is to present a method of deriving 
demand functions that is independent of the search strategy. This is done in 
Chapter 3 
this section: demand functions are derived that are expressed in terms of C 
and {gl,gZ' .. , goo}· To obtain the functions for specific search strategies, 
the particular values for these variables, such as in the examples of the 
preceding section, need only be substituted in as the final stage of the 
derivation .. As long as the dual function exists, this method is appropriate. 
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As noted earlier, the main effect that search has on the demand functions 
facing firms is through its effect on the number of consumers purchasing from 
particular firms. When consumer demand 1s inelastic, this is the only thing 
producing elastic demand functions for firms. When consumer demand is elastic 
and search has a financial cost, the firms' demand functions can be affected 
by income effects as well. To emphas~ze these separate effects, we consider 
the cases of inelastic consumer demand, quasilinear utility, and general 
utility separately. 
A. Inelastic Demand. 
Let q. denote the expected demand facing firm j (where "firm j" refers to 
.J 
the firm charging Pj)' and let there be M consumers each of whom buys X units 
of the good. 
Theorem 3-1: 
When consumer demand is inelasLLc, if there is a finite number of firms, 
'V i;tj, then 
q. = XM [ E H ( C ( n) ) . togn (p .) + g 1 (p . ) 1 J n=l J J 
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Proof: 
By the definition of b(n), 
00 
qj = XM L b(n)'g (p.) 
n=l n J 
(3-6-1) 
= XM [ (B(n-l)-B(n)) ·gn(P.) 
n=l J 
= XM[ ;: B(n)o6gn (po) + gl (Po)] n=l J J 
= XM[ ;: H(C(n))o6g (po) + gl (p j)] (3-6-2) 
n=l n J 
When p.*p. for j*i, then gl(P.) and ~g (p.) are constant and demand is 
J 1 J n J 
differentiable with 
Now from (3-4-1), 
aC(n) 
-- = -X~g (p .), ap j n J 
so (3-6-3) 
The requirement in Theorem 3-1 that firm j's price be unique is impor-
tanto Recall that firms are labelled according to the ordering of their 
prices. The functions gl and ~gn are then subject to discontinuities at each 
of the other firm's prices and the demand functions will in general be dis-
continuous. This is the problem referred to in Section 2.3 p 13: Because any 
o 
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two firms appear otherwise identical to a consumer who has sampled both, any 
difference in price, no matter how slight, will differentiate them in favour 
of the lower-priced firm. The demand discontinuity need not arise when there 
are either two or an infinity of firms. 
When there are only two firms, a consumer will not sample .both firms if 
their prices are the same. This is seen in equation (3-6-2): the summation 
term is zero when Pl=P2 since that implies that C(n)=Q Vn. Demand is then 
continuous as long as gl (Pl) = gl(P2)' 
As was noted in Section 2.3 p 15, when firms' prices are distributed 
along a continuum, the probability is zero that two firms charging the same 
price are sampled by any consumer, and so the discontinuity in demand 
disappears. Let F and f be the distribution and density functions of the 
continuum. The demand function of an atomistic firm can then be found as a 
fUnction of the distribution. 
Theorem 3-2: 
When consumer demand is inelastic, and if there is an infinity of firms 
charging prices along a continuum; then 
q(p) 
where r is the ratio of consumers to firms. 
Proof: 
Let the number of firms, J, tend to infinity in such a way that F is the 
1 2 J limit of the sequence {F , F ... }, where each F is a distribution function 
of the prices of J firms and 
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J 
F (p.) 
J 
= j 
]" 
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The differentiable distribution, G , derived from F according to some search 
n 
strategy, is similarly also the limit, as J tends to infinity, of a sequence 
1 2 {G , G ... }. Let M tend to infinity in such a way that the ratio of consumers 
n n 
to firms, r =~, is constant. Then from (3-6-1), 
qJ' = XM E ben)' (G (p.) 
n=1 n J 
G (p. 1)) 
n J-
= XM E ben)' (G (p.) - G (p.-(p.-p. 1))) 
n=1 n J n J J J-
Now, 
so 
F(p.) - F(p. 1) 1 
__ ~JT-____ ~J~-__ = ~ ______ ~ 
(p.-P. 1) J(p.-p. 1) 
J J- J J-
J but the sequence of F is defined so that as J 00, 
(3-6-5) therefore defines a derivative giving, 
Substituting (3-6-6) into (3-6-4) gives, 
lim q. 
J M 00 J , 
(p.-p. 1) O. Equation 
J J-
The bracketed term defines a derivative, so in the limit 
(3-6-4) 
(3-6-5) 
(3-6-6) 
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q(p) IT [00 ] = r---( ) L b(n)·gn(p) 
p n=l 
o 
Note that if all consumers were to sample only one firm, then the market 
share of firm j would be gl (Pj). The summation term, in equation (3-6-2) then 
represents the redistribution of market share from higher-priced firms to 
lower-priced firms that results from search. 
B. Elastic Demand with Quasilinear Utility. 
In this case, if the utility function takes the form of equation (3-4-3); 
demand is independent of the search cost and is given by Roy's identity 
X(p) = 
Theorem 3-3: 
av 
ap 
When consumers have quasilinear utility, if there is a finite number of 
firms, and if p.*p. V i*j, then' 
1 J 
q(p.) = X(P).M[ E H(C(n))·6g (p.) + gl (PJ.)]. 
J n=l n J 
and 
~. J _ 
ap
j
-
Proof: 
Equation (3-6-7) is the amended form of equation (3-6-2). Equation 
(3-6-8) follows since 
(3-6-7) 
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av(p. ) 
ac (n) _ J -llg (p.) = X (p) -llg (p.). 
apj - ap j n J n J 
C. General Demand. 
In the general model with a budget constraint, the demand functions are 
complicated by the income effects of differing c across consumers. Let 
X (p.,c) be the quantity demanded at price p. by a consumer with income 
n J J 
I = w-(n-l)c; that is, the quantity demanded by a consumer who has taken n 
quotations with a sample minimum p .. Here Roy's identity gives 
J 
X (p., c) 
n J 
Theorem 3-4: 
av/ap. 
____ ...::..J 
av/aI 
In the problem with general utility functions, if there is a finite 
number of firms, and if p.*p. V i*j, then 
1 J 
00 C(n-l) 
o 
qJ' = M L g (p·)I X (p.,c)-h(c) dc (3-6-9) 
n=l n J C(n) n J 
aq. 00 [ aC(n-l) 
and -a J = M L g (p.) X (p., C(n-l)) 'h(C(n-l)) '-a"---
Pj n=l n J n J Pj 
I
c(n-l) ax ( ) 1 
- X (p.,C(n))'h(C(n)).aca(n) + naPj'c h(c)dc 
n J p. p. 
J C(n) J 
(3-6-10) 
Proof: 
The only difference between Equations (3-6-9) and (3-6-1) is that here 
demand has to be inside the integral as it depends on c. Equation (3-6-10) 
follows from (3-6-9). 
o 
It does not follow automatically from equation (3-6-10) that aq./ap. < 0: 
J J 
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Although raising the price will lead to a reduction in the expected number of 
customers--as seen by (3-6-3)--who in turn are further up their demand curves, 
consumers may also have more income as a result of searching less and so 
demand more. This subsection, however, is included only to illustrate the 
complexity brought about by allowing income effects when there is a financial 
search cost. Clearly additional restrictions need to be made before this 
formulation will yield tractable demand functions. 
3.7 Welfare. 
The method of deriving demand functions presented in the previous section 
was the main concern of this chapter, but the procedure used of describing a 
search strategy by a set of parameters and then relying on duality has other 
applications. In this section, two measures of welfare for searching consumers 
are derived as an additional illustration of the way that keeping the descrip-
tion of consumers' search general can lead to both economy of effort and a 
more elegant presentation of results. 
Welfare questions are interesting in equilibrium search models. Costly 
search is an activity that is not- necessary for purchase of a good, and is 
only required when prices are believed to be dispersed. It therefore repre-
sents a loss to consumers incurred only to reduce an otherwise greater loss 
arising from the high prices charged by some firms. It follows that a market 
characterized by search will be inefficient. It is useful to have a measure 
welfare so that the costs of this inefficiency under different market struc-
tures can be compared. Two welfare measures are derived in this section: a 
dollar measure for the case of inelastic demand, and a utility measure for the 
case of elastic demand. 
When demand is inelastic, it is convenient to measure welfare as a loss. 
The welfare cost, "Average Total Expenditure" (ATE) is defined as the average 
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over all consumers of the sum of expenditure on search (ASE) and expected 
expenditure from purchasing the good (APE). If demand is elastic, the usual 
problems of defining a welfare measure when there are income effects apply. In 
the case where indirect utility is additively separable in income, however, 
Marshallian consumer surplus can be used. In this case, welfare is defined as 
the average over all consumers of expected utility, "Average Expected Utility" 
(AEU) . 
Theorem 3-5: 
a) When consumer demand is inelastic, Average Total Expenditure is given 
by 
00 C(n) 
L J H(c) dc 
n=1 0 
b) When consumer demand is elastic but utility is quasilinear in Average 
Expected Utility is given by 
00 C(n) 
L J H(c) dc 
n=1 0 
Proof: 
With either utility function, consumers' average search expenditure is 
00 C(n-l) 
ASE = L (n-1)J c·h(c) dc 
n=1 C(n) 
E (n-1)[(C(n-1)'H(C(n-1)) 
n=1 
) 
C(n-1) 1 
- C(n)'H(C(n)) - J H(c) dc 
C(n) 
(integrating by parts) 
Cen-1) 1 
- (n-1)J H(c) dc 
C(n) 
(3-7-1) 
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The Average Purchase Expenditure for a consumer with inelastic demand is 
APE == X ~ [ ~ p.' g (p.). b (n) 1 
n==l j==l J n J 
(3-7-2) 
00 [ J J 1 == X L L p.' Llg (p.). H ( C (n )) + L p.' g 1 (p . ) 
n==l j==l J .n J j==l J J 
(following the same manipulations used to derive equation (3-6-2) from 
equation (3-6-1)). 
00 
- L C(n)'H(C(n)) + XPl (3-7-3) 
n==l 
(from (3-4-1)). 
Combining (3-7-1) and (3-7-3) gives 
00 C(n-l) 
ATE XP1 L (n-l)S H(c) dc n==l C(n) 
00 [C(n-l) C(n) 1 
== XP1 L (n-l) S H(c) dc - So H(c) dc n==l 0 
00 C(n) 
== XP 1 L J H(c) dc 
n==l 0 
This completes the proof for part a) of the theorem. To prove part b), 
note that the average per-consumer utility cost of searching is given by 
(3-7-1) and that the expected utility from purchase can be derived by substi-
tuting V(Pj) for Pj' and Vi for XP1 in equations (3-7-2) to (3-7-3) and by 
using equation (3-4-4) in place of (3-4-1) in the substitution to get equation 
(3-7-3) . 
D 
Note that in both cases, the first term in the welfare measure is the 
expected cost or utility that would result from sampling a single store; the 
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second term represents the gain from search given a particular set of prices. 
This gain is maximized by maximizing C(n) for all n: that is, by solving the 
dual. 
Of course, the cost or utility to a single consumer with search cost c' 
can be found by substituting 
H(e) ~ {~ for 
into the formulae. 
c < c' 
C ~ c' 
3.8 Concluding Remarks. 
To get the results of this chapter, Assumption 3-1 was the only 
restriction that had to be placed on the search strategy used by consumers. 
This assumption is a sufficient condition to ensure diminishing returns to 
search for any price distribution, and it is a necessary condition for it to 
apply to every possible price distribution. 
4 
Diminishing retur~s to search 
seems an obvious property that should not need to be assumed directly, but 
instead be produced by more fundamental. assumptions about the type of sampling 
allowed by consumers. Assumption 3-1 did fail to hold in the final example of 
Section 3.5, but this only occurred in a situation where consumers were 
following an inferior strategy. 
The search strategy was taken as given here to emphasize the generality 
of the results to any strategy satisfying Assumption 3-1. An obvious extension 
of this work is to consider the optimal choice of search strategy. The exam-
ples of Section 3.5 suggest that there may exist some intuitive assumptions 
about the set from which feasible strategies are chosen such that Assumption 
3-1 only fails to hold for dominated strategies. 
4 Necessity follows directly from Lemma 3-1. 
CHAPTER 4: SEQUENTIAL SEARCH WITHOUT REPLACEMENT 
4.1 Introduction. 
This chapter has the same overall objective as Chapter 3: to investigate 
the properties, arising from the assumptions made about consumers' search 
behaviour, of the demand functions facing firms. Whereas Chapter 3 emphasized 
general ity-wi thin the constraint that consumers use FSS search - the 
sequential search model considered in this chapter is specific: Sampling is 
without replacement from a discrete distribution of prices. 
The model fills a small gap in the search literature. The optimal sequen-
tial sampling strategy for a consumer with inelastic demand searching from a 
continuum of prices, and the resulting demand functions have been derived by 
Axell (1977), Von Zur Muehlen (1980), and Rob (1985). This has been extended 
by Carlson and McAfee (1983) to the case where search is with replacement from 
a finite number of firms. Stiglitz (1987) derives properties of demand 
functions when consumer demand is elastic. 
Two properties of sequential search are crucial in enabling these authors 
to model equilibrium. First, in each case there is a reservation price rule. 
This implies that a consumer's optimal strategy is described by a single 
variable; demand functions for firms can be derived by finding a mapping from 
consumers' search costs to the distribution of reservation prices. The second 
useful property is that the recall option is never exercised: Consumers always 
buy from the last firm visited. The problem, discussed in Section 2.3, p 13 of 
discontinuous demand functions is then avoided as consumers are never in-
different between buying from two firms. 
1 
Sufficient conditions are presented in this chapter for both the 
reservation-price and no-recall properties to hold. The reservation-price rule 
1 
A consumer may still be indifferent between stopping and continuing search, 
but this does not lead to discontinuous demand. 
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is complicated by the fact that when sampling is without replacement the 
distribution of prices left to sample changes as search progresses. The reser-
vation price then depends on the number of firms sampled, but the result is 
still obtained that, if there is a continuous, differentiable distribution of 
consumer search costs, the demand functions will be continuous. The less 
encouraging result is also obtained, however, that these demand functions will 
be characterized by non-differentiable points that produce the same problems 
for existence of equilibrium as discontinuities. 
To derive the results on demand, the same device used in Chapter 3-
duality-is employed here. In this case, the dual expresses the consumer's 
optimal strategy by the search cost that would make him indifferent between 
continuing search and stopping at a particular price. In Chapter 3, the exist-
ence of a dual function required that the optimal sample size be a monotonic 
function of the consumer's search cost, c. Likewise, with sequential search 
the existence of a dual function requires that there be a reservation price 
which is a monotonic function of the search cost. In both cases, this mono ton-
icity comes from a form of diminishing returns to search. With sequential 
search, this implies that, the lower is the minimum price sampled, the smaller 
is the net gain from continuing search. Similarities between this chapter and 
Chapter 3 arise because of this common requirement of diminishing returns. 
In the next section, the notation and assumptions of the model are given. 
As ffiuch as possible of the structure and notation of Chapter 3 is carried 
over. In Section 4.3, conditions for the existence of a reservation price are 
derived. Section 4.4 derives the dual function for this problem, used in 
Section 4.5 to produce results on the demand functions facing firms. Some 
brief concluding remarks are contained in Section 4.6. Many of the proofs to 
results from this chapter are in Appendix B. 
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4.2 Notation and Setup of the Hodel. 
There are J firms posting prices {Pi" .. PJ} for a homogeneous good. Firms 
are indexed by the ordering of their prices, 
Pi ~ Pz ~ P ... J' 
Apart from the assumption of without-replacement sampling, the conven-
tional set-up for sequential search is used: After each quotation, the 
consumer must decide whether to stop search and purchase the good at the 
lowest price already received (full recall), or to continue searching by 
sampling a firm at random. Unsampled firms appear identical to consumers so 
the probability that the next firm sampled charges a particular price is 
directly proportional to the number of unsampled firms charging that price. 
Let s be the number of firms remaining to be sampled, 0 < S < J, so that 
s is an index of the extent of search over time. Because there is full recall, 
the state of the consumer in the search process is characterized entirely by 
the pair (s'Pj)' where Pj is the lowest price already sampled. 
Search has both a financial cost and a direct utility cost. Let w be the 
wealth that the consumer would have remaining if he searched all J firms at 
the constant financial cost c, and let I be his income at point s. Then 
I = w + sc 
The indirect utility from purchasing the searched-for good at p. when income 
J 
is w+sc is Y(s,p.). The direct disutility of taking an additional quotation is 
J 
S(s,p.). Since the function S has the same domain as Y and describes a 
J 
marginal cost there is no loss of generality from S being additively separable 
from Y. 
There is no cost, financial or utility, to sampling the first firm. This 
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ensures that the consumer will always start to search. Having started, the 
consumer's problem is to find the expected-utility maximizing stopping rule: a 
decision on whether to stop or continue 'search at every possible pair (s, p.). 
J 
Let U(s,p.) be the expected utility of a consumer who has taken J-s 
J 
quotations and for whom p. is the lowest price sampled, assuming the optimal 
J 
stopping rule is followed at that and every succeeding point. Let Z(s,p.) be 
J 
the increase in expected utility from taking an additional quotation. U(s,p.) 
, J 
is found by the dynamic program 
U(s,p.) = max {V(S,P')' V(s,p.)+Z(s,p.) } 
J J J J 
j :$ s+l, (4-2-1) 
j-l 
and Z(s,p.) = S-J
s
'+lU(S-l,PJ') + ~ L U(s-l,p.) - S(s,p.) - V(s,p.) (4-2-2) 
J si=l 1 J J 
where 
In equation (4-2-1), the value of continuing search is expressed as the 
value of stopping added to the marginal gain from continuing. The separate 
definition of a marginal benefit makes it easier to transfer notation from the 
general case of utility maximization to the special case, considered in the 
next section, of expenditure minimization. 
Note that if the s firms remaining to be sampled are those with the s 
lowest prices, the lowest price sampled till then will be Ps+l' For any other 
combination of remaining prices, the lowest quotation will be less than this. 
The index of the lowest quotation, j, can therefore never exceed s+l. So that 
equation (4-2-2) is defined for j = s+l, however, the variable U(s,p 2) is s+ 
defined but it has no interpretation as it always has a coefficient of zero. 
Likewise the convention is used throughout that 
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b 
L (.) - 0 when a > b. 
i=a 
Where a consumer is indifferent between stopping and continuing, the 
convention is followed that the consumer will choose to stop. With this 
notation, the consumer's optimal stopping rule can be stated: stop search if 
and only if Z(s,p.) ~ D. 
J 
4.3 Reservation Prices. 
To clearly identify the source of results, we consider the increasingly 
general cases of inelastic demand, quasilinear utility, and general elastic 
demand. 
A. Inelastic Demand. 
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Let the consumer demand one unit of the searched for good,2 let him only 
have a financial search cost and be risk neutral. It is convenient in this 
case to consider reductions in expected expenditure rather than increases in 
expected utility. Let A(s,p.) be the expected cost (from purchase and 
J 
additional search) after J-s quotations if the lowest quotation received at 
that point is p. and assuming the optimal stopping policy is followed at that 
J 
and every succeeding point. Then, 
A(s,p.) = min{ Pj' p.-Z(s,p.) } j ~ s+l (4-3-1) J J J 
j-1 [ s-j+1 + c 1 Z(s,p.) 1 (4-3-2) where = p. - --A(s-l p.) + - L A(s-l,p.) s ' J 
2 
J J Si=l 1 
This easily extends to inelastic demand for X units of the good: By choosing 
appropriate units of measurement for price, X can be arbitrarily set equal 
to one without loss of generality. A change in X is then equivalent to an 
inversely proportional change in c. 
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A(s,p.) is the negative of a utility measure. More precisely, there 
J 
exists the indirect-utility function 
V(s,p) - -p + W + cs (4-3-3) 
that describes the preferences underlying the inelastic demand, giving 
A(s,p.) - -U(s,p.). 
J J 
The definitions of Z(s,p.) in (4-3-2) and (4-2-1) are therefore consistent 
J 
with each other; the optimal stopping policy is still to continue search only 
when Z(s,p.) is positive. In this case, Z(s,p.) is the expected reduction in 
J J 
total expenditure from taking an additional quotation. As with U(s,p 2)' s+ 
A(s,p 2) is defined but has no interpretation. s+ 
For a given distribution of prices, the marginal benefit of search must 
be lower, the lower the minimum price already observed since the price 
reduction associated with any newly sampled price will be lower. In the case 
of inelastic demand, this automatically implies diminishing returns to search 
(and hence a reservation price) since the search cost is independent of price. 
Proposition 4-1: 
For each s, there is a reservation price r S such that search will 
S terminate if p. ~ r and continue otherwise. That is, 
J 
Proof: 
3 k s.t. Z(s,p.) ~ 0 
J 
\;/ j ~ k. 
It is sufficient to show that Z(s'Pj) is non-decreasing in Pj' for all 
j ~ s+l, for all s. The proof is by induction. 
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a) From (4-3-2) 
and 
so 
Z(1, Pi) = -c 
Z(l,P2) = P2-Pl-c , 
and the proposition holds for s=l. 
b) Assume that Z(s-l,p.) is non-decreasing in p .. Then, 
J J 
~ A(s-l,p.) - p. j ~ s-l (4-3-4) 
J J 
Now 
[ 
j-l 1 s-j 1 -A(s-l,p. 1) + - L A(s-l,p.) + -A(s-l,p.) 
s J+ si=l 1 s J 
which is positive (from (4-3-4)). It follows that if the proposition holds for 
s-l, it holds for s. 
Let C(s,p.) be the search cost that would leave the consumer indifferent 
J 
between stopping and continuing search at the point (s,p.)-that is, the 
J 
search cost for which Z(s,p.) = O. The existence of a reservation price rule 
J 
o 
means that the consumer's optimal policy can be described by a single variable 
rS. To use duality in deriving demand functions, C(s,p.) needs to be a 
J 
function defined for all (s,p.). This requires that r S be a monotonic function 
J 
of c. 
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Corollary: 
The reservation price is non-decreasing in c. 
Proof: 
BZ 
From equation (4-3-2), Bc < o. The result follows. 
o 
The diminishing returns to search that led to Proposition 4-1 reflected 
the fact that the sampling distribution of price reductions is different for 
different values of p. given s. This property, of course, applies to with-
J 
replacement search as well. There is a second effect when sequential sampling 
is without replacement As the number of firms remaining to be sampled changes, 
there is a change in the sampling distribution of prices. This results in a 
form of increasing returns to search over time: The more firms that have 
already been sampled for a given minimum price, the more chance there is of 
sampling the lower prices on succeeding searches, and so the greater is the 
expected gain from search. This leads to a no-recall result as it implies that 
the reservation price is non-increasing" as search progresses (that is, non-
decreasing in s). A non-increasing reservation price is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for consumers to always buy from the last firm sampled. 
Proposition 4-2: 
The recall option will never be exercised. 
Proof: 
If the reservation price is non-decreasing in s, then 
'* A(s,p.) 
J 
Let Pk be the reservation price at s-1 so Z(s-1,Pk) ~ o. It is sufficient to 
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show that 
The reservation price rule implies that 
. { s-k+1 1
k
-1 } A(s, Pk ) = mm Pk ' --Pk + - L p. + C s si=l 1 
[
S-k+1 1 k-1 
= Pk - -s-Pk + s L Pi i=l 
and, by definition, 
[
S-k+1 
-s-A(s-Z, Pk) 
k-1 
1 
+ - L A(s-Z,p.) 
si=l 1 
k-1 
- S(!-1)iE
1
(A(S-Z,Pk) 
Now clearly, 
k > i 
and, from (4-3-1), 
A(s-l,p.) =:; p. 
J J 
\fj 
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so that 
It follows that 
o 
The consumer's optimization problem can be shown on a grid where each 
cell represents a pair (s,p.). This is illustrated in Figure 4-1 where each 
J 
cell contains the value A(s,p.) calculated for an example where prices are 
J 
successive multiples of 12 and c = 10. The triangular shape of the grid 
results from the assumption of with-replacement sampling. Proposition 4-1 
implies that the grid can be partitioned into two regions by a single line 
. 5 432 10 following the reservation prIces (r =36, r =r =r =24, r =r =12), shown as a 
heavy border in Figure 4-1. The upper region represents the decision to 
continue search and the lower region the decision to stop. Proposition 4-2 
shows that this line is non-increasing. The figure shows, for example, that a 
searcher whose lowest quotation is 48 when 3 firms remain to be sampled will 
choose not to buy at that price, but will continue search with expected addi-
tional expenditure of 31. In the region for which search stops, A(s,p.)=p., so 
J J 
entries horizontal to each other are identical. To the right of the reser-
vat ion-price border, the entries decrease from left to right, illustrating the 
increasing returns property mentioned above. The equality of the values for 
A(s,p.) above the reservation-price border, for any s, reflects the fact that 
J 
the reservation price is non-increasing as s decreases. For instance, a 
searcher who decides to continue search when 5 firms remain unsampled will 
then never stop while the lowest quotation exceeds 24. Whether the first 
quotation was 48, 60, or 72 is irrelevant to his expected expenditure. 
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Figure 4-1. Table of A(s,p.) when c = 10. 
J 
P =72 6 
P =60 5 
P =48 4 
P =36 3 
P =24 2 
P =12 1 
37.9 
37.9 
37.9 
36 
24 
12 
5 
34.5 
34.5 
34.5 
24 
12 
4 
31 
31 27 
24 24 
12 12 
3 2 
B. Elastic Demand with Quasilinear Utility. 
22 
12 12 II 
1 o s 
It was noted earlier that a property of inelastic demand that ensures a 
reservation price rule is that the marginal cost of search is independent of 
price. If equation (4-3-3) is modified so that the consumer's indirect utility 
function takes the form 
V(s,p) v(p) + w + cs, 
then demand can be elastic and the search cost still be independent of price. 
Propositions 4-1 and 4-2 then extend, with the only modification to the proofs 
being that -v(p) needs to be substituted for p. in the expressions for A(s,p.) 
J J 
and Z(S,p.). 
J 
C. General Elastic Demand. 
In this formulation, marginal search costs need not be independent of 
price. To generalize Proposition 4-1 the following additional assumptions are 
made. 
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Assumption 4-1: 
a) 
82y 
8p8I 
~ 0 
b) 8S ~ 0 8p 
Proposition 4-3: 
S If Assumption 4-1 holds then, for each s, there is a reservation price r 
such that search will terminate if p. ~ r S and continue otherwise. That is, 
J 
Proof: 
3 k s.t. Z(s,p.) ~ 0 
J 
Given in Appendix B. 
o 
Yeendorp (1985) has shown, in the case of with-replacement sampling, that 
the reservation price rule does not necessarily hold when income effects are 
allowed for. He gives a sufficient condition that the marginal utility of 
income falls in price. It is interesting that this assumption is also used by 
Manning and Morgan (1982) to ensure a unique optimal sample size when extend-
ing FSS search to allow income effects. The requirement is that the marginal 
cost of search be higher at lower prices. In this chapter, because a direct 
utility cost has been allowed in addition to the financial cost, Assumption 
4-1 (b) is made. This also has a counterpart in Chapter 3--Assumption 3-2 (d). 
The properties of a reservation price rule in sequential search and of a 
unique local optimal search size in FSS search seem unrelated but both arise 
from the common objective, referred to in the introduction, of showing dimin-
ishing returns to search intensity. Yeendorp presents an example where a 
consumer will stop search at high or low prices and continue at prices in the 
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middle because the expected utility reduction from spending income on search 
is great at high prices. The assumption that a2YlapaI ~ 0 ensures that the 
utility loss is greater at lower prices; this supplements the property that 
the lower the best quote received, the lower the probability of reducing it on 
further search. In the Manning and Morgan model, increasing the number of 
2 firms searched reduces the expected price. In this case, a YlapaI ~ 0 then en-
sures that the indirect utility reduction from search is non-decreasing in n. 
It is not, then, that a reservation price rule and a unique optimal 
sample size are equivalent properties in some sense, but that they depend on a 
common property-diminishing returns. The following no-recall result, however, 
relies on increasing returns as more prices are sampled. The sufficient 
conditions used to generalize Proposition 4-2 therefore have the reverse 
inequalities from the equivalent conditions in Assumption 3-2. 
Assumption 4-2: 
a) 
a2 y 
aI 2 
~ 0 
b) as as 
~ 0 
c) 
a 2 y 
0 apaI ~ 
Assumption 4-2 (c) contradicts the sufficient condition for the 
reservation-price rule to hold. The proof of the following proposition showing 
no recall uses both Assumption 4-2 and the reservation-price property. For 
there to be a non-increasing reservation price it is necessary that la2YlaIapi 
and c be low relative to a2YlaI2 and s. This, of course is true in the case of 
quasilinear utility, which is why the no-use-of-recall could be proven there. 
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Proposition 4-4: 
If the reservation price property a.nd Assumption 4-2 hold, then the 
recall option will not be exercised. 
Proof: 
Given in Appendix B. 
o 
4.4 The Dual Function. 
In this and the following section, only inelastic consumer demand is 
considered. The basic result, that demand functions are not everywhere 
differentiable, carries over to the more general formulations though. 
Recall that C(s,p.) is the search cost that would leave the consumer 
J 
indifferent between stopping and continuing at point (s,p.), so, from (4-3-1), 
J 
j-l 
= S-J
s
·+1A(s-1,PJ.) + ~ L A(s-l,p.) + C(s,p.) 
Pj si=l 1 J 
(4-4-1) 
The first objective here is to find an expression for C(s,p.) as a function of 
J 
the prices Pl ... Pj. 
The difficulty in solving in general for C(s,p.) as a function of prices 
J 
is that each term A(s,p.) involves a succession of minimum functions when 
J 
expanded out. This is not a problem when j=l or j=2 , however. To get a feel 
for the problem these two cases are considered first before a formulation for 
the general case is extracted. Where C(s,p.) can be written c without 
J 
ambiguity, this will be done. 
A. j=1. 
Clearly, indifference requires C(s,Pl) = 0 V s. 
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B. j=2. 
From (4-4-1), 
(4-4-2) 
C(S,P2) is defined so that continuing search at (s,P2) is an optimal action. 
By Proposition 4-2, it must therefore be optimal at all (t,pz) for t<s. 
Therefore, 
= o < t < S. 
Equation (4-4-2) can then be expanded out 
+ C 
and so on until t=1, giving 
so 
Note that when one firm remains to be sampled, indifference requires that 
the search cost be equal to the (known) reduction in price. The fact that 
C(s,P2) increases as s decreases is the representation in the dual function of 
the increasing-returns property that gave non-increasing reservation prices. 
C. The general case. 
When j > 2, for c = C(s,P.), Proposition 4-2 implies that for any t < s, 
J 
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j-l 
) = t-j+l ( 1 ) A(t, p. -t-A t-l, PJ') + t L A(t-l, p. 
J i=l 1 
+ C 
Any term, A(s-l,p.), can therefore be expanded out as a function of A(t,p.), 
J 1 
t < s-l, i<j, as in the case where j=2. For l<i<j, the minimum function in the 
definition of A (equation (4-3-1» cannot be ignored. Here again, though, 
Proposition 4-2 simplifies the problem. As the reservation prices are non-
increasing as s decreases, the consumer's optimal policy can be described by a 
set of image reservation prices: values x. defined for each p. such that 
J J 
search will stop at p. for every s ~ x .. Formally, 
J J 
With this notation, 
{ 
Pi x. :S t 1 
A(t,p.) = (4-4-3) 
1 t-i+l 
i-l 
1 > t -t-A(t-l, Pi) + t L A(t-l,Ph) + c x. 
h=l 
1 
All terms A(t,p.) can then be successively expanded out as functions of x .. 
1 1 
Let x = (xl' ... ,xj ) be the vector of image reservation prices, and let 
C (s,p.) be the search cost that would leave the searcher indifferent between 
x J 
continuing and stopping search at the point (s,P.) if the stopping policy from 
J 
then on is given by the image reservation prices x. Substituting (4-4-3) in 
(4-4-1), the following expression for C (s,p.) is obtained. The derivation is 
x J 
given in Appendix B. 
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N(Pj) 
j > 1 max i5T-:J 
C (s,p.) = 
x PJ 
(4-4-4) 
x J j = 1 0 
where 
N(p. ) 
J 
x. 1! ] 1 - ( 1 ~. )" Ph ' (4-4-5) x i +1 1 .1 
D(p. ) 
J 
(s+1)! j-1[j-1 ] (x.+1)! (x.-i+1) 
= (s-j)!j +.L1 kTI . (xk+1-k) (X~-i+1)!~(i+1) , 
1= =1 1 
(4-4-6) 
Since consumers choose x to minimize costs, or, in the dual problem, to 
maximize C(s,p.), 
J 
C(s,p.) = max C (s,p.) 
J x x J 
subject to x =0' 
1 ' 
x.=s 
J 
The restriction that x. ~ i-1 follows from the point (t,p.) being 
1 1 
feasible only for t ~ i-1; xi ~ x
i
+
1 
follows from Proposition 4-2; and 
x. = s,from C(s,p.) being defined to give indifference at (s,p.). 
J J J 
(4-4-7) 
Finally, before using equation (4-4-4) to derive properties of demand 
functions, a result useful to these derivations is given. 
Proposition 4-5: 
If Pj = P j+1' then C(s,p.) = C(s,p. 1) J J+ 
Proof: 
Given in Appendix B. 
o 
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4.5 Demand Functions. 
Let consumers have identical inelastic demand for the searched-for good. 
Their search costs can differ, given by the distribution function H(c). Let 
qj(Pj) be the expected demand for firm j. 
A firm's price affects its demand in two ways: By influencing the 
decision of consumers to stop search after sampling other firms, it affects 
the number of consumers who sample that firm; and it then affects whether 
those consumers sampling the firm decide to purchase from it or continue 
sampling. 
Now, a consumer who has received a quote lower than p. will never buy 
J 
from firm j. Let ~sj be the expected number of consumers who sample firm j 
when there are s other firms remaining to be sampled, and who have not 
received a quote lower than p .. These consumers need not be a representative 
J 
cross-section of all consumers in terms of their search costs, as the probab-
ility that a consumer continues search until s firms remain unsampled depends 
on his search cost. Let H . be the distribution function of search costs for 
sJ 
these consumers. The proportion of the ~ . consumers whose search cost is 
sJ 
sufficiently low to induce search to continue is therefore H .(C(s,p.)), while 
sJ J 
the proportion (1 - H(C(S,Pj))) will stop and buy from firm j. Therefore, 
J-1 
qJ' = E ~ .(1-H .(C(S,P.))) 
s=o sJ sJ J 
(4-5-1) 
(Recall that J is the total number of firms. ) 
1 Now on average, ---J .~ . of the consumers sampling firm j when s firms 
-J sJ 
remain unsampled will have sampled firm i, i>j, when s+1 firms were unsampled. 
i 
Let H . be the distribution function of search costs for those consumers. 
sJ 
Then, 
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J 1 H . (c) = J_. L Hi.(c) (4-5-2) sJ J i =j+1 sJ 
H(s+1) i (c) 
c :5 C(s+l, p. ) 
H(s+l)i (C(s+l,Pi) 1 i 
with H . (c) = 
SJ 
1 c > C(s+l, p. ) 
1 
and H(J_1)j(c) = H(c) 
with 
Likewise, ~sj can be found recursively, 
1 J 
~sJ· = ~ L ~( +l)·H( +1)· (C(s+l,p.) s i=j+1 s 1 s 1 1 
M 
~(J-1)j = J 
where M is the total number of consumers. 
} s < J+1 (4-5-3) 
(4-5-4) 
The demand function for firm j is given by equations (4-5-1) - (4-5-4). 
The following result follows from these equations. 
Theorem 4-1: 
If H(c) is continuous and differentiable, then the expected demand for 
each firm is a continuous monotonic-decreasing function in its own price. 
Proof: 
Only a price change that leave the ranking of prices unaltered is con-
sidered. The continuity implied by Proposition 4-5 ensures that the result 
applies to global changes as well. 
From (4-5-1) - (4-5-4) and the continuity of H, q. is continuous in each 
J 
C(s,p.), i~j. Continuity of q. in price then follows from the C(s,p.) being 
1 J 1 
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continuous in price Vs V i~j, as shown by equation (4-4-4). 
Where the derivatives exist, 
aq. 
J = 
ap. 
J 
J -1 aq . ac ( s , p .) J -1 J aq . 
L J. J + L L J 
Oac (s, p . ) ap . s=O . . 1 ac (s, p. ) s= J J 1=J+ 1 
Now, from (4-5-1) 
aqj 
< 0 ac(s, p.) 
J 
V s; 
and from (4-5-3) , 
i aH . (c) 
sJ ~ 0 ac(s, p. ) 
1 
V i>j, 
so, from (4-5-1) , 
aq j 
~ 0 ac(s, p. ) 
1 
V i>j, Vs 
Finally, from (4-4-4), where the derivatives exist, 
ac(s, p.) 
J 
ap. 
J 
> 0 
ac(s, p. ) 
1 
ap. 
J 
< 0 
ac(s, p. ) 
1 
V i>j 
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(4-5-5) 
(4-5-6) 
(4-5-7) 
(4-5-8) 
(4-5-9) 
aq
j Substituting (4-5-6), (4-5-8) and (4-5-9) into (4-5-5) shows that < o. ap. 
J o 
The dual function, C, is defined as the upper envelope of a finite number 
of functions, C . As a result, C is non-differentiable at a finite number of x 
points. 
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Theorem 4-2: 
If the number of firms is finite but exceeds two, the demand functions 
for each firm will be characterized by both inward and outward kinks-that is, 
by points where the elasticity of demand for price increases is higher and 
points where it is lower than for price decreases. 
Proof: 
From equations (4-4-4) - (4-4-6), note that C (s,p.) is differentiable in 
x J 
p .. When J=2, the restriction in (4-4-7) implies that x takes a single value; 
J 
C is then equal everywhere to some differentiable function C . Let P. be a 
x J 
value of Pj where the optimal value of x changes for some C(s,Pi)' i~j; that 
is, a value of Pj where there exists vectors of image reservation prices, Xl 
and X2, and € > 0 such that, given all other prices, 
C (s,p.) C (s,p.) " > Pj = Pj + € Xl J X2 J 
C(s,p.) C (s,p.) C (s,p.) " (4-5-10) = = Pj = Pj 1 Xl J X2 J 
C (s,p.) C (s,p.) " > Pj = Pj - € X2 J Xl J 
" When J>2, there will be a finite number of such points p .. At any of these, 
J 
(4-5-10) implies that 
ac(s, p. ) 
1
. 1 
1m a ,,+ p. 
Pj Pj J 
> 
ac(s, p. ) 
1 
ap. 
J 
A 
At values, Pj' of Pj where there is non-differentiability in C(s'Pj)' then, 
(4-5-6) gives 
an inward (to the origin) kink, 
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A 
and for values, Pj' of Pj where there is non-differentiability in C(s,Pi)' 
i > j, (4-5-8) gives 
an outward kink. 
D 
If a firm has a differentiable cost function, it will never set its price 
at a point where its demand function has an outward kink. The demand functions 
produced from this form of search are therefore as troublesome to the exist-
ence of equilibria as are the discontinuities resulting from FSS search (which 
are, in effect, outward kinks) since the best-reply functions of firms will 
not be continuous. Examples of existent equilibria can be obtained, but any 
such examples are not robust. For-instance, Stiglitz (1987) has shown that a 
single price equilibrium is not possible under with-replacement search when 
h(O) > a and there are more than two firms. This is because, if all other 
prices are the same, a firm has an outward kink at that price in its demand 
function. He does give an example of a dispersed price equilibria with three 
firms. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks. 
This chapter has been concerned with demonstrating both the similarities 
and differences between sequential search models using with-replacement 
sampling and those using without-replacement. Although some desirable proper-
ties of the former model carryover to the latter, namely the reservation-
price rule and no-use-of-recall, without-replacement sampling does not lead to 
nicely behaved demand functions for firms. 
It is not the without-replacement assumption per-se that leads to demand 
kinks, but rather the non-stationarity of the problem. non-stationarity 
requires that later reservation prices be calculated when solving the dual at 
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any point, and so leads to a maximum operator in the definition of C. Station-
arity also fails when there are income effects, discounting over time, 
adaptive learning, or search costs that depend on the number of firms sampled 
(as, for example, when search costs arise from spatial separation of firms). 
These cases also lead to kinked demand functions. Equilibrium models which use 
the standard with-replacement model of sequential search are indeed special. 
78 Part B 
CHAPTER 5: BLIND SEARCH -- ADAPTIVE SAMPLING WITH MINIMUM INFORMATION 
5.1 Introduction. 
A formal specification of the the optimization problem of agents facing 
an uncertain environment requires that the agents have some information about 
the uncertainty. For example, under the rational-expectations assumption 
common to most models of consumer price search, consumers are assumed to know 
the price distribution; the only uncertainty is over the prices charged by 
particular firms. This assumption assigns consumers the maximum possible 
amount of information about prices consistent with a stochastic model. With 
such a strong assumption, strong results are obtained. The major results of 
the basic rational-expectations, sequential search model-a stationary 
reservation price, myopia, and no use of recall-all depend on rational 
expectations. 
In adaptive search models, sequentially-searching consumers have less 
information. They have prior beliefs about the price distribution, but can 
update these beliefs as search progresses. Models of adaptive search have been 
developed by Axell (1974), Rothschild (1974), Kohn and Shavell (1974), 
1 
Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981), and Morgan (1985). One of the appeals of 
adaptive models is generality. For instance, the Rothschild, Kohn and Shavell, 
and Morgan models all include rational expectations as a special case in which 
the prior belief accords certainty to a particular price distribution. The 
cost of generality is that adaptive models yield few predictions, for almost 
any result is possible given appropriate priors. Stronger results can be 
obtained by placing restrictions on the priors. For instance, Rothschild 
derives most of the results in his paper for the case where consumers' priors 
have the Dirichlet distribution. 
1 
Kohn and Shavell consider a general model which includes adaptive search 
among its possible interpretations. 
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The adaptive model considered in this chapter, termed "Blind Search" for 
reference, imposes very strong restrictions on consumers' beliefs about the 
price distribution. These beliefs represent about the minimum amount of infor-
mation that can be given to consumers and still leave a problem that can be 
formalized. The assumption is made that consumers' initial priors are over how 
prices are related rather than the absolute level of prices--that is, over the 
second rather than the first moment of the price distribution. This yields 
strong predictions about searchers' behaviour that, by casual empiricism, seem 
realistic. Among these is that consumers will be induced to stop search by 
both wide and narrow ranges of sampled prices. The main motivation for the 
model, however, is that within the range of search behaviour encompassed by 
general adaptive models, Rational Expectations Search and Blind Search 
represent the two extremes in terms of the information available to searchers. 
The specific results obtainable from the two models can then serve as useful 
benchmarks for considering the importance of information assumptions in models 
using search. Blind Search is used as such a benchmark in the following 
chapter, which considers the robustness of equilibrium results to the 
rational-expectations assumption. 
The assumptions made about consumers' beliefs are motivated in the 
following section. The model is formally presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 
establishes properties of Blind Search, which are used to derive comparative 
static results in Section 5.5, and to make comparisons with Rational 
Expectations Search in Section 5.6. Some derivations and proofs for this 
chapter are contained in Appendix C. 
5.2 Blind Search. 
The reason that the assumption of Rational Expectations seems very strong 
is not that it is unrealistic for consumers to know the price distribution 
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completely, but that they cannot have this information without also knowing 
the prices charged by specific firms. Until they acquire such specific 
information by search, consumers can only have vague prior beliefs about the 
price distribution. 
The prices observed by search do, however, give information about the 
distribution of the unsampled prices. It is reasonable for searchers to assume 
that the prices charged by different firms for a homogeneous good have 
positive correlation; that is, the observation of a low price makes it more 
likely that other prices are low. If prices are correlated, then those known 
as a result of the search process act as a signal about the prices charged by 
the remaining firms. One way of modeling this explicitly is to assume that all 
prices are perceived by searchers to be random variables independently drawn 
from the same distribution. As prices are sampled, information is gathered 
about the distribution from which they are assumed to be drawn. 2 
The interpretation of prices as signals suggests a way of modeling 
searchers' prior beliefs. Consumers only have a rough idea of the absolute 
level of prices, but past experience in other markets gives them some idea on 
how the prices in a particular market are likely to be related. It seems 
natural, then, to assume that consumers' priors are not over absolute prices, 
but over higher moments of the distribution. The assumption, that priors are 
over higher moments, implies that no beliefs about the price distribution 
itself are required to formulate the optimization problem. This and the fact 
2 In most search models, the population about which searchers' beliefs are 
formed is the actual distribution of prices charged by firms. Here, uncer-
tainty is captured by assuming actual prices to be random variables drawn 
from an unobservable population. When there is an infinity of firms, there 
is no difference between the approaches. When there is a finite number of 
firms, the present approach allows with-replacement statistical theory to be 
applied to without-replacement behaviour. It also allows the price distri-
bution to be considered continuous without compromising internal consistency 
when considering a small number of firms. 
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that uniform distributions are used for the priors that are required are the 
features that make Blind Search a minimum information model. These features 
are presented in detail in the next section. 
As usual, although the language of buyers searching for the lowest price 
is used, variables can be reinterpreted to apply to seller search, searching 
for utility etc. The only qualification is that the search cost c is expressed 
in the same units as the searched for data (e.g. dollars, utils ... ) and must 
be constant over search. This constraint in effect assumes away discounting 
and income effects. 
5.3 Notation and Set-up of the Model. 
A. The Sampling Environment. 
There are J firms selling a homogeneous good. The consumer is assumed to 
sample these firms sequentially, without replacement to find the lowest price. 
He wants to buy one unit of the good. The consumer always samples at least one 
firm. After each quotation he must decide whether to search an additional firm 
at costc, or to purchase at the lowest quotation received up to that stage; 
that is, full recall is assumed. His criterion for this decision is to 
minimize expected expenditure. Because search is without replacement, J is the 
maximum number of quotations that can be sought. 
B. The Consumer's Prior. 
The consumer regards all prices as being i.i.d. random variables, each 
drawn from the same distribution with unknown range x. Buyers have a prior 
belief that x is itself uniformly distributed, over the range [a,X]. X is 
known; it is the only information about the price distribution that consumers 
have prior to search. 
There are two sources of uncertainty here: the uncertainty arising 
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because prices are random variables, and the uncertainty over x. The first is 
common to all search models. If the magnitude of x and its location on the 
real line were known (that is, the price support), then this structure would 
be formally equivalent to rational-expectations search from a uniform 
continuum of prices where the searcher was limited to taking no more than J 
quotations. It is the uncertainty over x that makes this model adaptive. The 
quotations received enable the prior on x to be updated and also give 
information on the absolute level of prices. 
Note the sense in which this is a minimum information model. All the 
information about prices comes from sampling, since these assumptions imply 
that the original prior on prices is an improper uniform distribution over the 
range [-00, 00]. The prior about the distribution of the price range allows the 
posterior price distribution to be a proper distribution over a bounded 
support. For instance, after one price, Pi' has been sampled, the posterior 
price distribution is defined over [Pi-X, Pl+X]. 
The assumptions made about consumers' beliefs imply that, before search, 
consumers think positive and negative prices to be equally likely. Although 
unrealistic, this keeps the analysis simple. An additional constraint that the 
searcher expects all prices to be non-negative would only affect the results 
when sampled prices were low. As long as the maximum price sampled exceeds X, 
the support of the posterior distribution is positive everywhere, so an 
assumption of non-negative prices would be redundant. 
C. The Consumer's Problem. 
Let {p}n be the set of prices, {Pl,P2' ... Pn}' observed after n firms 
have been sampled, let Pnt and Pnh be the minimum and maximum prices in this 
sequence, and let x be the sample range 
n 
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F (pl{p}n) is the distribution function of the (n+l)th price after the 
n 
information in {p}n is used to update prior beliefs. 
The consumer's problem is to find the stopping rule that minimizes 
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expected expenditure. Let A ({p}n) be the expected cost (from additional 
n 
search and purchase) for a consumer who has observed {p}n, assuming the 
optimal stopping policy is followed at that and every succeeding point. Then 
(5-3-1) 
With the usual convention that a consumer indifferent between stopping and 
continuing search will stop, the optimal stopping rule can be expressed: Stop 
search if and only if A ({p}n) = p n' 
n n~ 
This, of course, implies continuing search if and only if the marginal 
benefit exceeds the marginal cost c. Since c is constant, it will be con-
venient to characterize the consumer's problem at every point by the marginal 
benefit of taking an additional quotation. Let G*(x ) be the marginal benefit 
n n 
after n quotations, gross of the search cost, of taking an (n+l)th quotation 
assuming the optimal policy is followed from then on. Then, 
(5-3-2) 
and the optimal stopping rule can be reexpressed in terms of G*(x ): Stop 
n n 
search if and only if C*(x ) ~ c. G* is written as a function of the sample n n n 
range, x
n
' rather than {p}n since, as will be shown in the next section, the 
particular prior beliefs assumed here imply that x is a sufficient statistic 
n 
to determine the stopping rule. That is, {p}n only affects the stopping rule 
through its effect on x . 
n 
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5.4 Properties of Blind Search. 
The properties of G*(x ) are derived in three stages as follows: 
n n 
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a) Let G (x ) be the marginal benefit when x is known for a searcher 
n n 
taking one and only one additional quotation. Then 
(5-4-1) 
where F (pl{p}n) is the distribution function of p 1 when x is known. Because n n+ 
knowing x is equivalent to knowing the distribution of a uniform continuum of 
prices, this is the standard rational-expectations, sequential search 
3 problem. 
b) Let G (x ) be the marginal benefit of a single quotation when x is n n 
unknown, so 
G (x ) = p n n nt -
(5-4-2) 
Let p(xl{p}n) be the posterior density function of x when the searcher has 
information {p}n. Then, 
so from (5-4-1) and (5-4-2) 
3 
This is true because the standard problem is myopic; that is, the searcher's 
stopping rule can be found by considering the expected value of taking one 
more quotation. 
86 Part B 
G (x ) = ( G (x )·p(xl{p}n) dx. 
n n n n 
x 
(5~4-3) 
n 
c) The true value of additional search G*(x ) differs from G (x ) as it 
n n n n 
takes into account the information an additional quotation will contain about 
the value of searching yet further when searchers are not constrained to take 
only one more quotation. From (5-3-2) and (5-3-1) 
G~(Xn) = Pnl - J[min{ p, Pn/' 
[JAn+z({{p}n,p,p' })'dFn+1 (p' I{{p}n,p}) + cnj'dFn(PI{p}n) 
= Pnl - I[P(n+l)1 + min{ 0, 
[JAn+z ({{p}n,p,p'})'dFn+1 (P' I{{p}n,p}) + cJ - Pnl }j'dFn(PI{P}n) 
= Gn(Xn ) + I max{ 0, Pnl -
(from (5-4-2)) 
(5-4~4) 
With G*(x ) expressed as a dynamic program derived from G (x ), proper-n n n n 
ties of G (x ) can be extended to G*(x ) by backward induction. These three 
n n n n 
stages are now developed fully. 
A. G (x ). 
n n 
Because there is full recall, the value of continuing search depends only 
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on the distribution of prices below the lowest price already sampled, Pnt. It 
is well known from the search literature that4 
(5-4-5) 
If x is known, prices are uniform i.i.d. random variables distributed 
over some interval [a,a+x], giving a distribution of prices, conditional on a, 
p-a 
~ x 
a :S P :S a+x. (5-4-6) 
Now a is itself uniform, over [p n-(x-x ), p n]' (The limits arise because the 
n<- n n<-
population minimum, a, cannot exceed the sample minimum, Pnt; and the sample 
maximum, p n+x , cannot exceed the population maximum, a+x.) Therefore, 
nL n 
p 
" L ,+x -~ 
n<- n 
(p-a) 1 ~. (~-x ) da 
n 
for p n+x -x :S P :S n<- n 
(The upper limit of the integration arises from the restriction in (5-4-6) 
that p ~ a.) This integral gives 
4 
(p-p t+(x-x ))2 
F (p I {p}n) = __ n ___ n __ 
n 2x(x-x ) 
n 
Equation (5-4-7) into (5-4-5) gives 
G (x ) 
n n = J
Pnt 
p n+x -x nL n 
(p-p t+(x-x ))2 
n n dp 
2x(x-x ) 
n 
For example see Rothschild (1974); the formula derives from equation 
(5-4-1), integrating by parts. 
(5-4-7) 
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(x-x )2 
n =---
6x 
For later reference, the full p.d.f. of prices conditional on x, 
f (pl{p}n), is given here. 
n 
p-p +x-x 
nl n 
~(~-x ) 
n 
1 
7<: 
X 
x-x +p -p 
n nh 
~(~-x ) 
n 
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(5-4-8) 
(5-4-9) 
This is illustrated in Figure 5-1. For P<Pnl' fn(p) is derived from 
(5-4-7). From the set-up of the problem, prices above Pnh are as likely as 
those below Pnl' so the density is symmetric. Between Pnl and Pnh' the 
distribution of observed prices contains no information; all prices within 
this range are equally likely to be the next price observed. 
Figure 5-1. 
B. G (x ). 
n n 
f (p) 
n 
1 
7<: 
X 
p 
Let p(x Ix) be the conditional density function of x . It is shown in 
n n 
Appendix C that 
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p(x Ix) = n(n_1)x~-2[1_Xn] 
n "n-l " X X 
By Bayes' Theorem, 
p(x Ix) 'p(x) 
n p(xlx ) = -;;;-;---------
n JX p(xnlx/)'p(x/)dx' 
x 
n 
= ~(i)n-2(l_i) 
Jx _1 (Xn) n-2 (1-Xn) dx ' xn x' x' x' 
(since p(x) 1 = p(x') = X). 
The following substitutions simplify the integrals: 
Let R = (:n) , R = (i), and R' = (:~). Then, 
p(xlx ) = 
n r R' n-3 (l-R' )dR' 
R 
(5-4-10) 
(5-4-11 ) 
When x and x are known, all distribution of n prices giving that x are 
n n 
equally likely. It follows that x exhausts the information about x contained 
n 
in {p}n, and hence that x is a sufficient statistic to update the 
n 
distribution of x. 
x 
Substituting R for ~ in equation (5-4-8), and the result and (5-4-11) x 
into (5-4-3), gives 
(5-4-12) 
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We continue to use the substitute variables R, R' and R purely for typo-
graphical convenience. In this form it is clear that G (x ) is homogeneous of 
n n 
degree 1 in all prices, since R is independent of the units of measurement. 
G (x ) depends only on the observed price range, and not the values of 
n n 
specific prices. This arises because the sample range is a sufficient 
statistic to update prior beliefs, and because the consumer, in deciding 
whether to continue search, is interested in the expected reduction in the 
minimum price rather than the minimum price itself. This feature is 
particularly important when n=l. G1 (xl) only has an interpretation at x1=O, 
since the sample range must always equal zero after one observation. Solving 
equation (5-4-12) for n=l gives 
= X(1-6R+3R
2 +2R3 -6R2 InR) 
12 (l-R+RlnR) 
with 
x = 12· (5-4-13) 
Because the searcher has no prior beliefs on the absolute level of prices, the 
first quotation gives no information on the spread of prices. Put another way, 
the price sample loses a degree of freedom in estimating the population mean. 
As a result, the decision to seek a second quotation is independent of the 
first. 
Blind Search shares with Rational Expectations Search the simplicity of 
depending on a single sample statistic-in this case the sample range, rather 
than the sample minimum. The optimal search strategy of consumers can then be 
easily described. A number of results are intuitive: When x =X (9 R=l), the 
n 
maximum price range the consumer believes is possible has been observed. As 
the minimum price must then have been sampled, there can be no gain from 
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further search. If x =a, for n~2, there is zero probability that x exceeds 
n 
zero; again price reduction from further search is impossible. As the number 
of firms sampled increases, so does the probability that the sample range x 
n 
is close to the true value x, and hence the gain from further search 
decreases. These intuitions are confirmed by the following proposition. 
Proposition 5-1: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
For n ~ 2, and for all x E (a,X): 
n 
G (a) = lim G (x ) = a· ,n x x n n 
n 
G is strictly quasi-concave in X' n n' 
G is "star-shaped" at the origin 
n 
G (x ) > G 1 (x ). n n n+ n 
Proof: 
Given in Appendix C. 
i. e. 
aG (x ) 
n n 
ax 
n 
< 
G (x ) 
n n 
x 
n 
5 
\/X' n' 
The quasi-concavity of G (x ) and its zero value at the endpoints n n 
o 
provides a useful counterpart in Blind Search to the reservation-price rule of 
Rational Expectations Search. 
Proposition 5-2: 
a) For each n, there exists reservation range values, Xnt' xnh' a~Xnt~Xnh~X, 
such that G (x »c if and only if x E(X n'X h)' n n n n<. n 
b) The reservation range values converge as n increases in the sense that if 
5 A function f is star-shaped at a point x if the line from f(x) to any other 
point on the function lies below the function. 
92 Part B 
Proof: 
Follows from a), b) and d) of Proposition 5-1. 
Note that Xnt and xnh are clearly unique if Xnt * xnh. However, if 
max{G (x )} < c, then any value of x n will satisfy the above definition as 
n n n<-
long as xnl=xnh, 
o 
Propositions 5-1 and 5-2 are illustrated in Figure 5-2 for X=120 and c=3. 
From (5-4-13), these particular values give G
1 
(0) = 10 > c, so the searcher 
would always take at least two quotations. x2t' x3t' and x 2h' x3h are found 
where G
2
(x
2
) and G3 (x3 ) cross the horizontal line c=3 from below and above 
respectively. Values for these are given below the figure. 
Figure 5-2. 
G, c 
10 G
1
(0) 
o 
0.60 6.48 
x 
n 
X3h ~ 45.60 
X=120 
X 2h - 51. 84 
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c. G*(x ). 
n n 
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To complete the description of consumer's search behaviour, it remains to 
show that the reservation range property holds when consumers are not 
constrained to seek only one more quotation. 
Let p (xix) be the mixed probability distribution and density function 
n n 
of x 1 given x . and let ~ be the set n+ n' n 
~n = { xl (G~+l (x)-c»O; O~x~X } 
Now that x has been shown to be a sufficient statistic to calculate the 
n 
stopping rule, equation (5-4-4) can be rewritten 
G:(xn ) = Gn(xn ) +xl~ (G:+1 (X)-c) .p(xlxn)dx. 
n 
(5-4-14) 
Since p(xlx ) is a mixed distribution, the integral in equation (5-4-14) is 
n 
interpreted as requiring both summation and integration. 
Using equation (5-4-14), the results of Propositions 5-1 and 5-2, can be 
extended to search not constrained to a single additional quotation. 
Proposition 5-3: 
* * * * a) There exist reservation range values xn£' xnh' O~xn£~xnh~X, such that 
* * search will continue if and only if xn E (xn£'xnh). 
b) Search intensity falls as n increases in the sense that if x~£ < x:h ' 
* * * then x(n-1)h > xnh' and that xn£ converges (though not necessarily 
monotonically) to xnh as n increases. 
Proof: 
Given in Appendix C. 
o 
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5.5 Comparative Statics. 
A feature of the basic rational-expectations, sequential search model is 
that a consumer will continue sampling until a price not exceeding the 
reservation price is found. In Blind Search, no matter how many firms there 
are, the number sampled is bounded. 
Theorem 5-1: 
* If the search cost is positive, there is a finite number n , such that no 
more than n* firms will be sampled, whatever the sequence of prices sampled. 
Proof: 
From (5-4-12), 
lim G (x ) = ° noon n 'if x E [0, X]. n 
* Therefore, if c > 0, there exists n such that 
G (x ) :s c 
n n 
'if x E [O,X], 'if n > n*; 
n 
and hence from (5-15), 
G*(x ) 
n n 
:s c 'if x E [0, X], 
n 
'if n > 
* In the example of Figure 5-2, n = 3. 
* n; 
For n < n*, the reservation-range bounds provide a simple measure of 
o 
search intensity, suitable for comparative static analysis: A diverging of the 
reservation range values X~t' x~h implies a greater intensity of search. 
There are three parameters that a consumer searching blindly considers in 
determining whether to stop search: his search cost, the total number of 
firms, and the perceived maximum price range. The following theorem describes 
the effect of changes in the other three parameters. 
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Theorem 5-2: 
Search intensity increases as: 
a) the unit search cost decreases; 
b) the total number of firms increases, up to some critical number J*; 
c) the perceived variability of price increases. 
Proof: 
The formal proof is left for Appendix C, but the intuition is outlined 
here. 
The effect of decreasing the search cost is obvious. The consumer 
searches if and only if the benefit from search exceeds the cost. Lowering the 
cost increases the range of x for which that will apply. 
n 
The difference between G*(x ) and G (x ) represents the value of the 
n n n n 
information about the price distribution that is contained in a price quota-
tion. The more firms that remain to be sampled, the greater is the potential 
value of this information. The limit, J*, is equal to n* of Theorem 5-1. Since 
no more than n* firms will ever be sampled, and since n* is independent of J, 
increasing firm numbers beyond this point will be of no benefit to the 
consumer. 
Because of the homogeneity of degree 1 of G (x ) (and hence G*(x )), it 
n n n n 
is obvious that an increase in X will have the same effect on the normalized 
* * * bounds, xne/X, xnhlX as a decrease in c. 8xnel8X > 0 then follows. The 
* expected but less obvious result 8xnhl8X < 0 can also be shown. o 
5.6 Comparisons with Rational-Expectations Search. 
Rothschild (1974) lists four major results of rational-expectations 
sequential search which carryover to adaptive search when consumers' priors 
take the Dirichlet distribution: 
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a) The probability of a searching customer purchasing from a firm is a 
non-increasing function of the price it charges; 
b) As search costs increase, the amount of search decreases; 
c) A mean preserving increase in the dispersion of prices reduces total 
expected costs to the consumer (total search cost plus price); 
d) A mean preserving increase in the dispersion of prices increases the 
6 amount of search. 
In Rational Expectations Search, the perceived and actual dispersions of 
prices are the same. In adaptive search models, the perceived price distribu-
tion gives the stopping rule (that is, the function of observes prices that 
determines when to stop); the actual distribution affects search by affecting 
which prices are observed. In Blind Search, for example, the perceived distri-
bution is given by X, the actual distribution affects x . Theorem 5-2 c) shows n 
that for an increase in the perceived dispersion of prices, the third and 
fourth properties of Rothschild hold for Blind Search. Theorem 5-2 a) shows 
that the second property holds. For the first property, and for the third and 
fourth when referring to an increase in the actual price dispersion, it is 
easy to construct counterexamples. 
Theorem 5-3: 
If all consumers use Blind Search, a firm may face an increasing demand 
function. 
Proof: 
Consider a market with three firms 1,2,3, charging prices P1 < P2 < P3. 
Neither firm 1 nor firm 3 can affect their demand with local price changes. 
6 Properties a)-c) also apply to rational-expectations, FSS search. 
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Firm 2, however, by narrowing the gap P3-P2' can induce more of the consumers 
who search firms 2 and 3 first to stop sample them, increasing firm 2's demand 
at the expense of firm 1. 
Theorem 5-4: 
A mean-preserving increase in the dispersion of actual prices may raise 
total expected costs to the consumer. 
Proof: 
Let there be three firms, and consider two distributions: 
i) P1=2, P2=9, P3=10; and 
ii) P1=l, P2=10, P3=10. 
o 
Distribution ii) has the same mean but is more dispersed than distribution i). 
Now let c be sufficiently small so that G;(1) > c > O. Then for the the first 
distribution, search will always continue until P1 is found giving E[p]=2, but 
for the second, there is a probability of 1/3 that search will terminate after 
firms 2 and 3 have been searched, giving E[p] = 4. There is a slightly smaller 
expected search cost in the second case, but this is dwarfed by the difference 
in expected price. 
Theorem 5-5: 
An increase in actual price-dispersion may decrease the intensity of 
search. 
Proof: 
o 
Consider the case where all firms charge either P1 or P2' and P2-P1=X; 
compared to one where prices are spread evenly between these two extremes. In 
the first case, no consumer will search more than twice, while in the second, 
they may do so if the search cost is sufficiently small. 
o 
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It is known from the Rothschild paper that such counterexamples can be 
created when priors are not Dirichlet. Although they show that some of the 
strong results of the standard model are not robust to the removal of the 
rational-expectations assumption, these counterexamples do use price distri-
but ions that are extreme, since their essence is that the observed prices send 
a bad signal as to the true distribution. Also, such counterexamples would be 
non-observable, as those price distributions would not occur in an equilib-
rium. The counterexamples therefore do not seem to represent a major differ-
ence between Rational Expectations Search and Blind Search. 
Blind Search does, however, yield three definite predictions that are not 
features of Rational Expectations Search, but that seem realistic by casual 
empiricism. These are that both low and high ranges of sampled prices will 
induce search to stop, that the decision to sample a second firm is indepen-
dent of the price quoted by the first, and that there is an upper limit to the 
number of firms that will be sampled. 
That search will stop for low sample ranges reflects the fact that there 
is sometimes not enough price dispersion to warrant search but that the 
consumer only finds this out by searching. For example, if a searcher receives 
a number of identical quotes, he may conclude that there is retail price 
maintenance and stop searching. The prediction of the model that it only 
requires two identical prices to terminate search seems overly strong. This 
result follows not from the basic formulation of consumer behaviour, but 
rather from the assumption that the consumer perceives prices as having been 
drawn from a continuous distribution. Of course within any range, there are 
only a finite number of possible prices (multiples of one cent), and even 
fewer "focal-point" prices (for example, the manufacturer's suggested price, 
multiples of $100 -1, etc.). With a discrete perceived price distribution, the 
marginal benefit of search at x =0 would exceed zero, so search would not 
n 
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necessarily terminate. 
The independence of the decision to seek a second quotation is a conse-
quence of the consumer not having prior beliefs about absolute prices. A 
similar result is found in Axell's (1974) adaptive search model where 
searchers have prior beliefs on the variance of prices but not the mean. Jan 
Herin, the discussant for this paper, suggested that Axell's assumption of the 
absence of a subjective conception of the mean is unrealistic. The interpreta-
tion of this assumption, however, is not that searchers have no prior beliefs 
about absolute prices. It is rather that those beliefs are sufficiently flimsy 
that the first quotation will be used correct beliefs rather than as a guide 
to where that price ranks in the distribution. 
The limit to the number of firms that will be sampled is a result of 
search being adaptive. In Rational Expectations Search, a searcher who has 
received a long sequence of prices higher than the reservation price will not 
revise his beliefs about the distribution, but will regard himself as unlucky 
and search on. It can be a very costly policy for a consumer who does not know 
the distribution to search as if he did, particularly if the consumer's 
perceived distribution is more heavily weighted to lower prices than is the 
actual distribution. Gastwirth (1976) analysed the case where searchers guess 
the price distribution incorrectly. He showed that FSS strategies are 
considerably more robust than sequential strategies in the sense of having a 
smaller loss from assuming the wrong distribution. He then suggested a 
strategy that would reduce this loss: the Naive Truncated Rule. With this 
strategy, consumers predetermine a maximum number of firms to sample and then 
search sequentially with a reservation price rule up to that number. For this 
to be an appropriate strategy, consumers would have to believe that more than 
one price distribution were possible. Adaptive models make this belief 
explicit in their use of prior distributions. The limit to the number of firms 
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sampled, imposed by Gastwirth, emerges as a result in Blind Search. 
This last :point indicates a similarity between Blind Search and FSS 
search. In fact, in some ways, Blind Search is more similar to FSS search than 
to a simple seq\lential model where sea.rchers sample as if they know the price 
distribution. Tl~is claim is expanded en in the next chapter which considers 
non-rational-expectations search in equilibrium. 
CHAPTER 6: EaulLiBRIUM SEARCH WITHOUT RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
6.1 Introduction. 
The behaviour of searchers who learn about the price distribution while 
searching has been comprehensively d€!scribed by the adaptive search literature 
dating back to to 1974 with the models of Rothschild, Kohn and Shave 11 , and 
Axel!. The mod·el of Blind Search in Chapter 5 adds to this literature. 
Equilibrium-search models, however, have almost exclusively assumed that 
consumers have rational expectations; that is, that they know the distribution 
of prices before beginning to search. 1 This assumption makes sense if search 
is used to compare results between oligopoly models with perfect information 
and those without. As suggested in the Chapter 5, to assume rational expecta-
tions about the price distribution is to make the minimum deviation possible 
from the assumption of perfect information about prices. The new results that 
arise from introducing incomplete price information can then be clearly 
attributed to this change in assumption. 
The assumption that consumers can ~:now a price distribution without 
knowing the prices charged by specific firms is, however, clearly unrealistic. 
It is reasonable to ask whether the results of equilibrium models apply with 
weaker assumptions about the way consumers become informed. 
The question of the sensitivity of results to the rational-expectations 
assumption has mainly been addressed in the pure-search literature. For 
instance, the adaptive models of Rothschild (1974) and Kohn and Shave11 (1981) 
were largely concerned with making comparisons with rational-expectations 
models. The specific differences betl,leen rational expectations and adaptive 
search enumerated in Chapter 5 are in contrast to the conclusions of these 
papers. As remarked there, Rothschild showed that four major results of 
rational-expectations search still hold in his adaptive model when searchers 
1 Exceptions are Wilde and Schwartz (1979), and Gabszewicz and Gare11a (1985). 
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have Dirichlet priors over the price distribution. Similarly. Rosenfield and 
Shapiro (1981) present a broad range of examples where properties such as the 
reservation-price and myopia still hold with adaptive search. Results such as 
these enable McKenna to claim: 
"By and large the additional complexity of adaptive models 
has not been justified by the additional insights they 
offer." 
McKenna (1987a, p 104) 
Rothschild makes a stronger claim: 
" ... economists can without great loss assume that the 
qualitative properties of demand functions which arise 
from optimal search from unknown distributions are the 
same as those which arise from optimal search from known 
distributions. " 
Rothschild (1974, p 710) 
Since these claims are based on the results of pure-search models, they 
are only applicable to descriptions of consumers' reactions to exogenous price 
distributions. If search is used in an equilibrium model, then the interdepen-
dence between searchers' and firms' actions has to be considered. Rational 
expectations is not just a special case of adaptive search where the 
consumer's belief in a particular distribution is unshakable: it also assumes 
that the belief is correct. As a result, if a firm changes its price, 
consumers are assumed to realize this and adjust their search strategies 
accordingly. The "qualitative properties of demand functions" can be very 
different when consumers' search behaviour is thus affected compared to when 
it is not. Consequently equilibria can be very different. 
The effect on equilibrium of not assuming rational expectations is 
considered generally in Section 6.2, and then illustrated in Section 6.3 using 
the example of Blind Search. It is shown in these two sections that many of 
the results of equilibrium-search models depend on the assumption of rational 
expectations. This raises the question, What is the alternative to this 
assumption? McKenna's point that adaptive models involve additional complexity 
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is particularly pertinent if search is used to derive firms' demand functions. 
Even in Blind Search, where very strong assumptions are made about prior 
beliefs, the resulting description of searchers' behaviour is too unwieldy to 
make it feasible to derive demand functions. It would be useful if there were 
a simple non-adaptive search strategy that was both manageable and preserved 
the major equilibrium properties of adaptive search. In Section 6.4, Blind 
Search is used to show that a form of FSS sampling may be the non-adaptive 
model that best meets this objective. The concluding.remarks of Section 6.5 
suggest directions for further research that could overcome some of the 
difficulties suggested here. 
6.2 Rational Expectations and Equilibrium. 
In this section and in Section 6.3, rather than developing a particular 
equilibrium model, we consider some general properties of non-rational-
expectations search if it used in an equilibrium-search model belonging to the 
general class outlined in Section 2.1, pS. The characteristics of this class 
are restated here: 
Consumers search in a market for a homogeneous good. They may differ in 
characteristics such as search cost. The firms selling the good follow 
Bertrand/Nash behaviour with respect to each other, choosing their price to 
maximize the profits from expected demand, while taking the other prices as 
given; and follow Stackelberg behaviour with respect to consumers, taking 
their search strategy as given. Firms may differ in their cost functions, and 
their number may be fixed or free entry assumed. Firms are labeled according 
to price so that if there are J firms, 
Consumers' demand for the good can be elastic or inelastic in the purchase 
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price. Even if consumer demand is inelastic, firms may face a downward sloping 
demand curve for their own output if price increases induce fewer consumers to 
buy from them. 
The important properties of non-rational-expectations search when 
considering equilibrium are contained in the following two remarks. 
Remark 6-1: 
If consumers do not have rational expectations, a firm cannot, by 
changing its price, affect the number of consumers visiting it. 
When searchers have rational expectations, if a firm changes its price, 
consumers yet to visit that firm know that the price distribution is changed 
and so may change their reservation price or, in a FSS model, their sample 
size. With non-rational-expectations search, price changes can only affect 
whether a consumer who visits a firm will decide to buy from it. 
It is because this difference between models with and without rational-
expectations is not captured in pure search models that they cannnot be used 
to make inferences about the sensitivity of equilibria to the rational-
expectations assumption. Many equilibrium results depend entirely on the 
ability of firms to affect consumers' reservation prices or the size of the 
sample they take. For example, Stiglitz (1987) shows that increasing the 
number of firms can reduce competition (raise prices) in a market. The 
intuition is that the number of firms affects the significance of the change 
to the price distribution when a single firm changes its price. This is 
important because part of the incentive for a firm to lower its price below 
its competitors is that this action lowers consumers' reservation prices and 
so induces more consumers to visit it; the more firms there are, the less 
effect has anyone firm on reservation prices and so the less elastic is its 
demand curve. Similar results in Chapter 7 also depend on price changes 
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affecting the reservation prices of consumers. 
The second equilibrium property of non-rational-expectations search 
follows from Remark 6-1. 
Remark 6-2: 
If consumers have full recall, the number of buyers buying from the 
lowest priced firm is locally inelastic in that firm's price. 
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This remark follows because a searcher visiting the lowest priced store 
will buy from that store regardless of whether the price induces him to search 
for further quotations. 
In Carlson and McAfee (1983) and Stiglitz (1987), the rational-
expectations assumption is crucial in ensuring that the firms have downward-
sloping demand functions. Elastic demand allows each price to be an equilib-
rium response to the others. However, when there is a finite number of firms 
and searchers do not have rational expectations, Remark 6-2 suggests that at 
least one firm would have an incentive to slightly undercut the lowest price 
of the others. Pure-strategy equilibria are unlikely without the rational-
expectations assumption. To give some structure to this claim, the example of 
Blind Search is considered. 
6.3 An Example: Blind Search. 
In addition to Remarks 6-1 and 6-2, Blind Search has the following two 
properties that enable definite statements to be made about equilibrium. 
Remark 6-3: 
In Blind Search, the recall option may be exercised. 
As noted several times in previous chapters, this property is important 
when at least some consumers search more than one firm and there is a finite 
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number of firms. Then, when two firms charge the same price, there is a 
positive probability that there will be a mass of consumers who visit both 
firms without visiting a lower priced store. This gives a profit function for 
each firm that is discontinuous at each of the other firms' prices. 
Remark 6-4: 
In Blind Search, the number of buyers buying from the highest priced firm 
is locally inelastic in that firm's price. 
A firm which is the only one charging the highest price can only sell to 
those consumers for whom that price is their only quotation--that is, to the 
consumers who sample that firm first and then stop. Remark 6-1 shows that the 
number of consumers visiting the firm is independent of its price. It is a 
feature of Blind Search that the decision to seek a second quotation by those 
consumers is also independent of the price. An implication of Remark 6-4 is 
that a unique highest price must be the monopoly price. 2 
The independence of the first quotation (on the decision of a searcher to 
take a second) is the most important equilibrium property of Blind Search. Let 
h(l) denote the (exogenous) proportion of consumers who stop search after one 
quotation. In equilibrium search models, this value, whether exogenous or 
endogenous, has been crucial to modeling equilibrium price dispersion as it 
affects whether the maximum and minimum prices in a distribution can be the 
result of profit maximizing decisions. An equilibrium price-dispersion model 
has to explain how demand can be positive at the highest price, and how demand 
2 In Chapter 5, Blind Search was presented as expenditure-minimizing search 
for a single unit of the good. If all consumers have the same choke price, 
above which no quantity is demanded, then it would be the monopoly price. As 
noted in Section 5.2, p 82, Blind Search also admits the interpretation of 
indirect-utility-maximizing search. This could give a downward-sloping 
demand function for the highest-priced firm, with the monopoly price where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
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can be greater at the lowest price so that both prices are Nash responses by 
firms. If the model can sustain the extreme prices in equilibrium, it is 
fairly easy to create conditions where intermediate prices are profit-
maximizing choices by firms. 
The importance of h(!) in allowing extreme prices is illustrated in the 
proof to the following theorem. 
Theorem 6-1: 
If there are a finite number of firms, firms have constant marginal 
costs, and consumer demand is inelastic, then Blind Search allows no price 
dispersion in equilibrium. 
Proof: 
Consider three cases for the value of h(l): 
a) h(l) = 1 (that is, everyone visits only one firm). 
This produces the famous Diamond (1971) result. Since every firm is a 
perfect monopolist (by Remark 6-4), the only equilibrium has every firm 
charging the monopoly price. 
b) h(l) = 0 (that is, everyone visits at least two firms). 
In this case, there can not be only one firm charging the highest price 
as its demand would be zero. If two or more firms charge the highest price, 
and that price exceeds marginal cost, there is always an incentive for firms 
to chisel when prices are identical. The only possible equilibrium is that of 
perfect competition: 
MC. 
J 
\I j. 
c) a < h(l) < 1. 
Remark 6-2 implies that Pi will always be arbitrarily close to P2' In 
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that case, the discontinuity in firm 2's profit function, implied by Remark 
6-3 would leave it an incentive to undercut firm 1 unless P2 = MC2 . With 
constant costs, price equaling marginal cost would imply zero profit. But 
positive profit can be earned with P2 > MC2 because some demand at the 
monopoly price is ensured by h(l) > 0, so P2 = MC2 is not an equilibrium 
response. There is therefore no equilibrium with 0 < h(l) < 1. 
o 
If any of the conditions in the theorem is violated, the theorem does not 
hold. First, increasing marginal cost would allow positive profit at P2 = MC2 . 
Second, if consumer demand is elastic (and MC2 > MC1), the profit-maximizing 
price for firm 1 need not be arbitrarily close to firm 2's. Finally, if there 
is a continuum of firms, there is zero probability of any two firms being 
sampled by the same consumer and so the discontinuity noted in Remark 6-3 does 
not apply.3 These examples are special cases though. Blind Search in a Nash! 
Bertrand framework with a finite number of firms does not generally allow 
existence of equilibrium with price dispersion. indeed, if 0 < h(l) < 1, 
degenerate equilibria will also be rare. 
It was suggested in Chapter 5 that. Blind Search is useful for making 
comparisons with Rational Expectations Search. Here, the specific predictions 
of Blind Search led to Remarks 6-3 and 6-4 and hence to Theorem 6-1. Although 
these remarks do not necessarily hold in all adaptive search models, they do 
reflect general properties of these models. For instance, recall of previous 
prices will result when additional information about the price distribution 
makes a previously rejected price more valuable than it first appeared 
relative to an unknown draw from the distribution. 
3 
Remark 6-4, in particular, illustrates the way that Blind Search and 
Is is also true that when, there is an infinity of firms, the distinction 
between models with and without rational expectations given by Remark 6-1 is 
lost, since in neither case can a single firm affect the price distribution. 
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Rational Expectations are two extremes in the amount of information available 
to consumers. The less information consumers have about the price distribution 
before they search, the more they learn about the mean of the distribution, 
and the less about the other moments, from the first quotation. But it is the 
higher moments which determine the benefit of continuing search. With adaptive 
search, then, the first quotation is less likely to affect the decision to 
seek a second than with rational-expectations search, and so the demand 
function will be less elastic at the highest price. In the limiting case of 
Blind Search, consumers have no information about prices; the first quotation 
gives no information about the variance of the distribution and so the demand 
curve is locally inelastic at the highest price. 
6.4 Approximating Adaptive Search. 
The example of the previous section illustrated some of the problems that 
can arise when modeling equilibrium without rational-expectations search, but 
did not show any way of avoiding the problems. Even in the case where there is 
a continuum of firms, so that Theorem 6-1 does not apply, the complexity of 
the stopping rule in Blind Search'makes it difficult to derive tractable 
demand functions for firms. 
The difficulty arises, not from the absence of rational expectations 
itself, but from the fact that stopping rules in adaptive search may depend on 
the entire sequence of observed prices. The two search models from which 
explicit demand functions have been derived in the equilibrium-search 
literature--with-replacement, non-adaptive sequential search, and FSS search--
can both be viewed as special cases of a more general sequential model where 
the decision on whether to take another quotation depends on a single 
variable. In the former, of course, the stopping decision depends only on the 
minimum price sampled. FSS search can also be interpreted as a form of 
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sequential decision making where the the searcher is precluded from observing 
the prices sampled before stopping (or from using the information contained in 
the prices) and so the stopping rule depends only on the number of firms 
sampled. As shown in Chapter 4, when sequential sampling is without replace-
ment, the stopping rule depends on both the minimum price and the number of 
firms already sampled. The complexity of the optimal policy being described by 
two state variables rather than one, was enough to prevent the derivation of 
explicit demand functions. 
Since adaptive-search models involve the beliefs about the price distri-
bution changing as search progresses, the stopping rule in these models will 
always depend on the number of firms sampled and at least one other statistic. 
For the reasons discussed above, then, equilibrium modeling is only likely to 
be feasible with non-adaptive search. If adaptive search is the appropriate 
consumer behaviour to assume in a particular equilibrium model, it would seem 
that a non-rational-expectations version of either simple sequential search or 
FSS search is needed. Which of the two is best, depends on which most closely 
approximates the equilibrium results of adaptive search. 
It does not follow that, because adaptive search is sequential, the best 
approximation to it is sequential. As suggested above, FSS search can be 
interpreted as a form of sequential strategy. It mimics adaptive search in its 
dependence on the number of firms sampled to determine the stopping rule. The 
basic sequential model ignores the sample size. It was because of the 
potential sub-optimality of sampling too many firms that Gastwirth (1976) 
incorporated the sample size into his naive truncated rule, referred to in 
Chapter 5. 
To capture the properties of Blind Search in a tractable model, the best 
model to use is non-adaptive, non-rational-expectations, without-replacement 
FSS search. It is identical to Blind Search as far as the crucial number h(l) 
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is concerned. Remarks 6-3 and 6-4 both apply to this model, and hence so does 
Theorem 6-1. Neither of these properties hold with non-adaptive sequential 
search. As noted earlier, the number of consumers buying from the first firm 
visited will be less elastic in that firm's price in adaptive-search models 
compared to non-adaptive sequential search models. This suggests that FSS 
search is a good approximation for adaptive search in general. 
Wilde and Schwartz (1979) use FSS search without rational expectations in 
their equilibrium model. They assume a continuum of firms so the difficulties 
of Theorem 6-1 do not apply. They cite Gastwirth (1976) as a justification for 
assuming FSS search. The discussion here provides another justification. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks. 
Schwartz and Wilde (1982), noting the enthusiasm of policy makers for 
regulation of informationally imperfect markets, addressed the question of 
whether equilibrium-search models were sufficiently developed to yield 
relevant policy conclusions about the best form of and need for regulation of 
such markets. They were particularly concerned that the rational-expectations 
assumption of most equilibrium models was giving inappropriate results. 
The main point of this chapter has been to show that many of the equi-
librium results of search models depend entirely on the assumption of rational 
expectations, but that it is difficult to get results of any sort if that 
assumption is abandoned. The previous section suggested a way to avoid the 
complexities of adaptive search while approximating its main equilibrium 
properties. It does not, however, solve the problem of non-existence of equi-
libria when firm numbers are finite. If questions such as those interesting 
Schwartz and Wilde are to be addressed, more robust equilibrium-search models 
are needed. 
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CHAPTER 7: INEFFICIENCY IN OLIGOPOLY WHEN PRICE INFORMATION Is ENDOGENOUS 
7.1 Introduction. 
This chapter is more directly about equilibrium than the four chapters of 
Part B. There, the connection between the assumptions made about how consumers 
search and the resulting demand functions was investigated. Some general 
results about the nature of possible equilibria were attainable by this 
approach. This chapter considers the role of search in equilibrium models from 
a different direction: The comparative static results obtained here from a 
simple equilibrium-search model allow a comparison with results from product-
differentiation models that do not involve search. 
Chapter 2 emphasized the point that equilibrium-search models have the 
structure of product differentiation. Each firm's product is differentiated 
from the others' by the varying amounts of information consumers have 
following a random search process. A feature of product differentiation is 
that it makes it feasible for firms to charge different prices in an equi-
librium. The possibility of price dispersion suggests some analogies with 
other product differentiation models. Whenever there is price dispersion due 
to transactions costs separating'markets (for instance with markets separated 
by location, time, or information) there may be unrealized gains from trade-
inefficiency-and hence opportunities for arbitrage. An arbitrager can be 
thought of as a dealer who, through economies of scale or some natural 
advantage, can combine such markets by reducing transactions costs. (Without 
transactions costs of some sort, the law of one price would prevail and so 
arbitrage would never be observed.) Arbitrage profits come from the increased 
gains from trade available in the enlarged market. 
Intuitively, therefore, arbitrage might be expected to reduce dispersion 
and increase efficiency in a price dispersion model. When markets are separ-
ated by information, however, rather than by a physical characteristic such as 
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product quality or location, the degree of differentiation is endogenous to 
the model and can be affected by the addition of a firm to the market. For 
instance, Stiglitz (1987) has shown that increasing the number of firms in a 
market characterized by consumer search has two opposing effects on the amount 
of competition in the market. Each firm's share of the market is reduced, but, 
with more firms, each firm has less impact on the amount of consumer search 
and so faces a less elastic demand curve. Introducing an arbitrager to the 
market may therefore create more inefficiency than it eliminates since it 
reduces the incentive to search and so in effect increases the amount of 
differentiation between firms. 
Although many authors have suggested the possibility of specialist 
dealers appearing in equilibrium-search models, 1 arbitrage appears not to have 
been modeled formally in this context. 
2 
This chapter uses a simple equilibrium 
model to examine the effect that firm numbers in general and arbitrage in 
particular have on prices and efficiency. It is shown that arbitrage, as 
modeled here, unambiguously reduces consumer welfare and is in general 
socially inefficient as well. While the model is a special case so that the 
strong welfare results do not necessarily carryover to more general struc-
tures, the source of the results-i.e .. the endogeneity of product differenti-
ation due to information-is common to most models of equilibrium search. 
The model used here is a simplified version of Carlson and McAfee (1983). 
In the following section, the basic model is outlined with welfare results 
derived in Section 7.3. The results from this price-dispersion model without 
arbitrage provide a benchmark for comparison when arbitrage is introduced into 
the model in Section 7.4. A numerical example is presented in Section 7.5, and 
1 
See, for example, Stigler (1961) and Butters (1977). 
2 
Manning and Paterson (1980) have modeled arbitrage with search but not in an 
equilibrium framework. 
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the final section contains some concluding remarks. Most of the algebraic 
derivations of results are confined to Appendix D. 
7.2 The Model: No Arbitrage. 
Let there be m firms who are potential sellers of a homogeneous good. 
Firms are denoted by the subscript j. Each firm can produce unlimited quanti-
ties of the good with constant marginal costs and no fixed cost. Marginal cost 
<Xj can differ between firms. 
Any firm producing positive output is considered to be "participating" in 
the market. Let there be n participating firms posting prices ordered from 
lowest to highest, 
O < Pi :S P 2 ... 
with n :S m. The subscripts j E {n+i ... m} denote the non-participating firms. 
Each firm must decide whether or not to participate, and, if so, what 
price to set. Firms follow Nash behaviour with respect to the prices set by 
the other firms. They set their own prices to maximize expected profit given 
by 
II.(p.lp .,n) - (p.-a.)q. 
J J -J J J J 
where P_j is the (n-i)-vector of all prices excluding Pj' and qj is the 
expected demand function facing firm j. 
Let r~(p .) be the reaction function of firm j so 
J -J 
The following definition describes a conventional Nash equilibrium with 
the added restriction that each firm participates. 
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Definition 7-1: 
An n-vector of prices p* is a "participant equilibrium" if and only if 
a) n n *) Pj = r. (p . j = 1 ... n, J - J 
b) qj > 0 j = 1 ... n. 
To extend this definition to include all potential firms, it is also 
required that none of the non-participating firms has an incentive to enter 
taking the participating firms prices as given. 
Defini tion 7-2: 
An n-vector of prices p* is an "entry equilibrium" if and only if 
a) p* is a participant equilibrium, 
b) max{rr. (p.1 p*, n+U} :s 0 
p j J J 
j = n+1. .. m. 
By enabling the number of firms to be endogenously determined, the entry 
equilibrium gives a complete characterization of the market. The less general 
3 
participant equilibrium will be used to analyze the welfare effects of entry. 
There are M consumers who each demand one unit of the good. They are 
assumed to know the distribution of prices but search to find the prices 
charged by particular firms. Search is sequential, with replacement. Consumers 
only sample from participating firms; the probability of any consumer sampling 
1 
any participating firm on a single search is n' independent of all other 
sampling by himself or other consumers. 
3 The model in this section differs from Carlson and McAfee's in only two 
respects: They do not model entry directly, but do allow upward-sloping 
marginal cost functions. A result of constant marginal costs is that nothing 
here depends on the number of consumers. This is not true of the Carlson and 
McAfee model. 
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Consumers differ only in their unit cost of search x. Let M be suffic-
iently large so that the distribution of x can be represented as a continuum. 
It is assumed that x is uniformly distributed over the range [O,T]. 
Define x
k 
as the expected gain to a consumer from taking one more price 
quotation when Pk is the lowest quotation already received. 
4 
Then, 
k-1 !(p (k-1) - L P.) 
n k i=l 1 
k=2 .. n, (7-2-1) 
A firm charging p. will sell nothing to consumers for whom x < x., will 
J J 
share with the first (j-1) firms the consumers for whom x. =:; x < x. l' and so 
J J+ 
on. Therefore, by the assumption of uniformly distributed costs, 
where x 1 == T. n+ 
Define p == 0 o 
j = 1 .. n, (7-2-2) 
and p 1 == T+15 n+ where 15 = ~ ~ p. so that (7-2-1) is n Lt=1 1 
defined for k=l, n+1. Then (7-2-1) substituted into (7-2-2) gives 
Now 
n 
L Pk + Pn+1 - PJ' k=j 
k Pi k-1 
L k + L 
i=l i=l 
Pi] k . 
4 In the notation of Chapters 3 and 4, x
k 
is the dual, xk=C(P
k
). The notation 
here is Carlson and McAfee's. 
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so 
= ~(T+p-p.) 
nT J 
j=1. . n. 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are 
8n. 8q. 
J * -cx.)_J = = qj + (Pj O. 
* J 8p. 8p.
J J 
Substituting (7-2-3) into (7-2-4) gives the reaction functions 
= 2(n~1)(nT + (n-l)cxJ. + I P.) i:;t:j 1 j=1. . n. 
From (7-2-4), 
2 8p. 
J 
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(7-2-3) 
(7-2-4) 
(7-2-5) 
so that the second-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied. 
Equations (7-2-5) can be solved for an explicit equilibrium, 
P~ = n~l T + 2~-1 an + 2~=i cxj j=1. . n (7-2-6) 
where 
The solution is confirmed by substitution of (7-2-6) back into (7-2-5). For 
ease of reading, the superscript on a denoting the number of firms will be 
omitted where no ambiguity results from doing so. 
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* The set of prices Pj given by (7-2-6) are profit maximizing for indivi-
dual firms. To complete the description of equilibrium, the conditions on 
entry and exit in Definitions 7-1 and 7-2 need to be satisfied. 
Without loss of generality, let the non-participating firms be labeled so 
Proposition 7-1: 
:sa. 
m 
a) A necessary and sufficient condition for equations (7-2-6) to describe 
a participant equilibrium is 
a -a < 2n-1 T n n-l . (7-2-7) 
b) To describe an entry equilibrium, it is also necessary that 
2n2-1 
a -a;:: ( ) T. n+1 n n-1 (7-2-8) 
Proof: 
From the first-order conditions and equation (7-2-3), 
and so iff 
iff a.-a < 2n-1 T 
J n-1 
j = 1 ... n. (7-2-9) 
Recall that the labeling of participating firms is not arbitrary but 
based on the ordering of prices. It follows trivially from (7-2-6) that 
< < 
Pi > Pj as a i > a j so that 
a. n 
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Therefore, for all firms to have positive output, it is necessary and suffi-
cient that (7-2-9) holds for j=n. 
Also from the first-order conditions, the expected demand of an entering 
firm j, j>n, when the prices of the other participating firms are given is 
so 
Mn (n+l( *)_ ) q.=----r. p IX., 
J (n+l)2T J J 
iff n+l * (r. (p )-IX.) ::S o. 
J J 
Substituting (n+1) for n in equation (7-2-5), this gives 
( (n+1)T - nIX. + £ p~) ::S 0 J i=1 1 
2 
IX -(i > 2n -1 T 
j - n(n-l) j = n+1 ... m 
(using (7-2-6)). 
The proposition follows from the ordering of non-participating firms. 
In a perfectly competitive market, all participating firms must have 
access to the most efficient technology or be forced from the market. 
Proposition 7-1 is a similar result, stating that it will not be profitable 
for firms to produce if their production costs are too far above the market 
o 
average relative to search costs. The following corollary demonstrates another 
similarity with technological efficiency. 
Corollary: 
In any entry equilibrium, the n participating firms will be the n-most 
efficient. 
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Proof: 
From (7-2-7) and (7-2-8), 
so 
~.-a 
J 
~. > ~ 
> > ~ -a 
n 
j = n+l ... m 
j = n+l ... m. 
J n D 
In the remainder of this section, the existence and uniqueness of entry 
equilibria are considered. The corollary limits the number of possible equi-
libria as it implies that there is at most one entry equilibrium with n 
participating firms for any n. 
Proposition 7-2: 
If the number of potential firms exceeds one, there is no entry 
equilibrium with only one participating firm. 
Proof: 
If n=l, then in (7-2-3) Pl=P and ql=M, and so a monopolist could raise 
its price indefinitely without affecting demand. Thus a potential firm taking 
5 
the monopolist's price as given would always have an incentive to enter. 
Proposition 7-3: 
D 
For any participant equilibrium where n ~ 2 and a < a l' if the (n+l)th n n+ 
firm has an incentive to enter, then the resulting participant equilibrium 
with n+l participating firms exists. 
5 This follows because of the assumption that consumer demand is inelastic 
everywhere. More realistically, of course, consumers would have a "choke 
price" above which they would not purchase. However, as a choke price is not 
necessary to set a limit on prices when there is more than one firm, 
modeling it explicitly only increases the algebraic manipulation required 
without adding to the intuition. 
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Proof: 
The result would fail to hold only If the (n+1)th firm had an incentive 
to enter at the existing prices but could no longer compete once the other 
firms adjusted their prices to the new competition. 
From (7-2-8), the (n+1)th firm has an incentive to enter if 
2 
ex _an < 2n -1 T 
n+1 n(n-1) 
_n+1 
ex -ex 
n+1 
-11+1 . ex -ex 
n+l 
(if n ;::; 2). 
< 
< 
< 
2n2-1 
'( n-+-:1")"""'(-n--"T1",) T 
2n2-1 
'( n-+-:1")"""'(-n--71"') T 
2n+1
T 
n 
(7-2-10) 
But this is the condition for existence of a participant equilibrium with 
n+l firms, given by substituting n+1 for n in (7-2-7). 
o 
Proposition 7-3 shows that an entrant firm that is only marginally 
profitable at the existing prices will benefit from the other firms' reacting 
to its presence. This counter-intuitive result is an indication of the anti-
competitive effect that entry can have by introducing more noise into the 
market. 
Proposition 7-4: 
a) If there exists any participant equilibrium with at least two firms, 
then there will always be an entry equilibrium with at least as many 
participating firms. 
b) There may be several entry equilibria. 
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Proof: 
Note that if there is any participant equilibrium with n firms, then the 
existence condition (7-2-7) implies that there is a participant equilibrium 
with the n-most efficient firms participating. Also note that a participant 
equilibrium with all m potential firms participating must be an entry 
equilibrium. 
The proof of a) is by construction. Consider the smallest value of n for 
which there is a participant equilibrium with the n-most efficient firms, 
n ~ 2. Either it is an entry equilibrium or the (n+l)th firm has an incentive 
to enter. If the latter is true, then Proposition 7-3 implies that there is a 
participant equilibrium with the (n+l) most efficient firms. It then must 
either be an entry equilibrium or the (n+2)th firm has an incentive to enter 
and so on. Clearly, by adding firms in order of costs in this way, an entry 
equilibrium must eventually be reached. 
The possible multiplicity of equilibria results from the fact that an 
entering firm which is only marginally profitable creates noise that is 
beneficial to it. Consider a participant equilibrium with n firms where 
2n2 -1 
-n-'( n-+-:"l---) T < < 
2n+1
T 
n 
From the proof to Proposition 7-3, the first inequality implies that there is 
an entry equilibrium with n firms as the (n+l)th firm has no incentive to 
enter, and the second shows that there would be a participant equilibrium with 
n+l firms and hence an entry equilibrium with at least that many. 
o 
The non-uniqueness result does not depend on the assumption that poten-
tial entrants treat the existing prices as given. Even if they were to allow 
for the adjustment of other firm's prices when considering entry, there could 
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still be a multiplicity of equilibria. This is easily shown. From (7-2-7), 
there will be a participant equilibrium after the entry of the (n+1)th firm 
only if 
n ( _n) 
--1 <X 1-<X n+ n+ < 
2n+1
T 
n 
However, if two firms with cost <Xn+1 enter simultaneously, the condition is 
< 
which is less restrictive. 
2n+3
T n+1 
The interpretation of this result is that although it may not pay for a 
single firm to enter, two firms may be able to jointly create enough noise in 
the market to make it profitable for both to do so! 
It is clear from these results, that entry will not always increase the 
competition in a market. This feature of the model is now developed more 
fully. 
7.3 Welfare Effects of Entry. 
The characterization of entry equilibria in the previous section were 
positive results giving conditions for when entry would occur. In this 
section, the more normative question of whether entry is beneficial to 
consumers and socially efficient is considered. Accordingly, participant 
rather than entry equilibria are compared. It is simply assumed, therefore, 
that the existence condition (7-2-7) holds in all cases, and that there are 
always at least two firms participating so that prices are bounded. 
Before comparisons of consumer welfare and efficiency in different equi-
libria are made, it will be necessary to derive measures for these concepts. 
This is now done. 
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In the case of perfect competition-i.e. T=O, and all firms having access 
to the most efficient technology-every consumer would pay a
1 
for the good and 
incur no search costs. Therefore a simple measure of the cost to the consumer 
of imperfect information is the difference between the total average expected 
payment per consumer and a
1
. This is given the term "consumer costs" denoted 
CC. 
Consumer costs can be decomposed into 3 parts: 
i) the average expected expenditure on search per consumer CASE) , 
ii) the average expected uni t production cost in excess of a
1 
(APC) , 
iii) the average expected markup by firms on unit costs (AM). 
Measures ii) and iii) are averages weighted by market-share so that all costs 
are "per-consumer" averages. 
The term "social costs", denoted SC, is used to describe the inefficiency 
of imperfect information in a Pareto sense. This is defined as average search 
costs plus excess production costs. The assumption of inelastic consumer 
demand implies that the monopoly markup is simply a lump-sum transfer from 
consumers to firms, with no deadweight loss. 
Expressions for these costs, derived in Appendix D, are 
ASE 
1 
= 2Tvar p 
n 
APC = L w.a.-a1 j=1 J J 
n 
AM = L w. (p .-a.) 
j=1 J J J 
where w. are the market-share weights 
J 
(7-3-1) 
(7-3-2) 
(7-3-3) 
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Substituting in the values of p. and q. from (7-2-6) and (7-2-4), (7-3-1) 
J J 
- (7-3-3) can be reexpressed 
giving 
ASE = (n-l)2 ----'var a 
2T(2n-l)2 
APC 
n-l 
= ((x-a1 ) - T (2n-l) var a 
AM = ~T + 
n-l 
n(n-l) 
var a 
2 T(2n-l) 
CC = ASE + APC + AM 
n _ (n-l)2 
= n-1T + (a-a1 ) - 2var a 2T(2n-l) 
and SC = ASE + APC 
(
N_N ) _ (3n-l) (n-l) 
~ ~1 var a 
2T(2n-l) 2 
(7-3-4) 
(7-3-5) 
(7-3-6) 
(7-3-7) 
(7-3-8) 
These measures are used to compare a participant equilibrium with (n-l) 
firms to one with n firms with the "entrant" denoted by the subscript e. The 
superscripts n-l and n are used to distinguish variables from the two 
equilibria. 
In oligopoly models with no uncertainty, whether perfect competition is 
achieved with any number of firms greater than one, or only achieved in the 
limit as the number of firms tends to infinity, depends on whether firms make 
a Bertrand or Cournot conjecture. Although search models imply that firms are 
Bertrand price setters, the downward sloping demand functions that firms face 
resemble Cournot. In the following special case, the Cournot result is 
approximated. 
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Theorem 7-1: 
If all firms have the same production costs, then consumer costs are 
lower the greater is the number of firms. 
Proof: 
From (7-3-4) - (7-3-6), var a = a implies that there are no search costs 
n 
or production inefficiencies, while the monopoly markup for n firms = ---iT, n-
which is a declining function in n. 
As outlined in Section 7.1, entry has two opposing effects on competi-
tiveness in a market; market-share is reduced, but so is the incentive for 
consumers to search. By this is meant the ex-ante incentive to search at the 
existing prices. For a given distribution of prices lower than the latest one 
sampled by a consumer, the probability of sampling one of these prices is 
reduced the greater is the number of firms, and so the marginal benefit of 
taking another quotation is lower. Theorem 7-1 shows that when firms are 
identical, the effect of reduced market share dominates. When there is price 
dispersion, however, so that consumers do search, the search effect becomes 
more important. This is demonstrated by the next theorem. The delta, ~, is 
used to indicate the difference in a variable as a result of entry. So ~CC = 
Theorem 7-2: 
When there is price dispersion, the entry of an additional firm will: 
o 
a) reduce consumer costs if and only if the entrant's production cost is 
less than some critical value-Leo there exists a: such that ~CC ~ a as 
< c a a· 
e > e' 
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b) reduce social costs if and only if the entrant's production cost is less 
s 
than some critical value below the market average--i.e. there exists a < 
e 
n-l < < s 
ex: such that flSC )' 0 as ae )' ae ; 
c) always benefit consumers if there is an increase in efficiency--i.e. 
flSC < 0 ~ flCC < 0; 
d) cause a greater increase in consumer and social costs, the greater is the 
existing amount of price dispersion-- i. e. 
aflCC > o and aflSC > o· avar p avar p , 
e) increase the range and variance of existing firms' prices. 
Proof: 
The proof to this theorem, which involves predictable algebraic manipu-
lation of equations (7-3-7) and (7-3-8), has no economic content and so is 
relegated to Appendix D. 
o 
The fifth result in Theorem 7-2 represents the effect of entry on search 
isolated from that on market-share. By reducing the ex ante incentive to 
search, entry results in a shift in relative market share from the lower to 
higher priced firms of those already in the market, as well as an absolute 
shift to the entrant. The increased dispersion of existing prices results from 
the shift in relative market-share, and mitigates in part the ex post 
incentive to search. 
7.4 Arbitrage. 
Now let one of the n firms be an arbitrager, denoted by subscript a, who, 
instead of producing the good, buys from one firm and sells to consumers at a 
higher price. It is assumed that the arbitrager can only buy from the lowest 
cost firm
6 
and that he has an additional constant marginal cost a in selling 
a 
6 
In an earlier version of this chapter, I assumed that the arbitrager 
purchases from the lowest priced firm. The less intuitive assumption of 
purchasing from the lowest cost firm is used here purely to simplify the 
Chapter 7 131 
the good. The arbitrager is as likely as any other firm to be searched by any 
consumer. The subscripts 1 and n are still used to denote the lowest and 
highest cost non-arbitraging firms respectively even though it will be 
possible that P2 < P1 and Pa > Pn in equilibrium. 
The interest here is in the welfare implications of arbitrage and so the 
wider question of entry is ignored. An arbitrage equilibrium in defined in the 
same way as a participant equilibrium in Section 7.2, the latter term only 
being used to refer to equilibria without arbitrage. 
Defini tion 7-3: 
* An n-vector of prices p is an "arbitrage equilibrium" if and only if 
a * r . (p .) 
J -J 
v j 
where r~(p .) are the reaction functions 
J -J 
r~(p .) == ar~max{(p.-a.)q.} J -J j J J J 
ra(p ) == ar~:ax{(Pa-aa-P1)qa} a -a 
J;t:a 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are 
aq. 
q. + (p. -a . ) ~ == 0 
J J J Pj 
(7-4-1) 
presentation. When the arbitrager buys from the lowest priced firm there is 
a discontinuity in the demand functions for each firm at the lowest of the 
other firms' prices leading to some very messy existence conditions. Since 
one of these conditions requires that the arbitrager buy from the lowest 
cost firm, the results are exactly the same with both interpretations. The 
example in Section 7.5 is valid for both. 
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(7-4-2) 
This model differs from that of Section 7.2 only in the interaction 
between the arbitrager and the lowest cost firm. As all firms appear identical 
to consumers, the demand functions are the same as in (7-2-3) with the 
exception that the arbitrager's demand is also demand for firm 1. So 
qj == J:!(T+P-p. ) j :;:. 1 nT J 
(7-4-3) 
q1 == n~(T+P-P1 ) +~ (7-4-4) 
Substituting into the first-order conditions gives the reaction 
functions, 
(7-4-5) 
(7-4-6) 
(7-4-7) 
This system of n equations has the solution, shown by substitution back 
into the reaction functions, 
(7-4-8) 
(7-4-9) 
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(7-4-10) 
where ¢ - 21 (n(2n-UT + (n-U
2
(a;a-(X1) - (2n
2
-2n+U(Xa)' 
5n -6n+2 
(7-4-1U 
The average cost a;a is the average for the non-arbitraging firms, 
Again the superscript will be omitted where possible. 
Existence requires positive output for all firms. Conditions are given by 
Proposition 7-5: 
For equations (7-4-8)-(7-4-10) to describe an arbitrage equilibrium it is 
necessary and sufficient that 
a) ¢ > 0 (7-4-12) 
(7-4-13) 
Proof: 
The first-order conditions, (7-4-1) and (7-4-2), guarantee that outputs 
(and hence profits) are positive if the markups on marginal costs are 
positive. That is, 
iff 
iff 
(p. -(X.) > 0 
J J 
From (7-4-9) and (7-4-10), ¢ is just the unit profit of arbitrage 
A.. = (p -(X -p ) 
'f' a a l' 
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so I/> > 0 # q > 0 a 
and from (7-4-10) 
so 
(p -a ) = --1--((3n-Z)1/> + naa) 1 1 n-Z 
This has the interpretation that, if arbitrage is profitable, selling to 
the arbitrager must be profitable. 
From (7-4-8), 
(7-4-14) 
so (p -a ) > 0 iff (7-4-13) holds. By assumption, 
n n 
a ~ a. \j j:;e1, a 
n J 
so from (7-4-14), 
(p -a ) > 0 ~ (p.-a.) > 0 \j j * 1,a. 
n n J J 
In the non-arbitrage case, firms benefit from other firms having high 
o 
costs and can only participate if their own costs are not too far in excess of 
the market average relative to search costs. Similar results are found here. 
For the arbitrager, from (7-4-11), a higher spread of search costs, T, implies 
that participation can be sustained with higher relative costs, but that it 
suffers from high costs in its supplying firm. For the firms not involved in 
arbitrage, using (7-4-11) to substitute out I/> in (7-4-14), 
(p .-a.) > 0 
J J 
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iff n(2n-1) (n-1) (Sn-2)T + (n-1) (n-2) (2n-1)aa - n(n-2) (Sn2 -6n+2) (a-a
1 
) 
Again, higher search costs imply that participation can be sustained with 
higher relative costs. The additional terms, aa and (a-a
1
), have opposite 
signs from (7-4-11) indicating the competition from the arbitrager. 
In considering the welfare implications of arbitrage, the comparison 
between an n-firm arbitrage equilibrium and the corresponding (n-1)-firm 
participant equilibrium is of particular interest; that is, the effect of 
introducing an arbitrager into a market with n-1 firms. 
As in Section 7.3, the effect of entry rather than whether entry will 
occur is being considered, so it is assumed that the existence conditions, 
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(7-2-7) and (7-4-12) - (7-4-13), hold where appropriate, and that there are at 
least two non-arbitraging firms so that prices are bounded. 
The impact on prices can be easily stated. Using superscripts n-1 and a 
to distinguish between variables from the equilibria before and after the 
entry of the arbitrager, 
(from substituting (n-1) for n in equations (7-2-6)) 
2 2 ) + (n-2)(n-1) a
1 
+ (n-1)(n-2) a
j 
(using (7-4-11)), 
Therefore, 
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a n-l 
Pj-Pj 1 ( 2 (n-l) (n-2) (2n-l) (2n-3) (2n-l)(2n -6n+3)T + (3n-2)aa 
3 2 ) + (n-l)(n-2)(a
j
-a
1
) - (2n -10n +9n-2)¢ (7-4-16) 
Equation (7-4-15) confirms the intuitive result that the lowest price 
must rise as a result of arbitrage, but from (7-4-16), all other prices are 
likely to rise as well. Indeed, 
Theorem 7-3: 
The introduction of an arbitrager into a market with price dispersion 
will increase the dispersion in the prices of the firms not selling to the 
arbitrager 
Proof: 
n-l n-l 
Consider two firms i,j * 1,a where a j > a i so that Pj > Pi From 
equation (7-4-16), 
> 0 
o 
The effect on the range of prices that consumers face is ambiguous; it is 
not necessary that Pl < P2 or Pa < Pn and so the firms charging the extreme 
prices may change after the arbitrager enters. It is possible for the perverse 
result to occur that arbitrage increases the range. The example in Section 7.5 
confirms this possibility. 
Theorem 7-3 is a very similar result to Theorem 7-2 e). This suggests 
that it is the increase in the number of firms and the resulting effect on the 
incentive to search at the previous prices that is driving the the price 
movements and not the particular properties of arbitrage. To separate out 
these two effects when considering welfare, Theorem 7-4 considers the effect 
of a firm switching from production to arbitrage while the numbers of firms is 
Chapter 7 137 
kept constant. Theorem 7-5 then combines these results with the effects of 
firm numbers derived in Theorem 7-2 to give the overall effect on welfare of 
the entry of an arbitrager. 
When using the measures CC and SC to describe an arbitrage equilibrium, 
two qualifications to equations (7-3-2) and (7-3-3) are needed. First, the 
total cost of production of one unit sold by the arbitrager is (aa+a
1
) so this 
is used in place of a ; and second, to avoid double counting, the market-share 
a 
weight w
1 
is calculated from firm l's sales to consumers only and not from 
those to the arbitrager. 
The firm switching to arbitrage will be denoted by the subscript e to 
facilitate comparison with Theorem 7-2. The results of this switch will 
obviously depend on how the firm's cost as a producer, a , compares to its 
e 
cost as an arbitrager a . It is assumed that the overall marginal cost to the 
a 
economy is kept constant, i.e. a =a +a
1
. This means that social costs would be 
e a 
unchanged if firms did not change their prices. The changes in welfare that 
result from the switch to arbitrage can then be attributed entirely to the 
market properties of arbitrage and not to the technology. 
Theorem 7-4: 
The switch of a firm e from production to arbitrage when a =a -a
1 
will: 
a e 
a) cause a rise in all prices and hence reduce consumer welfare; 
b) increase social welfare if and only the switching firm's cost is greater 
than some critical value above the average of the other firms-i.e. there 
exists aa > aa such that 6SC ~ 0 
e < 
Proof: 
< as a a. 
e 
The formal proofs of Theorems 7-4 and 7-5 are left for Appendix D but an 
intuitive sketch is given here. 
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The lowest cost firm's price increases because of the added demand of the 
arbitrager, as will the price of the firm switching to arbitrage because it 
has the cost of firm l's markup in addition to a
1
+aa' The prices of all other 
firms rise as the cross-price effects from PI and Pa cause their demand to 
increase. Consumers choose their actions to minimize consumer costs. An 
increase in all prices must increase consumer costs even if the search cost 
component of the measure is reduced. 
The ambiguous effect on social welfare arises because the transfer of 
demand away from a firm switching to arbitrage may be socially beneficial if 
that firm is an inefficient producer. 
Theorem 7-5: 
The addition of an arbitrager into a market will 
a) always reduce consumer welfare; 
b) reduce social welfare except possibly for very Iowa - 1. e. if there is 
a 
any value for a where arbitrage increases social welfare given T and 
a 
s <, < s 
Ox-al ), then there exists aa < (a-~) such that ll.SC >= 0 as aa >' ~ . 
The intuition underlying the reduction in consumer welfare is in the 
relative importance of the two entry effects when there is arbitrage. The 
entry of a firm as an arbitrager allows all firms to benefit from the steep-
ening of demand curves. The opposing effect of reduced market share is mini-
mized, however, as the high Pa resulting from the arbitrager having PI not a l 
as a cost results in low demand for the additional firm. In this way, 
D 
arbitrage provides a market structure which results in some of the gains from 
collusive behaviour being realized by non-cooperative firms. The arbitrage of 
this model is similar to the effect of firm I setting up a second outlet to 
nearly double the probability of being searched by any consumer. 
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Although it is possible to generate examples where introducing arbitrage 
increases social welfare, they require extreme values of parameters and, 
although it is not clear why, at least six firms including the arbitrager. The 
result that arbitrage will generally reduce efficiency even if costless (i.e. 
if a =0) is contrary to the intuition on arbitrage. As suggested in the 
a 
Section 7.1, this is largely because, by adding an extra firm, arbitrage 
creates more inefficiency than it eliminates. For instance, it could be profi-
table for an arbitrager to enter a market where there is no ex-ante price 
dispersion at all. This can be seen from equation (7-4-11). If all the non-
arbitraging firms have the same costs (so that a-a
1 
= 0), the profitability 
condition for arbitrage (¢ > 0) can still hold. 
The activity of the arbitrager who enters a market characterized by a 
single price is still arbitrage in the sense that it is enabling consumers to 
buy indirectly from an efficient firm when it is too costly for them to search 
enough to do so directly. It is only because of the presence of the 
arbitrager, however, that search is necessary at all. In this case the 
arbitrager's profit comes from arbitraging away some of the noise that it 
itself has created! 
7.5 A Numerical Example. 
To illustrate the results of the preceding sections, examples of three 
equilibria are given in this section: 
a) A Z-firm participant equilibrium; 
b) the corresponding 3-firm participant equilibrium with a = a; 
e 
c) the corresponding 3-firm arbitrage equilibrium with aa = a
e
-a1 . 
a) Let n=Z, T=1.Z5, a
1
=l, a
Z
=5 
then P1 = 4.833 
var a = 4.0 
Pz = 6.167 
var p = 0.444 
p = 5.5 
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then Pl = 4.075 P2 = 5.675 
var a = 2.667 var p = 0.427 
c) n=3, T=1.25, a
1
=1, a
2
=5, a =2 a· 
then Pl = 7.181 P2 = 7.534 Pa 
var p = 0.781 
= 
P = -p = 4.875 e 
9.207 P = 7.974 
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In all cases, existence is shown by the equilibrium prices exceeding 
marginal cost. 
Note that the range of prices facing the consumer has widened in Example 
c) compared to Example a), confirming the possibility suggested in Section 
7.4. 
The search, production, markup, consumer, and social costs of each 
equilibrium are given in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
search 
0.1778 
0.1707 
0.3123 
production 
0.9333 
1.1467 
1. 8115 
markup 
3.2111 
2.3870 
4.5381 
cc 
4.3222 
3.7044 
6.6619 
SC 
1. 1111 
1. 3173 
2. 1238 
The 3-firm non-arbitrage equilibrium is better for the consumer than the 
2-firm although Pareto-inferior to it, while the arbitrage equilibrium is 
inferior to both by all criteria. 
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7.6 Concluding Remarks. 
This chapter has demonstrated some counter-intuitive results from 
changing firm numbers and introducing arbitrage in an equilibrium-search 
model. Particularly surprising is the negative effect of arbitrage on consumer 
welfare and efficiency even when the effect from changing the number of firms 
is abstracted out, as in Theorem 7-4. The key to this result is the strong 
assumption that, to consumers, the arbitrager appears identical to the other 
firms. The monopoly power of firms exists because they are differentiated due 
to the search costs of consumers. Since the arbitrager also has to be searched 
by consumers, he does not reduce this transaction cost. The analogy with other 
classes of differentiated products models is interesting. In a model of loca-
tional separation, for instance, the analogous dealer would be one who located 
himself no closer to consumers than existing firms. Again, by not reducing the 
transactions costs of consumers, such a dealer would not increase the effic-
iency in the market. Unlike the present case, however, the dealer would not 
make a profit or reduce the efficiency. 
Although the assumption that the arbitrager is no more likely to be 
searched than other firms is perhaps unrealistic, it does illustrate very 
strongly the difference between models where firms are differentiated by an 
exogenous characteristic and equilibrium search models where the differenti-
ation is endogenous. It is true, however, that arbitrage will more readily 
perform its function of increasing the gains from trade and hence be more 
profitable in market structures where the arbitragers are more likely to be 
searched by consumers. Arbitrage is therefore more likely to be present where 
there are such structures. Retailing, where a small number of chains deal with 
large numbers of manufacturers and consumers deal only with the retailers, 
fits readily into this interpretation. 
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The material of Chapter 6 gives a second limitation on the extent to 
which the model can be used to explain particular market structures: The 
results depend on the very strong assumption of rational expectations. 
However, although the counter-intuitive results presented here would not apply 
if rational expectations was assumed, the substantive point these results are 
used to highlight would. That point is that there is an important difference 
between search-based and non-search-based product-differentiation models; 
namely, that the differentiation in the former is endogenous. 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1 Summary. 
Although this thesis has been about equilibrium search, only one of the 
five main chapters modeled equilibrium directly. Rather than building up 
specific equilibrium models, the emphasis has been on investigating thoroughly 
the relationship between the assumptions made about how consumers search and 
the properties of equilibrium. 
The link between search and equilibrium is the demand functions facing 
firms. Chapter 3 presented a method of deriving demand functions when 
consumers use FSS search. An important feature of this method is that demand 
is expressed as a function of the parameters that describe the consumers' 
sampling strategy. If these demand functions are used in an equilibrium model, 
the effect on equilibrium of changes in assumptions about search can be eas~ly 
analysed by adjusting these parameters. 
In models of oligopolistic equilibrium, it is usually assumed that demand 
functions are continuously differentiable. An implication of the approach of 
Chapter 3 is that, if there are a finite number of firms (but more than two), 
each firm's demand function will be discontinuous at the other firms prices. 
This makes it likely that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists with those 
demand functions. In Chapter 2, it was shown that few search models will 
produce continuously differentiable demand functions. An exception is the 
standard model of sequential search, which can be easily made to produce 
demand functions with the desired property. To do so, however, requires that 
the search problem is stationary. One condition that is required for station-
arity is that sampling be with-replacement. In Chapter 4, it was shown that 
when there is a finite number of firms, the demand functions will be non-
differentiable if without-replacement sequential sampling is assumed. 
The implications of non-stationarity were developed further in Chapters 5 
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and 6'which considered adaptive sequential search. Two main results about 
equilibrium came from these chapters. The first was that many results of 
equilibrium-search models only apply if consumers are assumed to have rational 
expectations about the price distribution. The second was that it can be 
better to model search in equilibrium using fixed-sample-size search, even in 
situations where it is optimal for consumers to search sequentially. This is 
because only simple, non-adaptive models are used in equilibrium; FSS search 
captures more of the equilibrium properties of adaptive search than does the 
basic sequential model. 
A conclusion of Part B, then, is that non-rational-expectations, without-
replacement, FSS search is an appropriate search model to use in equilibrium. 
The equilibrium model of Chapter 7, however, used rational-expectations, 
with-replacement, sequential search. The differentiable demand functions that 
resulted produced robust equilibria which were able to handle the comparative 
static analysis performed there. These results were interesting, particularly 
the conclusion that, in a market where there is inefficiency due to imperfect 
information, the introduction of a specialist dealer in information can lower 
the efficiency further. The previous chapters, however, show that the assump-
tions used are very special and crucial to the results. To complete the work 
of those chapters, ways of incorporating FSS search and non-rational-
expectations search into equilibrium with a finite number of firms need to be 
found. Two ways are suggested in the final section. 
8.2 Suggestions for Further research. 
The reason that it is difficult to find pure-strategy equilibria in 
models using FSS search or non-stationary sequential search is because firms 
are assumed to be be selling a homogeneous product. Discontinuities in the 
demand functions result from the fact that all consumers who have sampled any 
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two firms are indifferent between them except in price. An alternative would 
to introduce search into a model of product differentiation such as Lancaster 
(1966). There, atomistic consumers vary continuously in their preferences over 
similar goods, and so price-setting firms face continuous downward-sloping 
demand, even when consumers have perfect information. If search was introduced 
to this model, the more firms that consumers sampled, the closer the substi-
tutes they will find for the product of any particular firm. Search would then 
affect the elasticity of each firm's demand and the resulting search equi-
librium could be compared to the equilibrium without search, rather than to 
perfect competition. 
An alternative to the assumption of rational expectations would be to 
model reputation with search in a dynamic setting. Consumers would use 
previous experience to decide which firms to sample, and firms would then 
consider how this period's price would affect next period's search. It may be 
that such a model would converge to a form of rational expectations in a 
steady state. 
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ApPENDIX A: PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 3 
Proof of Lemma 3-1. 
We have to show that a necessary and sufficient condition for F to 
a 
stochastically dominate Fb is 
J 
L p (x . ) . (f (x.) - f b (x . ») > 0 
j=l J a J J 
(A-I) 
for all monotonic increasing functions p. By multiplying through by -1, the 
proof will obviously follow for monotonic decreasing functions when the 
inequality in (A-i) is reversed. 
Sufficient Condition. 
Fa fails to stochastically dominate Fb if either 
a) F (x.) 
a J 
'r/ x., or 
J 
b) F (x.) 
a J 
for some x .. 
J 
It is sufficient to show that if either a) or b) are true, then the inequality 
in (A-I) will not hold for all monotonic increasing functions p. 
'r/ j then 
J 
L p(x.)· (f (x .)-fb(x .») 
. 1 J a J J J= 
() 
so (A-i) does not hold. 
b) Assume there exists k such that Fa(xk ) > Fb(xk ). We need to find one 
monotonic increasing function p such that (A-i) does not hold. 
Let p(x .) 
J 
if j ~ k 
if j > k 
152 Appendices 
with Pl < Pz 
Then 
j 
L p(x.)· (f (X.)-fb(X.)) 
j=l J a J J 
violating (Al). 
Necessary Condition. 
j j 
LP(x.)·f (x.) 
j=l J a J 
= p(xj ) L f (x.) j=l a J 
j-l 
- (P(Xj)-P(Xj-l))jElfa(Xj) 
j-Z 
- (P(Xj-l)-P(Xj-z))jElfa(Xj) 
j-l 
= p(xj).F (xj ) - L (P(X. l)-P(X.)).F (x.) a j=l J+ J a J 
so 
j 
L P (x . ) (f (x.) -f b (x . )) 
j=l J a J J 
j 
= - L (p (x. 1) -P (X.)) (F (x.) -F
b 
(X.)) 
. 1 J+ J a J J J= 
> 0 \:j j 
and p(x.) is monotonic increasing. 
J 
This completes the proof for the case where f is discrete. When P and 
F are defined over the continuous domain [xl,xj ] the proof of the sufficient 
condition is essentially unchanged, while the limit form of the necessity 
proof is 
Appendix A 
(integrating by parts) 
= - [J dp. (F (x)-F (X)) 
dx a b 
xl 
> 0 
Proof of Proposition 3-3. 
To lighten the notation we write 
v (n) -
m 
J 
L V(P.,p,w-(n-1)c,n)·g (p.) 
j=l J m J 
\;/ x. 
so V (n) = V . This notation allows us to separate the benefit of search 
n n 
(increases in m) from the costs (increases in n). 
By Assumption 3-2, 
= 0, 
so V (n-1) - V (n) ~ V (n) - V (n+1) 
n n n n 
V (n-1) + V (n+1) ~ 2V (n) 
n n n 
V is a decreasing function in p, so from Assumption 3-1 and Lemma 3-1. 
V (n+1) - V 1(n+1) > V 1(n+1) - V (n+1) n n- n+ n 
Now by Assumption 3-2, 
a 
153 
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(A-3) 
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which implies that V (n-l) - V (n+l) is a non-increasing function in p, so 
n n 
from Assumption 3-1 and Lemma 3-1, 
Substitution of (A-4) into (A-3) gives 
V (n-l) - V (n-1) > V l(n+l) - V (n+l) n n-1 n+ n 
which, from (A-2), implies 
V (n) - V (n-l) > V l(n+l) - V (n) n n-l n+ n 
f:J.V > f:J.V l' n n+ 
Therefore there are diminishing returns to search, with 
To show that there exists a monotonic decreasing function C, it is also 
necessary to show that 
< 
Now = 
< 
o. 
av (n) 
n 
(n-l) . -a.,..-oro--
av (n) 
n 
av l(n+l) n+ 
- n' ar 
av 1(n+1) n+ 
n'---:::a-=1- - n' a1 
(A-4) 
(A-5) 
Appendix A 
< 
av l(n) n+ 
n° ar 
av 1(n+1) n+ 
- n° ar 
(from Assumptions 3-1 and 3-2 (b), and. Lemma 3-1). 
Finally, from Assumptions 3-2 (a) and (e), 
a 2v a~ (~~ I l) a 2v > 0, = - c-alan ar2 
so, from (A-6) , 
af1V n 
ac < o. 
155 
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ApPENDIX B: PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 4 
Proof of Proposition 4-3. 
The proof is the counterpart to that for Proposition 4-1. We want to show 
that Z(s,p.) is non-decreasing in p .. 
J J 
a) From (4-2-1), 
= 
Now S(l,Pl) ~ S(1,P2) 
(from Assumption 4-1 (b)), 
This gives the induction base. 
b) Assume that Z(s-l,p.) is non-decreasing in p .. 
J J 
Then U(s-l,p. 1) - V(s-l,p. ·1) ~ U(s-l,p.) - V(s-l,p.) 
J+ J+ J J 
(B-1) 
From (4-2-1), 
Z(s,p. 1) - Z(s,p.) = 
J+ J [
s- j 
-U(s-l,P'l) 
S J+ 
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~ S-j(U(S-l,P. l)-U(s-l,p.) + V(s-l,p.)-V(s-l,p. 1)) + (S(S,P.)-S(S,P. 1)) 
s J+ J J J+ J J+ 
(from Assumption 4-1 a)). 
So, from equation (B-1) and Assumption 4-1 (b), 
Z(s,p. 1) - Z(s,p.) ~ O. 
J+ J 
This completes the induction step: The proposition holds for s-l, so it holds 
for s. 
o 
Proof of Proposition 4-4. 
Following the procedure of the proof of Proposition 4-2, let Pk be the 
reservation price at (s-l) so Z(s-l,Pk) ~ O. The proposition will be proved by 
showing that Z(s,Pk) ~ o. 
Now 
and 
s-k+1 1k-1 
Z(s-l,Pk) = ---s---U(s-2,Pk) + - L U(s-2,p.) 
si=l 1 
k-1 
- S(S~1)i~1(U(S-2'Pk)-U(S-2'Pi)) - S(s-l,Pk) - V(s-l,Pk) 
so, 
Z(s-l.Pk) - Z(s.Pk ) " s-~+1[U(S-2'Pk)-V(S-1.Pk)1 + ~:E:[U(S-2'Pi)-V(S-1.Pi)1 
k-1 
- S(;-1)i~1(U(S-2'Pk)-U(S-2'Pi)) 
+ (V(S,Pk)-V(S-l,Pk)) + (S(S,Pk )-S(S-l,Pk )) 
Appendix B 
(from Assumption 4-2 (b)), 
and 
k-1 S-~+1(U(S-2'Pk-V(S-1'Pk)) + ~ L (U(S-2,P.)-V(S-1,P.)) + (V(S,Pk)-V(S-l,Pk)) 
si=l 1 1 
(by the definition of U(s-2,p.)) 
J 
(from Assumption 4-2 (c)) 
which is positive from Assumption 4-2 (a). 
Derivation of C(s,p.). 
J 
The following lemma will be used in the derivation. 
Lemma B-1: 
= 
(s+ j)! 
(s-2)! U+2) 
v j, V s~2 
Proof: 
The proof is by induction. Clearly the lemma holds for s=2. Assume 
159 
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that it holds for s, then 
I: (k+ j)! 
k=1 (k-1)! 
= 
= 
= 
(s+ j)! 
(s-2)! U+2) 
(s+j)! + (s+j)! 
'"( -s --'2=-)"!--';(;'-j'-+~2--) ( s -1) ! 
(s+j)! (s-1) 
(s-1)! U+2) 
(s+j+1) 
(s-1)! U+2) 
+ (s+j)! U+2) 
(s-1)! U+2) 
From equations (4-3-1) and (4-3-2), 
. { s- j+1 1 j-1 
A(s,p.) = mIn p .,--A(s-1,p.) + - L A(s-1,p.) 
J J s J si=1 I 
Appendices 
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(B-2) 
If Z(s,p.) < 0 so that search continues at (s,p.), then Proposition 4-2 
J J 
implies that it continues at all (t,p.) t > s. The second argument of (B-2) 
J 
can therefore be expanded out until there are no A(t,p.) terms left: 
J 
j-1 . 
s-j+1 1 
--A(s-1,p.) + - L A(s-1,p.) + c 
s J si=1 I 
=s-f+
2
[((S-j+1)!/(k-1)!)C + (S-j+1)!/(k-1)!j~1A(k+'_3 )j 
k=1 s!/(k+j-2)! s!/(k+j-3)! i~1 J ,Pi 
Appendix B 
( . 1),s-j+2(k ·3),j-l 
= ~(s+l)c + S-J7 . L (~J~),. L A(k+j-3,p.) 
J s. k=l -. i=l 1 
(using Lemma B-1. ) 
Equation (B-2) can then be re-expressed 
A(s,p.) 
J 
(s- j) ! . {( s! ) , mln (_ . )' p. , s. s J. J (
(s+1)! ) 
(s-j)!j c 
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(B-3) 
j-1 s-j+2(k+j_3)! . } 
+ (s-j+l) L k~-l (k-1)! A(k+J-3,Pi) (B-4) 
i=l 
Taking the last part of equation (B-4), 
. 1 ·+2 
J- s-J (k+j-3)! . 
L k~-l (k-1)! A(k+J-3,Pi) 
h=l 
(B-5) 
Let x. be the image reservation price for p .. That is, let x. be the lowest 
J J J 
s such that search terminates at (s,p.). Then, 
J 
A(k+j-3,p. 1) = p. 1 V k > x. 1-j +2 
J- J- J-
and for all k ~ x. 1-j+2, A(k+j-3,p. 1) can be expanded out as in (B-3) 
J- J-
substituting (k+j-3) for s, and (j-1) for j. Therefore the second term of 
equation (B-5) can be re-expressed, 
·+2 
_ s-J (Ck+ j -3)!) 
- L. (k-1)! Pj-1 
k=x. 1-J+3 
J-
+ J-~ (k+ j-3)! 
k=l (k-1)! [
x. - j+2 J 
[(
k+ j -2) (k-1)! [k (h+j-4)! j-2 . lJ 
x ~ c + Ck+j-3)! hEl (h-1)! iE
1
A(h+J -4,Pi) 
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_ s-j+Z ((k+j -3)!) 
- L. (k-1)! Pj-1 
k=x. -J+3 
J-1 . 
x. -j+Z 
J-1 ((k+ j-Z) ! ) 
+ k~l (k-1)! (j-1) c 
The first term of equation (B-S) can be written, 
= 
[ 
'+3 1 . Z x. 1-J J- J- . L L (k+J-4)! ~k-1)A(k+j-4,P.) 
i=l k=l (k-1). 1 
j-Z[ s-j+Z (k+j-3)! . 1 +.L L. (k-1)! A(k+J-3,P i ) 
1=1 k=x. -J+3 
J-1 
Proposition 4-1 and the definition of x. imply that 
J 
so that 
V t ~ x., i ~ j. 
J 
V k ~ x. 1-j+3, i ~ j-1 
J-
so p. can be substituted for A(k+j-3,p.) in the last term of (B-7). 
1 1 
Adding (B-7) to (B-6), (B-S) can be reexpressed, 
= j-1[ s-j+Z ((k+
j -3)!) 11 
+ L L (k 1) I p. 
'lk '3 -.1 1= =x. -J+ 
J-1 
(B-6) 
(B-7) 
Appendix B 
Now 
so using Lemma B-1 to reexpress the coefficients on c and Pi 
. j- j-
[[
(x. 1+1)! (x. 1-j +2 )) 
(s-j+1) (x
j
_
1
- j +2)!j(j-1) c 
The numerator and denominator are multiplied by x. 1-j+2 in the 
j-
coefficients for c and Pi to keep the expression defined when x j _1 = j-2. 
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(B-8) 
Equation (B-8) is the last term of (B-4) expanded out to eliminate the 
A(s-l,p.) term. The last term of (B-8) can be iteratively expanded in a 
1 
similar way (extending the coefficient (s-j+1)' (x. 1-j+2) ... with each 
j-
iteration) so that, from (B-4), 
where by definition 
(B-9) 
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Now, 
x j - s, xl - 0; and i-l :5: x. :5: x. 1 1 1+ 
1 < i < j. 
C (s,p.) is defined so that the two terms in the min function of 
x J 
(B-9) are equal. Collecting terms and rearranging gives 
C(s,p.) 
J 
N(p .) 
= J 
D(p .) 
J 
j > 1 
with N(p.) and D(p.) as defined in equations (4-4-5) and (4-4-6) 
J J 
Proof of Proposition 4-5. 
If p.=p. l' then x.=x. l=s in the definition of C(s,p. 1). Therefore, 
J J+ J J+ J+ 
from (4-4-6), 
= 
( 1)' j [ j ] (x.+1)! (x.-i+1) s+ . 1 1 
(s-j-1)! U+1)+.Ll kTI . (xk+1-k) (x .. +1)! iCi+1) 1= =1 1-1 
(s+l)! 
(s- j-1)! j 
(s+1)! ()j-1[j-l ](X.+1)!(X.-i+1) 
(s-j-l)!j(j+1) + S-j.L TI. (xk+1-k) (x~ .+l)!~(i+l) 1=1 k=l 1-1 
( 
.)(s+1)!(S-j+1) 
+ s-J (s-j+l)!j(j+l) 
o 
( .)(s+1)! = s-J ( .)'. s-J .J 
(s+1)! ()j-l[j-l ](X.+1)!(X.-i+1) 
(s-j-l)!j(j+l) + s-j.L TI. (xk+1-k) (x~ .+1)!~(i+l) 
1=1 k=l 1-1 
= (s-j)D(p.) 
J 
and, from (4-4-5), 
(s+1) ! 
+ '( -s--J-;-. -:-l'""""')"!-cj"(---:;j:-+-=-1) 
Appendix B 
so 
= 
= (s-j) ·N(p.) 
J 
(s-j)N(p.) 
J 
(s-j)D(p.) 
J 
= C(s,p.) 
J 
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ApPENDIX C: PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 5 
Derivation of p(xnlx). 
Let Pnt(p) be the density function of the minimum price sampled after n 
quotations when x is known and let Pnh(pIPnt) be the density function of the 
maximum price conditional on both x and the sample minimum Pnt. Then 
(C-l) 
In a sample of size n, the probability that any given price exceeds some 
value pi is 
a+x-pl 
5{ a < pI < a + x 
where a is the infimum of the price support. The probability that all n prices 
do is 
So 
giving 
(a+@-p/r a < pi < a + 
Pr (pnt~pl ) 1 - (a+@-p/r 
= ~x (a+x~-p) n-l Pnt(p) " 
A 
X 
(C-2) 
Given Pnt' the probability that all the remaining (n-I) prices do not 
exceed some value pi is 
[ 
p/-Pnt 
a+x-Pnt r 
168 
giving 
[ 
p/-Pnt 
a+x-Pnt 
Equations (C-2) and (C-3) substituted into (C-1) give 
p(x Ix) 
n I
a+x-xn xn-2 
n(n-1)~ dp 
An 
X 
a 
= n(n-1)~ 1_~xXn n-2 [ ] 
An-l 
X 
Proof of Proposition 5-10 
Appendices 
(C-3) 
a). G (0) follows directly from (5-4-12); lim G (x) = 0 is established by 
n x x n 
applying L'R pital's rule twice. 
b). First, note from equation (5-4-12) that G (x ) > 0 V X E (O,X). For the 
n n 
1 2 
proposition to be false, it is necessary that there exist xn' xn' 
xl < x 2 < x3 , such that 
n n n 
for i E {1,2,3}; 
and G"(Xl) < 0, G"(x2) > 0, G"(X3 ) < O. 
n n n n n n 
where 
Let feR) and g(R) be the numerator and denominator of (5-4-12). From the 
quotient rule for differentiation, 
Let 
( f / g ) II I ( (f / g ) I =0 ) = f"og/-f/og" gog' 
A(R) 
= (f"·g/-f/og") 
6XRn - 4 
Appendix C 
Since g' < 0, it is sufficient to show that there exists RA such that 
and 
A for RE(O,R ) 
A for RE(R ,1). 
It is easily demonstrated that 
i) A(O) > 0, A(1) = O' , 
ii) A' (0) < 0, A' (1) = 0; 
iii) A"(R) = Rn- 4B (R), 
iv) B(1) = 0 and B'(1) < O. 
where 
169 
Since B(R) is a positive cubic, iv), iii), and ii) imply that there exists RB 
such that 
and 
A With i), this implies the existence of R . 
C). Note that 
Let 
aG (x ) 
n n 
ax 
n 
G (x ) 
< n n 
x 
n 
G (RX) 
n C (R) = --;:;:--
R 
We want to show that 
~R(RC(R)) < C(R) 
C' (R) < O. 
aG (XR) 
iff 
n 
aR 
G (XR) 
< n 
R 
B 
V R E (R ,1). 
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Using the quotient rule, 
c' (R) 
n-4 = 6XR (l-R)D(R) 
g(R)2 
where 
1 1 
D(R) = RJ (1_R)3Rn-4dR - (1-R)2J Rn- 3 (1-R)dR 
R R 
Now, D(O) < 0, D(l) = 0, and 
1 1 
D'(R) = J (1_R)3Rn-4dR + Z(l-R)J Rn- 3 (1-R)dR> 0, 
R R 
so D(R) < 0, and hence C' (R) < 0 V R E (0,1). 
d). We want to show that 
1 
J R (1-R) 3Rn-4 dR 
1 
JR(1-R)R
n
-
3
dR 
1 
J R (1-R)R
n
-
2
dR 
1 r (1-R)Rn-3dR 
1 
J R (1-R) 3Rn-3 dR 
1 
J R (1-R)R
n
-
2
dR 
1 
J R (1-R)3Rn-3dR 
1 r (1_R)3Rn-4dR 
We can write the LHS of (C-4) as 
(1-R)Rn- 3ctft 
where ql(R) = --1-------------
JR(1-R' )R,n-3dR, 
and 
> 0 
> 0 
(l-R' ) 3 R, n-4dR , 
Appendices 
(C-4) 
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can both be interpreted as probability density functions. The inequality of 
(C-4) will then hold if qz stochastically dominates q1' From Lemma 3-1, p 36, 
this implies 
A 
- qz (ft) )dft H(A) == J
R 
(q1 (ft) < 0 \;/ i\ E (R, 1). 
Note that 
H(R) = H(1) = 0 (C-5) 
(I-AlA
n
-,[ I A (l_i\)2 1 and H' (i\) = (l-R' )R,n-3dR, J (l-R' )R' n-4dR, 
The bracketed term is a concave function of A so, from (C-5), 
H(A) < 0 \;/ A E (R, 1) 
o 
Proof of Proposition 5-3. 
The proposition is proved with the aid of a series of lemmas. 
Lemma C-1: 
ap (xix) 
a) n n > 0 \;/ X E [x , X] ax n n 
ap (x Ix ) 
b) n n n > O. ax 
n 
Proof: 
Let p(xlx ) be the probability distribution of x 1 conditional on n n+ 
x and x. So 
n 
p (xix) = J p (xix )·p(xlx )dx n n n n n (C-6) 
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Now 
p < Pnl 
Pnl ~ P ~ Pnh 
Pnh < P 
p(xlx ) is then a mixed distribution, calculated from (5-4-9), 
n 
= { 
2(x-x) 
x > x > (a density function) ~(~-x ) x 
p(xlx ) n n n x n x > x (a probability mass) .,.,-- = x x n 
x 
(C-7) 
x n Let R - X and Rn = X-. Substituting (C-7) and (5-4-10) into (C-6) gives 
and 
p (xIx) = 
n n 
= 
(t IR 
2L,n 
R 
n 
R XJ1 (1-R')R,n-3dR, 
n R 
n 
(~) R~-2 (1_nRn- 1 + (n-1 )Rn) 
n n 1)Rn- 1J1 (1-R')R,n-3dR, 
R 
n 
J~ (l-R)Rn-2dR 
n p (x Ix ) = ~------
n n n r (l-R' )R' n-3 dR' 
R 
n 
for x < x 
n 
The numerator of equation (C-8) increases in R ; the denominator 
n 
decreases. Part a) of the proposition follows since aR lax > O. 
n n 
To show b), from (C-9), 
ap (x I x ) 
n n n 
ax = J~ (l-R)Rn-3dR 2 
n 
> 0 
(C-8) 
(C-9) 
o 
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Lemma C-2: 
Proof: 
G*(x ) ?: G (x ) 
n n n n V n, 
v X E (O,X) 
n 
Follows from equation (5-4-14) and the definition of ~ . 
n 
Lemma C-3: 
G*(x ) = G (x ) 
n n n n 
Proof: 
We want to show that 
J~ (G:+1 (x)-c)·p(xlxn)dx = a for xn E [xnh,X). 
n 
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o 
Note that p(xlx )=0 for x<x so we only need to show that x ~ ~ for any 
n n n 
X E [xnh,X]. The proof is by induction. 
a) By definition, 
(as only one firm remains to be searched) 
b) Assume that 
From Proposition 5-1, 
G l(x) < G (x ) n+ n n n 
so if (C-11) holds, 
v xl?: n+ x . n' 
(C-10) 
(C-11 ) 
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and so 
o 
Lemma C-4: 
For all xn ~ Xnt' the decision to continue search is independent of 
the opportunity for future search. Formally, 
Proof: 
G*(X ) ~ c 
n n > as 
< 
G (x ) => c n n 
The lemma follows for xn E (xnt'xnh ) from Lemma C-2, and for xn E 
[xnh,XJ from Lemma C-3. 
o 
* Lemma C-4 implies that xnh exists and is equal to xnh. Proposition 5-3 b) 
then follows from Proposition 5-2 b) for the upper limit. To complete the 
proof of a), it is sufficient to show that G*(O) = 0, and that, for x E 
n 
* [O,x nJ , G (x ) is an increasing function. Again, the proof is by induction, n<- n n 
a) From (C-10) and Proposition 5-2, Proposition 5-3 a) holds for n=J-1. 
b) Assume that it holds for n+1. The set ~ is then a compact interval, and 
n 
we can rewrite (5-4-14) 
* 
[
(n+1)h 
G*(x ) = G (x ) + (G* 1(x)-c)'p(xlx ) dx n n n n n+ n 
G*(O)=O, 
n 
since, 
* x(n+1 H 
from Proposition 5-1 a), G (0)=0, and from (C-11) 
n 
p (xIO)=O. Let Xl n be the unique value of x such that 
n ~ n 
(C-12) 
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i) G*(x' ) = c· and 
n nt ' 
That is, X~t is the highest value of xn in the range (o,xnh) such that i) 
holds. We want to show that it is the only value. From Proposition 5-1, Lemma 
C-l, and the induction base, G*(x ) is increasing in x for x <x' n. It follows n n n n nL 
that x:t exists and is equal to X~t. 
Finally, note that 
from Proposition 5-1 b); and 
G* l(x )-c > G* 2(x ) n+ n n+ n from the induction base. 
Unfortunately, it is not always the case that p (xix) > p lCxlx) V x>x , so . n n n+ n n 
the natural proof that x:t converges monotonically to x:h does not follow. To 
* * * show that Xnt does converge if x CJ- 1)t < x(J-1)h note from (C-12) that 
from (C-10), 
* x(J-1)t = x(J-1)t 
and from Proposition 5-2 b), 
for 1 < n < J-1. 
It follows that 
for 1 < n < J-l. 
o 
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Proof of Theorem 5-2. 
* * ax f-
) _n_> 0 a. ac 
ax h 
and _n_< 0 
ac follow from the fact that ~*(x* ) > 0 ax n nf- and 
a * * 
.:;...-Ga (x h) < 0 x n n 
as shown by the proof to Proposition 5-3. This implies (from 
equation (C-12)) that ~:(xn) < 0 V xn E (O,x7n+1)h)' strengthening the 
result. 
b). Let ~JG*(x ) be the increase in G*(x ) as a result of increasing the 
n n n n 
number of firms from J to J+1. From (C-10) and (C-12), 
so 
G*(x ) = 
n n 
G (x ) 
n n 
* 
[
(n+1)h 
G (x ) + (G *1(x)-c)'p(x 1x )dx n n n+ n 
* x(n+1H 
* 
* ~ 1G (x ) > 0 n+ n n if [
(n+1)h 
(G* 1(x)-c)'p(x 1x )dx n+ n 
* x(n+1H 
= 0 otherwise; 
and, iterating backwards, 
iff ~JG*(x) > 0 n n V n < J-1. 
> 0 
* It follows from (C-13) and Theorem 5-1 that ~JG (xnf-) > 0 iff 
Finally, since G:(xnh ) = Gn(xnh ), ~JG:(xnh)= O. 
n = J-1 
n < J-1 
J < J* = 
(C-13) 
* n. 
c). To show that search intensity increases with X, it is sufficient to 
V X E (O,X]. First consider the effect of X on G (x ) 
n n n 
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Lemma C-5: 
v X E (O,X). 
Proof: 
axK 
Define x
K 
so that Gn(x
K
) = K. We want to show that ax is negative 
when G (x ) is increasing and positive when G (x ) is decreasing. Let n n n n 
Then, 
(C-14) 
By the implicit function theorem, 
(C-15) 
Now, from (5-4-12), 
so (C-15) into (C-14) gives, 
G(xR ) 
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{ aG(XR
K)I G(XRK)} for G (x ) increasing 
axK 
sgn aR X - RK n n 
and so sgn{ ax } = 
-sgn{ aG(XR
K)I _ G(XRK) } f 
aR X RK or G (x ) decreasing n n 
aG(XR
K)I _ G(XRK) ------ < a follows from Proposition 5-1 a). 
aR X RK 
a * To show that ~n(xn) > 0, note that, from (C-l0), 
* 
(
(n+l)h 
G*(x ) = G (x ) + (G* l(XR)-C)'p(RIR )dR 
n n n n n+ n 
R* 
(n+l)e 
xn+l 
where p (RIR ) is the conditional density function of ----X given by 
n n 
p(RIR ) = Xp (xix ) n n n 
o 
axp (xix ) 
n n 
Now Gn(xn ) is increasing in X by Lemma C-5, and from (C-8), ax = 0, so 
we only need to show that, as X increases, R~t and R~h diverge. 
from substituting G*(XR*n) and G*(XR*h) for G (XRK) in (C-18). 
n n<- n n n 
This follows 
o 
ApPENDIX 0: PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 7 
Derivation of Monopoly/Inefficiency Costs. 
A. Average Total Search Cost (ASE). 
-The average unit search cost of those consumers for whom x
k 
~ x ~ x
k
+
1 
is 
-Their expected number of searches 
where (3 = 
00 ~((3i ) = (1-(3) L 
i=l 
a(3 
00 
= (1-(3)~ L (3i 
a(3i=l 
(1-(3) 1 = 
(1_(3)2 
n 
= k' 
-The proportion of consumers in that group 
Therefore, 
n-k 
n 
T 
2' 
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T 2' the average cost of the first unit of search, is subtracted off as it is 
required whether or not there is price dispersion and so does not represent an 
efficiency loss. 
Using (7-2-1), 
Note that 
and 
and 
so 
n n 
222 L kPk+l = L (k-l)Pk + npn+1, k=l k=l 
n k 
L 2Pk+1 L Pi k=l i=l 
n k 
L 2Pk L p. = k=l i=l 1 
n k-1 
2 L Pk L p. + 2np'Pn+1, k=l i=O 1 
n n k-1 
2 
2 L Pk + 2 L Pk L p., k=l k=l i=l 1 
l(n 2 2 ) ASE = 2nT L Pk + nPn+ 1 - 2np'Pn+1 k=l 
1 (n 2 _2 ) = 2nT L Pk - np + n~ k=l 
T 
2 
(as P 1 - T+p), n+ 
1 
= 2Tvar p. 
In a participant equilibrium, 
T 
2 
Appendix D 
(n-l)2 
var p = ----~var a 
(2n-I)2 
(n-l) 2 
ASE = ------'var a. 
2T(2n-l)2 
B. Average Production Costs And Markups. 
The market-share for firm j, 
I -------.q. 
\,n J 
L.. i =l
q i 
w., is 
J 
Therefore, average excess production costs 
n I ( P-Pj) 
= L - I + -T- a
J
. - aI' 
j=ln 
which in a participant equilibrium 
N (n-I)..2 
= "" + T(2n-l) a 
(n-l) 
= (a-al ) - T(2n_l)var a. 
And average markup 
n 1( P-P.) = L - I + __ J (p. -a .) , 
j=ln T J J 
181 
(D-I) 
(D-2) 
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which in a participant equilibrium 
n(n-l) (n-l) n ~T- _2 2 a + I a. n-l 2 2 j=l J (2n-l) T (2n-l) T 
= ~T + (n-l)n var a. n-1 2 (2n-l) T 
Proof of Theorem 7-2. 
a) From (7-3-7), 
= Can -(
1
) + ~ T 
n-l 
(n-l) 2 n 
----'var a 
2T(2n-l)2 
so flCC = !(a _~-1) 
n e 
1 (n-2)2 n-1 (n-l) 2 n 
-----T + var a - var a 
(n-l) (n-2) 2T(2n-3)2 2T(2n-1)2 
N t th t n 1\,( _n )2 o e a var a = -L a.-a 
so 
n J 
= ~((n-1 )varn - 1a + (a _an- 1 )2 + I: (a. _ct-)2 - [ (a. _<f-1 f) 
e j=l J j=l J 
1 ( n-1 n-1 2 = n (n-l)var a + (a
e 
-a ) 
n-l ( n-1 1 _n-1 2) = - var a + -(a -a ) 
nne 
1 ( -11-1 )2) - - a -a 
n e 
IICC 1 ( _n-1) 
Ll = - a -a 
n e 
3 
__ (n_-_l_) __ (a _if-1)2 _ 
2Tn2(2n-l)2 e 
1 
-----T 
(n-l) (n-2) 
1((n-2)2 (n-l)3) n-1 + - - var a. 
2T (2n-3)2 n(2n-1)2 
(D-3) 
(D-4) 
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and 
m Let a be the supremum of the set of a that give positive output. From 
e e 
equation (7-3-7), 
Equation (D-5) is minimized when a 
e 
aflCC 
= 
1 
n 
(n-i) 
n(2n-i) > O. 
m 
= a 
e 
. Using (D-6) , 
183 
(D-5) 
(D-6) 
flCC is therefore monotonic increasing in a
e
, proving the existence of the 
critical point. (D-6) into (D-4) gives 
= 3n -Sn+3 T + ~ (n-2) _ flCC I (a =am ) 
e e 
2 (  
2 2 2(n-i) (n-2) 2T (2n-3) 
which is strictly positive so that a C < am. 
e e 
b) From equation (7-3-S), 
SCn (an -a
i 
) (n-l) (3n-l) n = - var a, 
2 2T(2n-i) 
(n-l) 3) n-l 
2 var a, 
n(2n-i) 
( _n-l) a -a 
(n-2) (3n-4) (n-l) (3n-l) 
flSC 
e n-l n so + = var a - var a 
n 2T(2n-3) 2 2T(2n-l) 2 
o 
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1 ( _n-1 ) = - a -a 
n e 
(n-l)2(3n-l) ( -11-1)2 
~--~----~ a -a 
2Tn2(2n-l)2 e 
+ ~((n-2)(3n-4) 
2T (2n-3)2 
(n-l)2(3n-l») n-1 - var a (D-7) 
n(2n-l) 
2 
(using (D-3). 
Then, 
8f1SC 1 
= ~ n 
e 
2 
(n-l) (3n-l) ( _n-1 ) ------------ a -a . 
Tn 2 (2n-l ) 2 e 
This is a monotonic increasing function for a < an - 1 
e 
fiSC 1((n-2) (3n-4) (n-l)2(3n-l») n-l -- - var a 
2T 2 2 
(2n-3) n(2n-l) 
while at a 
e 
> O. 
Therefore the result holds for a 
e 
It remains to show that 
_n-1 
a > a 
e 
=} fiSC> O. 
-11-1 
= a 
Note that 82f1SC/8a2 < 0 so that it is sufficient to show that fiSC> 0 at the 
e 
maximum value am. (D-6) into (D-7) gives, 
e 
fiSC/ (a =am ) = 
e e 
T 1((n-2) (3n-4) (n-l)2(3n-l») n-l ------ + 2T 2 - 2 var a, 
2(n-l) (2n-3) n(2n-l) 
1 
which is always positive. 
c) It is sufficient to show that aC > as. From (D-4) and (D-7), 
e e 
2 
A -(n-1) ( _n-l )2 uSC - flCC = a -a + 
Tn(2n-l)2 e 
1 (4n
2
-12n+7) (n-l) n-1 
----------T + var a, 
(n-l) (n-2) (2n-l)2(2n-3)2 T 
which is negative for low and high values of a and positive in-between. 
e 
Let aO be the value of a such that flSC-flCC = 0 with aO < an - 1 
e e e 
o 
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Substituting into (D-7) gives 
l'.SC I (a =ao ) 
e e 
= !(aO_~0-1) _ (3n-l) T 
n e 2n(n-l) (n-2) 
_ [(4n
2
-12n+7)(n-l)(3n-l) + -- - vara 1((n-2) (3n-4) (n-l)2(3n-l))] 
2 2 2nT(2n-l) (2n-3) 2 2 2T (2n-3) n(2n-l) 
1 ( 0 _0-1) (3n-l) T (n-2) 0 = - a -a - - var a < . 
n e 2n(n-l) (n-2) 2nT(2n-3)2 
It then follows from b) of this theorem that a O < as < _0-1 and so from the e e a , 
definition of a;, l'.CCI (a =as ) < O. Therefore, from a of this theorem, 
e e 
d) Follows directly from (D-4), (D-7) and (D-l). 
e) Range: From equation (7-2-6), 
and 
so 
0-1 _0-1 
Variance: p. -p 
J 
n-2 -11-1 
= 2-3 (a. -a ), n- J 
so 0-1 (n-2)2 0-1 var p. = --'----'-'var a . ; 
J (2n-3)2 J 
> O. 
o 
o 
186 
and 
n 1 n n-l _n-l 
p. - -1 \' p. = -2 1 (a .-a ) , J n-.~ J n- J J:;ce 
so the n-firm variance of the existing prices n-1 prices is 
(n-1)2 n-l 
---var a. 
(2n-l)2 J 
n-l > var p .. 
J 
Proof of Theorem 7-4: 
Appendices 
o 
Let the superscript n denote variables from the participant equilibrium, 
and a the arbitrage equilibrium. From (7-2-6), 
n _n T n _n n-l p = +::::---:;-{X + ~. 
j n-l 2n-l 2n-l J 
= ~T + ___ n_[(n-l)aa+ae] + n-l 
n-l 2n-l n 2n-l a j 
= (n_l)~2n_l)((sn2-6n+2)¢ + n(2n-l)aa + n(n-l)a1 + (n-l)2a j ) (D-8) 
(using (7-4-11) to substitute ¢ for T and aa). 
So (D-9) 
CD-l0) 
an 1 (32 ) Pi-Pi = (n-l)(n-2)(2n-l) (n +3n -Sn+2)¢ + n(2n-l)aa > O. CD-ll) 
From (7-3-1), (7-3-2), (7-3-3), 
1 
CC = 2Tvar p + L p.w. - a1 J=l J J 
n 
Appendix D 
=> 
and 
flee 
1 n 
= 2Tflvar p + L fl(p.w.), 
j=l J J 
1 n 
se = 2Tvar p + L a.w. - a l j=l J J 
flse 
n 
1 = 2Tflvar p + L a.flw., 
j=l J J 
(where flee = eea-een etc). 
a n Note that all prices have risen by Pj-P
j
, given by equation (D-9), with 
additional rises in Pa ' Pi' 
187 
CD-12) 
(D-13) 
CD-14) 
CD-iS) 
A constant rise in all prices will affect neither var P nor the weights 
Wj so, with the qualification that P~-Pj has to be added to the value derived 
for flee, the remainder of the derivation will reason as if flP
a 
and flP
l 
were 
the only changes in price. 
The 3 components of (D-12) and (D-13) are calculated in turn. 
1 
A. 2Tflvar p. 
n 
\' 2 _2 nvar P = ~ p. - np , 
j=l J 
so nflvar P 2 + flp 
a 
where Pi' Pe ' p are the initial, participant equilibrium values of these 
variables. 
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Now 
so nlwar p 
and 
n-l ---.Il 
(p -15) = 2-1 (0: -0: ), e n- e 
but 
n 
so (D-17) 
and (D-18) 
(dropping the superscript on aa from this point on). 
Putting (D-14), (D-IS), (D-l7) , (D-18), into (D-16) gives 
1 n-l (3 2 2 2 2 2T~var p = -------------- (lOn -16n +9n-2)¢ + n (3n-4)0: 
2Tn2(n-2) (2n-1)2 a 
C. IMp.w J. 
J J 
So (D-20) 
By (D-2), 
Appendix D 
so from (D-17) and (D-18), 
I 2 ((Sn
2
-6n+2)¢ + n(2n-l)aa) 
(2n-l)n T 
w
n = ----I---2-((Sn2-6n+2)¢ + n2). 
a (2n-1)n T 
Now ~w. = TI(~p-~p.), 
J n J 
I 
so ~w. = -(~p +~PI) 
J n2 T a 
and 
~wI = _I_(~p -(n-I)~PI) 
n2T a 
I (. 3 2 ) = 2 -en -4n +Sn-2)¢ , 
n T(n-2) (2n-l) 
~w = _I_(~p -(n-I)~p ) 
a n2T I a 
Putting (D-14), (D-IS) and (D-21)-(D-2S) into (D-20) gives 
189 
(D-21) 
(D-22) 
(D-23) 
(D-24) 
(D-2S) 
n I (4 3 2 2 2 2_ L ~(p.w.) = 2 (20n -46n +46n -22n+4)¢ + 2n (n-I) (a-al )aa -j=1 J J n T(n-2) (2n-l) 
22 2 432 22 _) n (2n -IOn+6)aa + (2n +20n -32n +18n-4)¢aa + 2(n-l) (4n -Sn+2)¢(a-a
l
) (D-26 ) 
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C. LlX. ./::"w •• 
J J 
(D-23)-(D-25) give 
n 
LlX.·/::"w. = 
j=lJ J 
2 1 ((n-i) (4n2-5n+2) (a-lX.
i 
)</> + n2 (n-i) (a-OJ. )lX.a Tn (n-2) (2n-i) 
- (3n -9n +7n-2)lX. </> - n (n-2)lX. . 3 2 2 2) 
a a 
Adding (D-9), (D-19) and (D-26) gives 
flee = (30n -72n +7in -33n+6)</> 1 (4 3 2 2 
2Tn2(n-2) (2n-i)2 
2 2 2 2 2) + n (14n -14n+4)</>lX.
a 
+ n (n +3n-2)lX.
a 
1 (2 2 ) + (n-i) (n-2) (2n-i) (4n -5n+2)</> + n lX.a > 0, 
proving that consumer costs rise as a result of arbitrage. 
(D-19) added to (D-27) gives 
flSe = (n-i)(10n -16n +9n-2)</> + 2n(4n -5n+2)</>lX. 1 ( 3 2 2 2 
2Tn2(n-2) (2n-i)2 a 
(D-27) 
(D-28) 
+ 2n(n-i) (4n2-5n+2)</> (a-lX.
i 
) + 2n3 (n-i) (a-OJ.)~ - n3 (n-3)lX.
a 
2). (D-29) 
To complete the proof of Theorem 7-4 b), note that if lX. ~ a, then 
e 
lX. ~ (a-lX. ) 
a 1 
and so flSe > O. It follows that lX.a > a. 
e 
8/::,.se < 0 
acx- > a 
as [2n
3
(n-1) (~-al) - 2n3 (n-3)aa + 2n(4n2-Sn+2)¢ 
+ 2n(4n2-sn+2)aa[~~a) + 2(n-l)(10n3-16n2+9n-2)¢[~~a)l < 0 > 
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Now, nSC ~ 0 9 n 3 (n-3)a= > 2n(4n2-5n+2)¢ + 2n3 (n-1) (a-a1 ), and ~! < O. 
a 
Therefore, 
llSC ~ 0 811SC 9 acx:- < O. 
a 
The monotonicity in a (and hence a ) proves the remainder of the result. 
a e 
Proof of Theorem 7-5. 
a) Substituting ¢ and a for (a -a) in (D-4) and adding to (D-28) gives, 
a e 
where A = (2n-3) (n-1)(5n +8n -33n +32n -13n+2)¢ 2( 5 4 3 2 2 
o 
232 
- 2n (2n-1)(n -7n +7n-2)¢T + n (2n-1) (3n -9n+4)T 2 2 2 2) 
2( 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 ) + (2n-3) 2n (n-1)(2n +2n -5n+2)¢aa +n (n-1) (4n -5n+2)aa + 2n (2n-1)Ta
a 
2 4 3 2 n-l 
+ n(n-2) (n-1) (4n -24n +47n -35n+9)var a. 
Note that when n=3, all coefficients are positive, while the first bracketed 
term can be written 
65 4 3 2 22 3 2 (4n +17n -104n +167n -122n +43n-6)¢ + n (2n-1) (n-4)T 
+ ((n
3
-7n
2
+7n-2)¢ - n
2
(2n-1)T)2 
which is always positive for n ~ 4. 
o 
b) Substituting ¢ and a for T and a in (D-7) and (D-29), and adding gives 
a e 
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where 
B = (2n-3) (n-l)(lOn -l6n +9n-2)¢ + 2 ( 3 2 2 
+ 2(n-l) (lOn3 -23n2 +l6n-4)¢a + 
a 
(n-l) (4n3 -8n2 +5n-2)a 2 
a 
+ 2 (6n4-28n3 +37n2 -20n+4)¢(a-a
l 
) - 2(2n4 -9n3 +11n2 -7n+2)aa (a-I:))) 
4 3 2 n-l + n(n-2)(l2n -56n +S5n -49n+9)var a, (D-30) 
so that 
{
8b.SC} sgn acx:-
a 
{ 
332 332 = sgn (n-l) (lOn -23n +l6n-4)¢ + (n-l) (4n -Sn +5n-2)aa 
2 4 3 2 _ \ 
- (n-l) (2n -9n +lln -7n+2) (a-a
l 
) ~. 
) 
(D-3l) 
From the definition of ¢ 
- n(2n-1)T, 
so (D-32) . 
Substituting (D-32) as an equality into (D-3l) gives 
This shows the existence of the critical point provided b.SC < 0 when a =0. 
a 
Finally, substituting aa for (a-a
l
) in (D-30) gives entirely positive co-
e efficients, proving that aa must be below (a-a
l
). 
o 
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